For submodular valuations, a two-agent, eight-good instance exists in which every EF1 allocation is Pareto-dominated, so EF1 and Pareto optimality are incompatible.
Optimal bounds on the price of fairness for indivisible goods
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When One Good Is Not Enough: EF1 and Pareto Optimality Are Not Compatible for Submodular Valuations
For submodular valuations, a two-agent, eight-good instance exists in which every EF1 allocation is Pareto-dominated, so EF1 and Pareto optimality are incompatible.