In committee-based blockchains, the cost of omitting a vote and the cost of delaying a vote are mathematical inverses, so reward systems must balance the two attacks; both Cosmos and Ethereum are shown to be imbalanced.
On Fairness in Committee-based Blockchains
1 Pith paper cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.
1
Pith paper citing it
abstract
Committee-based blockchains are among the most popular alternatives of proof-of-work based blockchains, such as Bitcoin. They provide strong consistency (no fork) under classical assumptions, and avoid using energy-consuming mechanisms to add new blocks in the blockchain. For each block, these blockchains use a committee that executes Byzantine-fault tolerant distributed consensus to decide the next block they will add in the blockchain. Unlike Bitcoin, where there is only one creator per block with high probability, in committee-based blockchain any block is cooperatively created. In order to incentivize committee members to participate to the creation of new blocks rewarding schemes have to be designed. In this paper, we study the fairness of rewarding in committee-based blockchains and we provide necessary and sufficient conditions on the system communication under which it is possible to have a fair reward mechanism.
citation-role summary
background 1
citation-polarity summary
fields
cs.GT 1years
2025 1verdicts
CONDITIONAL 1roles
background 1polarities
background 1representative citing papers
citing papers explorer
-
Balancing incentives in committee-based blockchains
In committee-based blockchains, the cost of omitting a vote and the cost of delaying a vote are mathematical inverses, so reward systems must balance the two attacks; both Cosmos and Ethereum are shown to be imbalanced.