An efficient randomized algorithm approximates max Nash social welfare under additive valuations by e^{1/e} - c for some c > 0 — the first improvement over the 2018 bound of Barman et al.
APX-hardness of maximizing Nash social welfare with indivisible items , url =
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A Better-than-$e^{1/e}$ Approximation Algorithm for Nash Social Welfare under Additive Valuations
An efficient randomized algorithm approximates max Nash social welfare under additive valuations by e^{1/e} - c for some c > 0 — the first improvement over the 2018 bound of Barman et al.