Evaluation blindness, silent measurement failure where monitoring looks healthy while systems fail, is formalized, classified into six production classes, and found in 53% of 36 verifiable public incidents.
From Confident Closing to Silent Failure: Characterizing False Success in LLM Agents
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abstract
LLM agents can fail silently by asserting task completion when the environment state shows otherwise. We study this failure mode, false success, across two agent benchmarks: 9,876 tau2-bench trajectories from 8 model families and 1,879 AppWorld trajectories from 4 model families with text-independent ground truth. False success is common but varies by setting: 45--48% of failures in single-control tau2-bench domains, 3% in dual-control telecom, and 75.8% among AppWorld self-assessing coding-agent trajectories with explicit status claims. LLM judges fail reliably: no configuration across 5 judges, 5 prompt strategies, and full task specifications exceeds AUROC 0.65 on tau2-bench, and the same judges reach only 0.54 AUROC on AppWorld API-call traces. Judges rely on surface completion proxies -- confident closing language in tau2-bench and coarse action-sequence volume in AppWorld -- rather than verified state changes. Lightweight TF-IDF detectors achieve task-disjoint AUROC 0.83 on tau2-bench and 0.95 on AppWorld, recovering 4--8x more false successes than the best judge at the same flag rate with 3,300x lower latency. These results suggest that production monitoring should use lightweight, domain-calibrated detectors as triage signals rather than relying on LLM judges as the primary monitor for false success.
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Evaluation Blindness: How Silent Measurement Failures Corrupt AI Systems from Training to Deployment
Evaluation blindness, silent measurement failure where monitoring looks healthy while systems fail, is formalized, classified into six production classes, and found in 53% of 36 verifiable public incidents.