Introduces and characterizes visibly fair mechanisms that generalize serial dictatorship, gives necessary and sufficient conditions for strategy-proofness, and shows how to satisfy distributional objectives at the cost of reduced preference elicitation.
ψ( ˆmi, m−i)i ≿i ψ(m)i; but state ψ( ˆmi, m−i)i is not available to officer i under m
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Visibly Fair Mechanisms
Introduces and characterizes visibly fair mechanisms that generalize serial dictatorship, gives necessary and sufficient conditions for strategy-proofness, and shows how to satisfy distributional objectives at the cost of reduced preference elicitation.