In the coordination-II payoff ordering (1 > 0 > S > T), a population of one-shot sampling players (PR(1)) is an evolutionarily stable strategy that resists invasion by fully von Neumann-Morgenstern rational mutants, making bounded rationality the evolutionarily stable basis of cooperation.
Now, since A corresponds to coordination-II game, we havea > d, b = c and a > b; consequently, PR is ESSN for any finite population
1 Pith paper cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.
1
Pith paper citing it
fields
physics.soc-ph 1years
2025 1verdicts
CONDITIONAL 1representative citing papers
citing papers explorer
-
Coordinating cooperation in stag-hunt game: Emergence of evolutionarily stable procedural rationality
In the coordination-II payoff ordering (1 > 0 > S > T), a population of one-shot sampling players (PR(1)) is an evolutionarily stable strategy that resists invasion by fully von Neumann-Morgenstern rational mutants, making bounded rationality the evolutionarily stable basis of cooperation.