Context-ordinal Nash equilibria are defined via social choice aggregation of ordinal preferences, shown to exist under mild conditions, with regularization, approximation, regret notions, complexity results, and learning rules developed.
No-regret learning in harmonic games: Extrapolation in the face of conflicting interests.Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, 37:123637–123674
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Nash without Numbers: A Social Choice Approach to Mixed Equilibria in Context-Ordinal Games
Context-ordinal Nash equilibria are defined via social choice aggregation of ordinal preferences, shown to exist under mild conditions, with regularization, approximation, regret notions, complexity results, and learning rules developed.