Maximal EF1 allocations exist for two agents under monotone valuations on any conflict graph and are computable in polynomial time for several cases, but fail to exist for three agents even with identical monotone valuations and are NP-hard to decide; EF[1,1] maximal allocations exist for identical非
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Fair Allocation under Conflict Constraints
Maximal EF1 allocations exist for two agents under monotone valuations on any conflict graph and are computable in polynomial time for several cases, but fail to exist for three agents even with identical monotone valuations and are NP-hard to decide; EF[1,1] maximal allocations exist for identical非