Formulates mixed-autonomy routing as a variational inequality to prove equilibrium existence without convexity, uniqueness of aggregate flows under specific costs, and sufficient conditions for social cost changes with altruistic AV penetration.
Coupled vehicle-signal control based on stackelberg game enabled multi-agent reinforcement learning in mixed traffic environment,
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Routing Equilibrium in Mixed-Autonomy Traffic Networks with Altruistic Autonomous Agents
Formulates mixed-autonomy routing as a variational inequality to prove equilibrium existence without convexity, uniqueness of aggregate flows under specific costs, and sufficient conditions for social cost changes with altruistic AV penetration.