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For rounds𝑡≤𝑇/2, the learner’s payment is𝜆 (𝑡) 𝑃L(𝑣 ★ 1 )= 1 2𝜆 (𝑡)

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cs.GT 1

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2026 1

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UNVERDICTED 1

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Learning vs. Optimizing Bidders in Budgeted Auctions

cs.GT · 2026-04-09 · unverdicted · novelty 7.0

Budget constraints in repeated auctions require the optimizer to switch among up to k+1 mixed strategies over time, and a proportional controller for the learner makes the optimizer's utility no higher than the budgeted Stackelberg equilibrium value.

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  • Learning vs. Optimizing Bidders in Budgeted Auctions cs.GT · 2026-04-09 · unverdicted · none · ref 1

    Budget constraints in repeated auctions require the optimizer to switch among up to k+1 mixed strategies over time, and a proportional controller for the learner makes the optimizer's utility no higher than the budgeted Stackelberg equilibrium value.