Frontier browser agents show strong resistance to hand-crafted multi-step prompt injections (0/140 success), unlike coding agents (up to 100%), indicating domain-conditioned safety and that prior high ASR reports may not generalize.
A systematization of security vulnerabilities in computer use agents
3 Pith papers cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.
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citation-polarity summary
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2026 3verdicts
UNVERDICTED 3roles
background 2polarities
background 2representative citing papers
The paper develops a unified framework that organizes computer-use agent reliability around perception-decision-execution layers and creation-deployment-operation-maintenance stages to map security and alignment interventions.
A synthesis of 247 papers on LLM agent security identifies prompt injection and tool hijacking as dominant threats, notes weakly compositional defenses, and argues for trust boundaries and realistic evaluations.
citing papers explorer
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Domain-Conditioned Safety in Frontier Computer-Using Agents: A 793-Episode Browser Benchmark, a Coding-Domain Cross-Reference, and a Reproducibility Audit of Recent Red-Teaming
Frontier browser agents show strong resistance to hand-crafted multi-step prompt injections (0/140 success), unlike coding agents (up to 100%), indicating domain-conditioned safety and that prior high ASR reports may not generalize.
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Securing Computer-Use Agents: A Unified Architecture-Lifecycle Framework for Deployment-Grounded Reliability
The paper develops a unified framework that organizes computer-use agent reliability around perception-decision-execution layers and creation-deployment-operation-maintenance stages to map security and alignment interventions.
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Toward Secure LLM Agents: Threat Surfaces, Attacks, Defenses, and Evaluation
A synthesis of 247 papers on LLM agent security identifies prompt injection and tool hijacking as dominant threats, notes weakly compositional defenses, and argues for trust boundaries and realistic evaluations.