Introduces Deception Stackelberg equilibria (DSE) and Hyper Nash equilibria (HNE) for three-party deception games, provides consistency conditions between them, and a convergent hypergradient algorithm for computation, applied to wireless security and false data injection defense.
Consistency of Stackelberg and Nash equilibria in three-player leader-follower games
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Zero-determinant strategies achieve the upper-bound performance of strong Stackelberg equilibria in moving target defense with substantially lower computational complexity.
citing papers explorer
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Deception Equilibrium Analysis for Three-Party Stackelberg Game with Insider
Introduces Deception Stackelberg equilibria (DSE) and Hyper Nash equilibria (HNE) for three-party deception games, provides consistency conditions between them, and a convergent hypergradient algorithm for computation, applied to wireless security and false data injection defense.
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Zero-determinant Strategy for Moving Target Defense: Existence, Performance, and Computation
Zero-determinant strategies achieve the upper-bound performance of strong Stackelberg equilibria in moving target defense with substantially lower computational complexity.