Models selling uncertain-outcome services via two-stage contracts, proves the structure is necessary for max profit, gives FPTAS for constant buyer types, and shows single-contract optimality in single-parameter settings.
There is a single action a with cost c(a) = 0 and transition probabilities pa q = 1 2 , ∀q ∈ [2]
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How to Sell a Service with Uncertain Outcomes
Models selling uncertain-outcome services via two-stage contracts, proves the structure is necessary for max profit, gives FPTAS for constant buyer types, and shows single-contract optimality in single-parameter settings.