Individually calibrated predictors become collectively miscalibrated under Brier-optimal strategic responses with positive belief correlations, but VCG aggregation restores dominant-strategy incentive compatibility and near-optimal performance.
Prediction, Learning, and Games
3 Pith papers cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.
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In bandit-feedback zero-sum games, uncoupled algorithms achieve last-iterate Nash convergence at the optimal rate of O(T^{-1/4}).
General criteria extend L^p-mean Wasserstein convergence rates of occupation measures to non-stationary or non-Markovian ergodic processes under conditional convergence to equilibrium, with applications to Brownian diffusions and fractional Brownian driven SDEs.
citing papers explorer
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When Individually Calibrated Models Become Collectively Miscalibrated
Individually calibrated predictors become collectively miscalibrated under Brier-optimal strategic responses with positive belief correlations, but VCG aggregation restores dominant-strategy incentive compatibility and near-optimal performance.
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The Harder Path: Last Iterate Convergence for Uncoupled Learning in Zero-Sum Games with Bandit Feedback
In bandit-feedback zero-sum games, uncoupled algorithms achieve last-iterate Nash convergence at the optimal rate of O(T^{-1/4}).
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Convergence rate of the occupation measure of classes of ergodic processes toward their invariant distribution in mean Wasserstein distance
General criteria extend L^p-mean Wasserstein convergence rates of occupation measures to non-stationary or non-Markovian ergodic processes under conditional convergence to equilibrium, with applications to Brownian diffusions and fractional Brownian driven SDEs.