Incentive conditions for under-collateralized credit in non-custodial micropayments are characterized via repeated game models with bounded exposure, verifiable settlements, and continuation value.
Summing this loss over a punishment duration ofTepochs with discount factorδyields ∆uloss j = TX τ=1 δτ−1 ℓj = 1−δ T 1−δ ℓj,(14) which establishes the stated bound
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Credit Limits beyond Full Collateralization in Decentralized Micropayments: Incentive Conditions
Incentive conditions for under-collateralized credit in non-custodial micropayments are characterized via repeated game models with bounded exposure, verifiable settlements, and continuation value.