A Constructive Epistemic Logic with Public Announcement (Non-Predetermined Possibilities)
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We argue that the notion of epistemic \emph{possible worlds} in constructivism (intuitionism) is not as the same as it is in classic view, and there are possibilities, called non-predetermined worlds, which are ignored in (classic) Epistemic Logic. Regarding non-predetermined possibilities, we propose a constructive epistemic logic and prove soundness and completeness theorems for it. We extend the proposed logic by adding a public announcement operator. To declare the significance of our work, we formulate the well-known Surprise Exam Paradox, $\mathbf{SEP}$, via the proposed constructive epistemic logic and then put forward a solution for the paradox. We clarify that the puzzle in the $\mathbf{SEP}$ is because of students'(wrong) assumption that the day of the exam is necessarily predetermined.
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