Conjoining uncooperative societies facilitates evolution of cooperation
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Social structure affects the emergence and maintenance of cooperation. Here we study the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in fragmented societies, and show that conjoining segregated cooperation-inhibiting groups, if done properly, rescues the fate of collective cooperation. We highlight the essential role of inter-group ties, that sew the patches of the social network together and facilitate cooperation. We point out several examples of this phenomenon in actual settings. We explore random and non-random graphs, as well as empirical networks. In many cases we find a marked reduction of the critical benefit-to-cost ratio needed for sustaining cooperation. Our finding gives hope that the increasing worldwide connectivity, if managed properly, can promote global cooperation.
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