Pith. sign in

REVIEW 1 cited by

Market Design with Distributional Objectives

Not yet reviewed by Pith; the record is open.

Re-run · record.json Download PDF Read on arXiv ↗

This paper has not been read by Pith yet. Machine review is queued; the pith claim, tier, and objections will appear here once it completes.

SPECIMEN: schema-true, not a live event

T0 review · schema-true

One-sentence machine reading of the paper's core claim.

pith:XXXXXXXX · record.json · timestamp

arxiv 2301.00237 v2 pith:MQPJHVS3 submitted 2022-12-31 econ.TH

Isa E. Hafalir , Fuhito Kojima , M. Bumin Yenmez , Koji Yokote This is my paper
classification econ.TH
keywords distributionalmeritadditionapplicationschoicechoosingfamilyobjective
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
0 comments
read the original abstract

We provide optimal solutions to an institution that has distributional objectives when choosing from a set of applications based on merit (or priority). For example, in college admissions, administrators may want to admit a diverse class in addition to choosing students with the highest qualifications. We provide a family of choice rules that maximize merit subject to attaining a level of the distributional objective. We study the desirable properties of choice rules in this family and use them to find all subsets of applications on the Pareto frontier of the distributional objective and merit. In addition, we provide two novel characterizations of matroids.

Discussion (0). Sign in to comment.

Forward citations

Cited by 1 Pith paper

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score.

  1. Aggregate Stable Matching with Money Burning

    econ.TH 2026-05 unverdicted novelty 7.0 of 10

    An aggregate NTU stability concept using one-sided money burning decentralizes stable matchings in type-based markets and extends to a random utility model with proven existence, uniqueness, and convergent algorithm.

Pith tools