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arxiv: 2604.15349 · v1 · submitted 2026-04-01 · 💰 econ.GN · q-fin.EC

Time Preference and Tax Burden Acceptance: Asymmetric Effects on Intertemporal and Contemporaneous Redistribution

Eiji Yamamura , Fumio Ohtake This is my paper

Pith reviewed 2026-05-13 21:56 UTC · model grok-4.3

classification 💰 econ.GN q-fin.EC
keywords time preferencetax acceptanceintertemporal redistributioncontemporaneous redistributionsurvey analysisimpatiencefiscal policy
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The pith

Higher time preference reduces acceptance of tax burdens more strongly for immediate redistribution than for future-oriented ones.

A machine-rendered reading of the paper's core claim, the machinery that carries it, and where it could break.

The paper tests whether individual impatience, measured as time preference, shapes support for two distinct forms of tax redistribution. One form raises current taxes in return for proportional cuts later; the other shifts the current tax load directly onto lower-income households. Regression results from a large online survey show a negative link in both cases, but the coefficient is larger in magnitude when redistribution occurs right away rather than across time periods. This pattern matters because it implies that the timing of tax costs influences how much impatience affects public willingness to bear them. A reader would care insofar as it connects personal discount rates to concrete fiscal policy preferences.

Core claim

Using cross-sectional data from roughly 12,000 survey respondents and multiple regression specifications, the authors establish that higher time preference correlates negatively with acceptance of both an intertemporal tax swap and a contemporaneous income transfer. The estimated negative association is larger in absolute value for the contemporaneous case, producing asymmetric effects across the two redistribution domains.

What carries the argument

Comparison of regression coefficients on time preference across two binary acceptance measures: one for exchanging a present consumption-tax rise for a future proportional reduction, and one for shifting the present tax burden to significantly poorer households.

If this is right

  • Immediate income-redistribution policies face steeper resistance from high time-preference individuals than policies that defer costs.
  • Support for future tax relief in exchange for present increases depends less on impatience than direct current transfers do.
  • Population-level differences in time preference can produce uneven backing for progressive taxation depending on whether burdens are front-loaded or spread over time.
  • Policy design that front-loads benefits or back-loads costs may raise acceptance among impatient segments of the public.

Where Pith is reading between the lines

These are editorial extensions of the paper, not claims the author makes directly.

  • Framing tax policies to highlight long-term offsets could narrow the acceptance gap between impatient and patient citizens.
  • The same asymmetry may appear in other domains such as pension contributions or environmental taxes that involve delayed payoffs.
  • Laboratory experiments with real monetary stakes could test whether the survey pattern holds when choices carry actual financial consequences.

Load-bearing premise

Survey answers about hypothetical tax changes accurately reflect genuine time preferences and real willingness to accept tax burdens without large hypothetical or social-desirability bias.

What would settle it

A follow-up study that replaces survey hypotheticals with incentivized choices or observed responses to actual enacted tax reforms and finds no statistically larger negative coefficient on time preference for contemporaneous than for intertemporal redistribution.

read the original abstract

This paper examines the extent to which individual time preferences are associated with the willingness to accept different tax burdens. The first is an intertemporal redistribution in which a current consumption tax increase is exchanged for a proportional future reduction. The second is a contemporaneous redistribution where the tax burden borne by individuals is transferred directly to those with significantly lower incomes than their own. Using a cross-sectional online survey of approximately 12,000 observations, we found through various regression analyses that higher time preference is negatively associated with acceptance in both domains. Crucially, the negative coefficient is larger in absolute value for contemporaneous redistribution than for the intertemporal one.

Editorial analysis

A structured set of objections, weighed in public.

Desk editor's note, referee report, simulated authors' rebuttal, and a circularity audit. Tearing a paper down is the easy half of reading it; the pith above is the substance, this is the friction.

Referee Report

2 major / 1 minor

Summary. The paper uses cross-sectional regressions on an online survey of approximately 12,000 observations to estimate associations between elicited time preferences and stated acceptance of two forms of tax redistribution: an intertemporal trade-off (current consumption tax increase exchanged for a future proportional reduction) and a contemporaneous transfer (tax burden shifted directly to lower-income individuals). It reports a negative association in both domains, with the coefficient larger in absolute value for the contemporaneous case.

Significance. If the reported asymmetry survives detailed robustness checks, the result would indicate that time preferences shape support for redistribution in a domain-specific manner, with implications for models of voter preferences over tax policy timing. The sample size provides statistical power, but the purely empirical design offers no parameter-free derivations or machine-checked proofs.

major comments (2)
  1. [Abstract] Abstract: the central claim that the negative coefficient on time preference is larger in absolute value for contemporaneous than for intertemporal redistribution cannot be evaluated because the abstract (and provided summary) supplies no coefficient magnitudes, standard errors, tests of coefficient equality, variable definitions, or control variables.
  2. [Empirical strategy] Empirical strategy: both the time-preference measure and the two acceptance outcomes are elicited from the same hypothetical survey instrument; without reported validation against incentivized tasks, behavioral correlates, or explicit checks for domain-specific response bias, the observed coefficient difference could arise from differential social-desirability pressure rather than underlying preferences.
minor comments (1)
  1. Provide full regression tables with all controls, R² values, observation counts, and any clustering or fixed effects; clarify how the time-preference elicitation question was worded and scaled.

Simulated Author's Rebuttal

2 responses · 0 unresolved

We thank the referee for their constructive comments on our manuscript. We will revise the abstract to include more details as suggested. For the empirical strategy concern, we will add further discussion and robustness checks in the revision.

read point-by-point responses

  1. Referee: [Abstract] Abstract: the central claim that the negative coefficient on time preference is larger in absolute value for contemporaneous than for intertemporal redistribution cannot be evaluated because the abstract (and provided summary) supplies no coefficient magnitudes, standard errors, tests of coefficient equality, variable definitions, or control variables.

    Authors: We agree that the abstract lacks sufficient detail to evaluate the central claim. In the revised manuscript, we will update the abstract to report the coefficient estimates and standard errors for the key time preference variable in both the intertemporal and contemporaneous specifications. We will also include the p-value from the statistical test of whether the coefficients differ significantly, along with a concise description of the main control variables. revision: yes

  2. Referee: [Empirical strategy] Empirical strategy: both the time-preference measure and the two acceptance outcomes are elicited from the same hypothetical survey instrument; without reported validation against incentivized tasks, behavioral correlates, or explicit checks for domain-specific response bias, the observed coefficient difference could arise from differential social-desirability pressure rather than underlying preferences.

    Authors: We acknowledge this potential limitation of using hypothetical survey data for both the independent and dependent variables. The time preference measure is elicited using a standard multiple-price list approach, which is widely used in the literature and has been validated in previous studies against real-stakes choices. To address concerns about response bias, we include an extensive set of controls for demographics, political attitudes, and other individual characteristics. In the revision, we will add explicit checks for domain-specific biases, such as comparing responses across question orders and including a social desirability scale if available in the data. We argue that the observed asymmetry is consistent with theoretical expectations and unlikely to be entirely attributable to bias. revision: partial

Circularity Check

0 steps flagged

No circularity; purely empirical associations from survey regressions

full rationale

The paper reports cross-sectional regressions of stated tax-acceptance measures on elicited time-preference scores from the same online survey. No theoretical derivation, first-principles model, or prediction step exists; the central claims are estimated coefficients whose signs and relative magnitudes are data-driven rather than forced by construction, self-citation, or redefinition of inputs. The analysis is therefore self-contained against external benchmarks.

Axiom & Free-Parameter Ledger

2 free parameters · 1 axioms · 0 invented entities

The central claim depends on the accuracy of the time preference elicitation in the survey and the validity of the regression model assumptions, with parameters fitted to the observed data.

free parameters (2)
  • time preference measure
    Constructed from survey responses, likely involving choices that are fitted or scaled.
  • regression coefficients
    Estimated via regression to quantify associations with tax acceptance.
axioms (1)
  • domain assumption Ordinary least squares assumptions hold for the regressions
    Used in 'various regression analyses' to estimate associations.

pith-pipeline@v0.9.0 · 5400 in / 1078 out tokens · 49594 ms · 2026-05-13T21:56:53.987874+00:00 · methodology

discussion (0)

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Reference graph

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