Coupled Replicator Equations for the Dynamics of Learning in Multiagent Systems
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Starting with a group of reinforcement-learning agents we derive coupled replicator equations that describe the dynamics of collective learning in multiagent systems. We show that, although agents model their environment in a self-interested way without sharing knowledge, a game dynamics emerges naturally through environment-mediated interactions. An application to rock-scissors-paper game interactions shows that the collective learning dynamics exhibits a diversity of competitive and cooperative behaviors. These include quasiperiodicity, stable limit cycles, intermittency, and deterministic chaos--behaviors that should be expected in heterogeneous multiagent systems described by the general replicator equations we derive.
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