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State machine inference of QUIC

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arxiv 1903.04384 v1 pith:VR3LFPAG submitted 2019-03-11 cs.NI

classification cs.NI
keywords quicmachineprotocolstategoogleimplementationimplementationsinference
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal

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QUIC is a recent transport protocol that provides reliable, secure and quick service on top of UDP in the internet. As QUIC is implemented in the application space rather than in the operating system's kernel, it is more efficient to dynamically develop and roll out. Currently, there are two parallel specifications, one by Google and one by IETF, and there are a few implementations. In this paper, we show how state machine inference can be applied to automatically extract the state machine corresponding to the protocol from an implementation. In particular, we infer the model of Google's QUIC server. This is done using a black-box technique, making it usable on any implementation of the protocol, regardless of, for example, the programming language the code is written in or the system the QUIC server runs on. This makes it a useful tool for testing and specification purposes, and to make various (future) implementations more easily comparable.

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    Seven of ten SSH servers misimplement strict key exchange, and two violations are exploitable: pre-auth RCE in Erlang SSH and a rogue session attack in Tectia SSH.

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