Pith. sign in

REVIEW 1 cited by

Hipsters and the Cool: A Game Theoretic Analysis of Social Identity, Trends and Fads

Not yet reviewed by Pith; the record is open.

This paper has not been read by Pith yet. Machine review is queued; the pith claim, tier, and objections will appear here once it completes.

SPECIMEN: schema-true, not a live event

T0 review · schema-true

One-sentence machine reading of the paper's core claim.

pith:XXXXXXXX · record.json · timestamp

arxiv 1910.13385 v1 pith:UUMU6X3I submitted 2019-10-29 econ.TH econ.GNq-fin.EC

classification econ.THecon.GNq-fin.EC
keywords socialdynamicsidentitynetworktrendscomplexculturalcycles
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal

Signed reviews

No signed human review yet.

0 comments
read the original abstract

Cultural trends and popularity cycles can be observed all around us, yet our theories of social influence and identity expression do not explain what perpetuates these complex, often unpredictable social dynamics. We propose a theory of social identity expression based on the opposing, but not mutually exclusive, motives to conform and to be unique among one's neighbors in a social network. We then model the social dynamics that arise from these motives. We find that the dynamics typically enter random walks or stochastic limit cycles rather than converging to a static equilibrium. We also prove that without social network structure or, alternatively, without the uniqueness motive, reasonable adaptive dynamics would necessarily converge to equilibrium. Thus, we show that nuanced psychological assumptions (recognizing preferences for uniqueness along with conformity) and realistic social network structure are both necessary for explaining how complex, unpredictable cultural trends emerge.

Discussion (0). Continue with ORCID to comment.

Forward citations

Cited by 1 Pith paper

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. Contrarian Incentives and Costly Social Learning

    econ.TH 2025-08 conditional novelty 5.0 of 10

    In a Gaussian social-learning model, contrarian preferences expand the set of public beliefs where agents invest in private information, as long as the no-signal action is the observed majority.

Pith tools