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Paper Citation Record · LEDGER

Social Choice with Changing Preferences: Representation Theorems and Long-Run Policies

As of 13 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 0 of 0 outbound references and 2 inbound Pith citation observations for arXiv:2011.02544.

A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.

pith.paper-citation-record.v1
2011.02544 v1

Coverage vector

measured 0 of 0 reference resolution

Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links

measured 2 of 2 standing notices

One-hop event checks from named stored sources.

Source: scholarly_work_events, retraction_status_cache, observed 2026-08-13T06:32:02.005865+00:00

measured 2 of 2 inbound itemization

Pith citing papers itemized under the disclosed page cap.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-12T15:45:49.983680Z

measured 0 of 1 external citation measurements

A source-named dated measurement, never combined with another source.

Source: arxiv_reference, observed 2026-07-04T12:29:52.045001Z

Reference resolution

0 of 0 outbound references displayed

  • verified exact0
  • verified fuzzy0
  • unresolved0
  • parse uncertain0
  • malformed identifier0
  • metadata mismatch0

External citation measurements

No source-named external measurement is stored.

Outbound references

No outbound reference observations are available for this paper version.

Pith citing papers

Observation d832b1bb-8084-4683-904f-feaa13f07005 · inbound

Can an AI Agent Safely Run a Government? Existence of Probably Approximately Aligned Policies cites this paper.

Can an AI Agent Safely Run a Government? Existence of Probably Approximately Aligned Policies Social Choice with Changing Preferences: Representation Theorems and Long-Run Policies

Reference 21

Resolution
unresolved
no resolver link, observed 2026-08-12T15:45:49.983680Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T15:45:49.983680Z digest=sha256:82b1035172218fbc68c6bcec26927ace09794e5c1f308fadf0ab26e67466802f

Observation c283b6b0-4fb4-4bc9-a2aa-790947efc590 · inbound

Welfarist Control Design -- How to fulfill the societal mandate in multi-agent control? cites this paper.

Welfarist Control Design -- How to fulfill the societal mandate in multi-agent control? Social Choice with Changing Preferences: Representation Theorems and Long-Run Policies

Reference 76

Resolution
verified exact
arxiv_id, observed 2026-07-04T12:29:52.046754Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-13T06:32:02.005865+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-06-26T06:44:15.559910Z digest=sha256:1ccf3048fda765ec4f66111b40c9226c95650d67a297de1d8c9e027bb477f04a