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Two-sided matching with firms' complementary preferences

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arxiv 2205.05599 v2 pith:DFEUPC55 submitted 2022-05-11 econ.TH

Chao Huang This is my paper · ORCID
classification econ.TH
keywords firmscomplementarymatchingpreferencesconditionstabletwo-sidedacceptable
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This paper studies two-sided many-to-one matching in which firms have complementary preferences. We show that stable matchings exist under a balancedness condition that rules out a specific type of odd-length cycles formed by firms' acceptable sets. We also provide a class of preference profiles that satisfy this condition. Our results indicate that stable matching is compatible with a wide range of firms' complementary preferences.

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    cs.LG 2025-01 reject novelty 4.0 of 10

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