On voting rules satisfying false-name-proofness and participation

Agustin G. Bonifacio; Federico Fioravanti

arxiv: 2503.02740 · v2 · pith:2263UNTCnew · submitted 2025-03-04 · 💰 econ.TH

On voting rules satisfying false-name-proofness and participation

Agustin G. Bonifacio , Federico Fioravanti This is my paper

Pith reviewed 2026-05-23 01:53 UTC · model grok-4.3

classification 💰 econ.TH

keywords false-name-proofnessparticipationanonymityneutralityseparable preferencesvoting rulessocial choice

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The pith

False-name-proofness and participation together force anonymity and rule out neutrality on the universal domain of strict preferences.

A machine-rendered reading of the paper's core claim, the machinery that carries it, and where it could break.

The paper studies voting rules that cannot be manipulated by casting extra votes under fake names and that make abstention unprofitable. On the full domain of strict preferences these two properties together require that the rule treat all voters identically while making it impossible for the rule to treat alternatives symmetrically. When preferences are restricted to separable orders over subsets of objects, rules can meet false-name-proofness, participation, onto-ness, object neutrality, and tops-onlyness at once, and no strictly larger domain permits this combination.

Core claim

On the universal domain of strict preferences, false-name-proofness together with participation implies anonymity and is incompatible with neutrality. On the domain of separable preferences over subsets of objects, rules exist that satisfy false-name-proofness, participation, onto, object neutrality, and tops-onlyness, and the separable domain is maximal for these properties.

What carries the argument

The combination of false-name-proofness (immunity to multiple voting under different identities) and participation (immunity to abstention) under varying preference domains.

If this is right

Any rule meeting both properties must treat voters symmetrically.
Neutrality with respect to alternatives cannot hold on the universal domain.
Separable preferences admit rules that are also onto, object neutral, and tops-only.
No domain strictly containing the separable preferences allows all five properties simultaneously.

Where Pith is reading between the lines

These are editorial extensions of the paper, not claims the author makes directly.

Designers facing unverifiable identities may need to restrict the allowable preference domain to separable orders to preserve both symmetry among voters and symmetry among objects.
The maximality result indicates that attempts to work with richer preference domains will force the sacrifice of at least one of the listed axioms.
Similar domain restrictions could be relevant for other mechanism-design problems in which identity verification is costly.

Load-bearing premise

That the relevant settings are either the universal domain of strict preferences or the separable domain over subsets of objects.

What would settle it

A voting rule on the universal domain of strict preferences that is false-name-proof and satisfies participation yet fails anonymity, or a strictly larger domain than separable preferences on which rules can still satisfy all five listed properties.

read the original abstract

We consider voting rules in settings where voters' identities are difficult to verify. Voters can manipulate the process by casting multiple votes under different identities or abstaining from voting. Immunities to such manipulations are called \emph{false-name-proofness} and \emph{participation}, respectively. For the universal domain of (strict) preferences, these properties together imply \emph{anonymity} and are incompatible with \emph{neutrality}. For the domain of preferences defined over all subsets of a given set of objects, both \emph{false-name-proofness} and \emph{participation} cannot be met by rules that are also \emph{onto}, \emph{object neutral}, and \emph{tops-only}. However, when preferences over subsets of objects are restricted to be separable, all these properties can be satisfied. Furthermore, the domain of separable preferences is maximal for these properties.

Editorial analysis

A structured set of objections, weighed in public.

Desk editor's note, referee report, simulated authors' rebuttal, and a circularity audit. Tearing a paper down is the easy half of reading it; the pith above is the substance, this is the friction.

Desk Editor's Note private letter to a colleague

The paper shows false-name-proofness plus participation imply anonymity and block neutrality on the universal strict-preference domain, while separable preferences over subsets make the full set of axioms possible and maximal.

read the letter

The main things to know are the clean domain split: on the full domain of strict preferences, the two axioms force anonymity and rule out neutrality, and on the full subset domain they also clash with onto, object-neutral, and tops-only rules. Restricting to separable preferences lets everything hold simultaneously, and that domain turns out to be maximal for the combination. This is the fresh part beyond standard false-name results. The work is straightforward axiomatic social choice. It states the claims directly from the domain assumptions and gives the incompatibility and maximality results without extra machinery. The modeling choice of those two domains is explicit, so the reader can see where the results apply. The soft spots are limited. Everything rests on the domain restrictions being the right ones to consider, which is a modeling judgment rather than a flaw in the logic. The abstract gives no proof sketches, so the derivations would need verification in the full text, but the stress-test found no internal gaps or hidden assumptions in the axiom setup. No equations or fitted quantities appear, which keeps the circularity burden low. This is for readers already working on mechanism design with unverifiable identities or on participation constraints in voting. A social choice theorist who cares about robust rules would get direct value from the characterizations. It deserves a serious referee because the results are precise, the maximality claim adds something concrete, and the paper engages the relevant axioms without overreach.

Referee Report

0 major / 2 minor

Summary. The manuscript examines voting rules satisfying false-name-proofness (immunity to multiple identities) and participation (no incentive to abstain). On the universal domain of strict preferences, these axioms imply anonymity and are incompatible with neutrality. On the domain of all preferences over subsets of objects, they are incompatible with onto, object-neutral, and tops-only rules. On the subdomain of separable preferences, rules satisfying all listed properties exist, and the separable domain is maximal for the combination of axioms.

Significance. If the derivations hold, the paper contributes to social choice theory by clarifying how domain restrictions enable positive results for voting rules under identity manipulation and abstention. The maximality claim for separable preferences is a notable strengthening of the possibility result, as it identifies the largest domain on which the axioms are compatible.

minor comments (2)

The abstract states the maximality result but does not indicate whether the proof relies on a specific construction (e.g., a particular separable rule) or a general argument; a brief pointer in the introduction would help readers locate the relevant section.
Notation for the separable domain and the listed axioms (false-name-proofness, participation, onto, object neutrality, tops-only) should be introduced with explicit definitions or references to standard definitions in the first section where they appear.

Simulated Author's Rebuttal

0 responses · 0 unresolved

We thank the referee for the positive evaluation of the manuscript, the recognition of its contribution to social choice theory, and the recommendation for minor revision. We are pleased that the maximality result for separable preferences is viewed as a notable strengthening.

Circularity Check

0 steps flagged

No significant circularity identified

full rationale

The paper derives implications between standard axioms (false-name-proofness, participation, anonymity, neutrality, onto, object-neutrality, tops-only) on explicitly stated preference domains (universal strict, full subsets, separable subsets) using direct axiomatic arguments and maximality constructions. No equations, fitted parameters, self-definitional reductions, or load-bearing self-citations appear in the derivation chain; all results are self-contained within the stated domain restrictions and standard social-choice techniques.

Axiom & Free-Parameter Ledger

0 free parameters · 2 axioms · 0 invented entities

Results rest entirely on standard domain assumptions of social choice theory; no free parameters or new entities introduced.

axioms (2)

domain assumption Universal domain of strict preferences
Invoked for the anonymity and neutrality results.
domain assumption Preferences defined over all subsets of objects, with separability restriction
Invoked for the onto/object-neutral/tops-only compatibility and maximality result.

pith-pipeline@v0.9.0 · 5681 in / 1115 out tokens · 62762 ms · 2026-05-23T01:53:48.351974+00:00 · methodology

On voting rules satisfying false-name-proofness and participation

Core claim

What carries the argument

If this is right

Where Pith is reading between the lines

Load-bearing premise

What would settle it

discussion (0)