Paper Citation Record · LEDGER

Optimal Auction Design with Contingent Payments and Costly Verification

As of 8 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 9 of 9 outbound references and 0 inbound Pith citation observations for arXiv:2403.19945.

A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.

pith.paper-citation-record.v1
2403.19945 v6

Coverage vector

measured 9 of 9 reference resolution

Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-05-24T03:10:16.409144Z

measured 9 of 9 standing notices

One-hop event checks from named stored sources.

Source: scholarly_work_events, retraction_status_cache, observed 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00

measured 0 of 0 inbound itemization

Pith citing papers itemized under the disclosed page cap.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links

measured 0 of 1 external citation measurements

A source-named dated measurement, never combined with another source.

Source: cited_works

Reference resolution

9 of 9 outbound references displayed

verified exact2
verified fuzzy7
unresolved0
parse uncertain0
malformed identifier0
metadata mismatch0

External citation measurements

No source-named external measurement is stored.

Outbound references

Observation f2a32e5b-42e3-48e6-83fd-2a4adb17545d · outbound

This paper cites Probabilistic Verification in Mechanism Design.

Optimal Auction Design with Contingent Payments and Costly Verification Probabilistic Verification in Mechanism Design

Reference 1

Resolution: verified exact; arxiv_id, observed 2026-05-24T03:13:48.979600Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

Observation 31d32f82-5f8a-4f84-8b2c-1fae4744996c · outbound

This paper cites On Regularity and Normalization in Sequential Screening.

Optimal Auction Design with Contingent Payments and Costly Verification On Regularity and Normalization in Sequential Screening

Reference 2

Resolution: verified exact; arxiv_id, observed 2026-05-24T03:13:48.973930Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

Observation 8cbca308-1a79-4159-aa2a-904f8386a409 · outbound

This paper cites Optimal Allocation with Costly Veriﬁcation.

Optimal Auction Design with Contingent Payments and Costly Verification Optimal Allocation with Costly Veriﬁcation

Reference 3

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-05-24T03:15:58.396974Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

Observation 49f2110f-6819-40e0-87ca-76d5b5625ae3 · outbound

This paper cites Sequential Screening.

Optimal Auction Design with Contingent Payments and Costly Verification Sequential Screening

Reference 4

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-05-24T03:15:58.403467Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

Observation b957bdfc-159d-4320-bf2f-ad5097b9d6b9 · outbound

This paper cites Full extraction of the surplus in Bayesian and dominant strategy auctions.

Optimal Auction Design with Contingent Payments and Costly Verification Full extraction of the surplus in Bayesian and dominant strategy auctions

Reference 5

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-05-24T03:15:58.410210Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

Observation ebcafcec-7919-4ed8-a6d4-64d4913be457 · outbound

This paper cites Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem.

Optimal Auction Design with Contingent Payments and Costly Verification Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem

Reference 6

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-05-24T03:15:58.400370Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

Observation 0c53aa9e-0a28-426d-8ee9-93efb20914b6 · outbound

This paper cites Auctions with Contingent Payments.

Optimal Auction Design with Contingent Payments and Costly Verification Auctions with Contingent Payments

Reference 7

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-05-24T03:15:58.389505Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

Observation ed7dde34-6a03-42b6-96c2-759c57f251a1 · outbound

This paper cites Mechanism design with Interdependent Valuations: Eﬃciency.

Optimal Auction Design with Contingent Payments and Costly Verification Mechanism design with Interdependent Valuations: Eﬃciency

Reference 8

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-05-24T03:15:58.406821Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

Observation 7cce97f9-2f2b-4cec-985a-83999368ed71 · outbound

This paper cites Dynamic Mechanism Design: A Myersonian Approach.

Optimal Auction Design with Contingent Payments and Costly Verification Dynamic Mechanism Design: A Myersonian Approach

Reference 9

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-05-24T03:15:58.393792Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

Pith citing papers

No inbound Pith citation observations are available.