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Paper Citation Record · LEDGER

Large Language Models Playing Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium Games

As of 8 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 0 of 0 outbound references and 2 inbound Pith citation observations for arXiv:2406.10574.

A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.

pith.paper-citation-record.v1
2406.10574 v2

Coverage vector

measured 0 of 0 reference resolution

Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links

measured 2 of 2 standing notices

One-hop event checks from named stored sources.

Source: scholarly_work_events, retraction_status_cache, observed 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00

measured 2 of 2 inbound itemization

Pith citing papers itemized under the disclosed page cap.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-07T04:55:43.659108Z

measured 0 of 1 external citation measurements

A source-named dated measurement, never combined with another source.

Source: arxiv_reference, observed 2026-05-12T05:51:25.720237Z

Reference resolution

0 of 0 outbound references displayed

  • verified exact0
  • verified fuzzy0
  • unresolved0
  • parse uncertain0
  • malformed identifier0
  • metadata mismatch0

External citation measurements

No source-named external measurement is stored.

Outbound references

No outbound reference observations are available for this paper version.

Pith citing papers

Observation 1a6d10ae-4627-4cf4-be51-15241858be55 · inbound

Beyond Nash Equilibrium: Bounded Rationality of LLMs and humans in Strategic Decision-making cites this paper.

Beyond Nash Equilibrium: Bounded Rationality of LLMs and humans in Strategic Decision-making Large Language Models Playing Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium Games

Reference 45

Resolution
unresolved
no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T04:55:43.659108Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-08-07T04:55:43.659108Z digest=sha256:1299064bb93d5657f502ae6f2901e8735c99de12032fe1f39d626a399aa5a152

Observation f16a54a9-2dc2-4a66-bf7c-3ffc15086d05 · inbound

Equilibrium Residuals Expose Three Regimes of Matrix-Game Strategic Reasoning in Language Models cites this paper.

Equilibrium Residuals Expose Three Regimes of Matrix-Game Strategic Reasoning in Language Models Large Language Models Playing Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium Games

Reference 9

Resolution
verified exact
arxiv_id, observed 2026-05-12T05:51:25.726030Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-05-12T04:52:47.745976Z digest=sha256:f2100132d65397000cb7961af5dc237bdd886d612b54c5841fd0d7d9df1522f0