Paper Citation Record · LEDGER

Bandit Learning in Matching Markets: Utilitarian and Rawlsian Perspectives

As of 22 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 33 of 33 outbound references and 0 inbound Pith citation observations for arXiv:2412.00301.

A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.

pith.paper-citation-record.v1
2412.00301 v1

Coverage vector

measured 33 of 33 reference resolution

Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-12T05:39:00Z

measured 33 of 33 standing notices

One-hop event checks from named stored sources.

Source: scholarly_work_events, retraction_status_cache, observed 2026-08-22T06:32:14.747728+00:00

measured 0 of 0 inbound itemization

Pith citing papers itemized under the disclosed page cap.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links

measured 0 of 1 external citation measurements

A source-named dated measurement, never combined with another source.

Source: cited_works

Reference resolution

33 of 33 outbound references displayed

verified exact2
verified fuzzy24
unresolved7
parse uncertain0
malformed identifier0
metadata mismatch0

External citation measurements

No source-named external measurement is stored.

Outbound references

Observation c2134988-7491-4fa2-aea4-2b078e7bb0c2 · outbound

This paper cites The New York City High School Match.

Bandit Learning in Matching Markets: Utilitarian and Rawlsian Perspectives The New York City High School Match

Reference 1

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T05:39:00.645116Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-22T06:32:14.747728+00:00.

Observation af5acdf3-5fca-43bf-a4ea-a2b4b9c10530 · outbound

This paper cites The Boston Public School Match.

Bandit Learning in Matching Markets: Utilitarian and Rawlsian Perspectives The Boston Public School Match

Reference 2

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T05:39:00.627326Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-22T06:32:14.747728+00:00.

Observation bbaf9121-4a3a-4cc6-b290-7c8c27984b18 · outbound

This paper cites Ride Sharing, pages 73--97.

Bandit Learning in Matching Markets: Utilitarian and Rawlsian Perspectives Ride Sharing, pages 73--97

Reference 3

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-12T05:39:00.164913Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-22T06:32:14.747728+00:00.

Observation 219481ce-d6d1-4534-9a82-7e8bc4db1ef5 · outbound

This paper cites Beyond log^2(t) regret for decentralized bandits in matching markets.

Bandit Learning in Matching Markets: Utilitarian and Rawlsian Perspectives Beyond log^2(t) regret for decentralized bandits in matching markets

Reference 4

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T05:39:00.610795Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-22T06:32:14.747728+00:00.

Observation 4c9a6f9b-86fa-4df7-8d07-4d2b682b9bd5 · outbound

This paper cites Regret, stability & fairness in matching markets with bandit learners.

Bandit Learning in Matching Markets: Utilitarian and Rawlsian Perspectives Regret, stability & fairness in matching markets with bandit learners

Reference 5

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T05:39:00.594436Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-22T06:32:14.747728+00:00.

Observation f759ef2c-d981-4620-964d-9c46d5dd9bdd · outbound

This paper cites Two-sided bandits and the dating market.

Bandit Learning in Matching Markets: Utilitarian and Rawlsian Perspectives Two-sided bandits and the dating market

Reference 6

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T05:39:00.577840Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-22T06:32:14.747728+00:00.

Observation 48a8bbe4-2daf-47ab-b09c-b5b3cb4d184a · outbound

This paper cites Using stable matching to optimize the balance between accuracy and diversity in recommendation.

Bandit Learning in Matching Markets: Utilitarian and Rawlsian Perspectives Using stable matching to optimize the balance between accuracy and diversity in recommendation

Reference 7

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T05:39:00.562064Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-22T06:32:14.747728+00:00.

Observation 5f9a1622-7860-4f7d-b812-9b8352799ab3 · outbound

This paper cites College admissions and the stability of marriage.

Bandit Learning in Matching Markets: Utilitarian and Rawlsian Perspectives College admissions and the stability of marriage

Reference 8

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-12T05:38:59.973808Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 8809ca97-8221-4430-accf-c61f088fba4d · outbound

This paper cites Gerding, Sebastian Stein, Valentin Robu, Dengji Zhao, and Nicholas R.

Bandit Learning in Matching Markets: Utilitarian and Rawlsian Perspectives Gerding, Sebastian Stein, Valentin Robu, Dengji Zhao, and Nicholas R

Reference 9

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T05:39:00.535064Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-22T06:32:14.747728+00:00.

Observation 29bd6639-9762-4a55-811b-577c668fc265 · outbound

This paper cites Three fast algorithms for four problems in stable marriage.

Bandit Learning in Matching Markets: Utilitarian and Rawlsian Perspectives Three fast algorithms for four problems in stable marriage

Reference 10

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-12T05:38:59.985291Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation ac70df59-2a90-4eb1-9d0c-67b382f0bbb6 · outbound

This paper cites Putting gale & shapley to work: Guaranteeing stability through learning.

Bandit Learning in Matching Markets: Utilitarian and Rawlsian Perspectives Putting gale & shapley to work: Guaranteeing stability through learning

Reference 11

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T05:39:00.508812Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-22T06:32:14.747728+00:00.

Observation d9b6721e-cfb9-476f-a5b4-a7ea6af047bd · outbound

This paper cites An efficient algorithm for the “optimal” stable marriage.

Bandit Learning in Matching Markets: Utilitarian and Rawlsian Perspectives An efficient algorithm for the “optimal” stable marriage

Reference 12

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-12T05:38:59.995039Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation af32c396-b866-4373-be6f-af753d94c914 · outbound

This paper cites Learning equilibria in matching markets from bandit feedback.

Bandit Learning in Matching Markets: Utilitarian and Rawlsian Perspectives Learning equilibria in matching markets from bandit feedback

Reference 13

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T05:39:00.479690Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-22T06:32:14.747728+00:00.

Observation 894a89fe-eb7a-4160-90a4-5f54678a6511 · outbound

This paper cites Complexity of the sex-equal stable marriage problem.

Bandit Learning in Matching Markets: Utilitarian and Rawlsian Perspectives Complexity of the sex-equal stable marriage problem

Reference 14

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T05:39:00.463543Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-22T06:32:14.747728+00:00.

Observation d915ad78-3da7-49f9-beee-0dad4303a85b · outbound

This paper cites Mariages stables et leurs relations avec d'autres probl \`e mes combinatoires: introduction \`a l'analyse math \'e matique des algorithmes.

Bandit Learning in Matching Markets: Utilitarian and Rawlsian Perspectives Mariages stables et leurs relations avec d'autres probl \`e mes combinatoires: introduction \`a l'analyse math \'e matique des algorithmes

Reference 15

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T05:39:00.447027Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-22T06:32:14.747728+00:00.

Observation 59eaca7f-493e-4c14-9385-2f73d2fa044d · outbound

This paper cites Matching with couples: Stability and incentives in large markets.

Bandit Learning in Matching Markets: Utilitarian and Rawlsian Perspectives Matching with couples: Stability and incentives in large markets

Reference 16

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T05:39:00.431014Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-22T06:32:14.747728+00:00.

Observation a54a46e6-172b-4e8b-99ca-e8bbbd7b8418 · outbound

This paper cites Player-optimal stable regret for bandit learning in matching markets.

Bandit Learning in Matching Markets: Utilitarian and Rawlsian Perspectives Player-optimal stable regret for bandit learning in matching markets

Reference 17

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T05:39:00.414852Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-22T06:32:14.747728+00:00.

Observation a30a1e43-1aca-4568-a691-5fa2a007a78c · outbound

This paper cites Improved bandits in many-to-one matching markets with incentive compatibility.

Bandit Learning in Matching Markets: Utilitarian and Rawlsian Perspectives Improved bandits in many-to-one matching markets with incentive compatibility

Reference 18

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-12T05:39:00.147551Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-22T06:32:14.747728+00:00.

Observation 6febe81c-22fd-49bc-ab03-166f8421f603 · outbound

This paper cites Bandit algorithms.

Bandit Learning in Matching Markets: Utilitarian and Rawlsian Perspectives Bandit algorithms

Reference 19

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-12T05:39:00.032903Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 97bd152a-6678-4c94-955a-3c6ae3c45a8f · outbound

This paper cites Liu, Horia Mania, and Michael Jordan.

Bandit Learning in Matching Markets: Utilitarian and Rawlsian Perspectives Liu, Horia Mania, and Michael Jordan

Reference 20

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T05:39:00.387734Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-22T06:32:14.747728+00:00.

Observation 942c0b28-9d45-474e-a2b5-284e19595d5c · outbound

This paper cites Bandit learning in decentralized matching markets.

Bandit Learning in Matching Markets: Utilitarian and Rawlsian Perspectives Bandit learning in decentralized matching markets

Reference 21

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T05:39:00.370662Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-22T06:32:14.747728+00:00.

Observation 6b13b500-82dc-4c69-a3ba-82c38bd87e46 · outbound

This paper cites Decentralized, communication- and coordination-free learning in structured matching markets.

Bandit Learning in Matching Markets: Utilitarian and Rawlsian Perspectives Decentralized, communication- and coordination-free learning in structured matching markets

Reference 22

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T05:39:00.354857Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-22T06:32:14.747728+00:00.

Observation 843543a4-1a1b-4d9f-9904-51a982aebfd0 · outbound

This paper cites The stable marriage problem.

Bandit Learning in Matching Markets: Utilitarian and Rawlsian Perspectives The stable marriage problem

Reference 23

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T05:39:00.337400Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-22T06:32:14.747728+00:00.

Observation d9a44d6b-cfb3-401f-a64e-5f54e57a19c4 · outbound

This paper cites Deep Learning for Two-Sided Matching.

Bandit Learning in Matching Markets: Utilitarian and Rawlsian Perspectives Deep Learning for Two-Sided Matching

Reference 24

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-12T05:39:00.059394Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 25eacd25-6e37-47da-877f-61b3dee97ee8 · outbound

This paper cites The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory.

Bandit Learning in Matching Markets: Utilitarian and Rawlsian Perspectives The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory

Reference 25

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T05:39:00.320550Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-22T06:32:14.747728+00:00.

Observation f090740f-7b80-480e-94ee-f83ac550d45c · outbound

This paper cites On the allocation of residents to rural hospitals: a general property of two-sided matching markets.

Bandit Learning in Matching Markets: Utilitarian and Rawlsian Perspectives On the allocation of residents to rural hospitals: a general property of two-sided matching markets

Reference 26

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T05:39:00.303814Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-22T06:32:14.747728+00:00.

Observation 066e63c1-4571-49e9-84b5-dbf62cec1bc3 · outbound

This paper cites The economist as engineer: Game theory, experimentation, and computation as tools for design economics.

Bandit Learning in Matching Markets: Utilitarian and Rawlsian Perspectives The economist as engineer: Game theory, experimentation, and computation as tools for design economics

Reference 27

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-12T05:39:00.074869Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation e4b7b52e-2f29-4cac-96e5-d04500d3df74 · outbound

This paper cites The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design.

Bandit Learning in Matching Markets: Utilitarian and Rawlsian Perspectives The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design

Reference 28

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T05:39:00.277024Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-22T06:32:14.747728+00:00.

Observation 29f8543a-d250-4c04-9226-c72a1f2ff4e7 · outbound

This paper cites Dominate or delete: Decentralized competing bandits in serial dictatorship.

Bandit Learning in Matching Markets: Utilitarian and Rawlsian Perspectives Dominate or delete: Decentralized competing bandits in serial dictatorship

Reference 29

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T05:39:00.260121Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-22T06:32:14.747728+00:00.

Observation a824fd01-6ce3-4531-939b-beb0c8ae65d9 · outbound

This paper cites Optimal analysis for bandit learning in matching markets with serial dictatorship.

Bandit Learning in Matching Markets: Utilitarian and Rawlsian Perspectives Optimal analysis for bandit learning in matching markets with serial dictatorship

Reference 30

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T05:39:00.243351Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-22T06:32:14.747728+00:00.

Observation c97abdb8-c3af-46fd-bf6c-19cd2326fb72 · outbound

This paper cites Bandit learning in many-to-one matching markets.

Bandit Learning in Matching Markets: Utilitarian and Rawlsian Perspectives Bandit learning in many-to-one matching markets

Reference 31

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T05:39:00.226142Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-22T06:32:14.747728+00:00.

Observation 00990cb2-3a7c-4714-a4d9-e9f1a29c1eaf · outbound

This paper cites Decentralized two-sided bandit learning in matching market.

Bandit Learning in Matching Markets: Utilitarian and Rawlsian Perspectives Decentralized two-sided bandit learning in matching market

Reference 32

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-12T05:39:00.099638Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 20bbd328-5a0e-4a1e-b0eb-960fc1d1fc6f · outbound

This paper cites Matching in multi-arm bandit with collision.

Bandit Learning in Matching Markets: Utilitarian and Rawlsian Perspectives Matching in multi-arm bandit with collision

Reference 33

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T05:39:00.199194Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-22T06:32:14.747728+00:00.

Pith citing papers

No inbound Pith citation observations are available.