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Paper Citation Record · LEDGER

Neural Double Auction Mechanism

As of 20 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 24 of 24 outbound references and 1 inbound Pith citation observation for arXiv:2412.11465.

A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.

pith.paper-citation-record.v1
2412.11465 v1

Coverage vector

measured 24 of 24 reference resolution

Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-11T14:58:52.127453Z

measured 25 of 25 standing notices

One-hop event checks from named stored sources.

Source: scholarly_work_events, retraction_status_cache, observed 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00

measured 1 of 1 inbound itemization

Pith citing papers itemized under the disclosed page cap.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-03T19:33:07.765926Z

measured 0 of 1 external citation measurements

A source-named dated measurement, never combined with another source.

Source: cited_works

Reference resolution

24 of 24 outbound references displayed

  • verified exact0
  • verified fuzzy19
  • unresolved5
  • parse uncertain0
  • malformed identifier0
  • metadata mismatch0

External citation measurements

No source-named external measurement is stored.

Outbound references

Observation face7b18-5b05-495e-8f36-95b4b7809a2a · outbound

This paper cites Concurrent auctions across the supply chain.

Neural Double Auction Mechanism Concurrent auctions across the supply chain

Reference 1

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T14:58:52.419467Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-08-11T14:58:52.042516Z digest=sha256:ab8ee31ccc325727dd20f58a743c6904bfa05bb84bc79e8e186f318d3bf3f58b

Observation 390fe8ef-94c8-4826-9fdd-658329d37657 · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Neural Double Auction Mechanism Unresolved cited work

Reference 2

Resolution
unresolved
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T14:58:52.409367Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-08-11T14:58:52.046767Z digest=sha256:3b6935f94a25da5de1520faedab73fef687217e50d428064114b3b7affe2b73c

Observation c2797ba4-248c-4240-b8b8-c87e62b073d4 · outbound

This paper cites Complexity of mechanism design.

Neural Double Auction Mechanism Complexity of mechanism design

Reference 3

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T14:58:52.398748Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-08-11T14:58:52.050561Z digest=sha256:04c26bdee3c615d07db4b8231f5ecb6858b8e038978f5403441e8c778600d526

Observation c44985be-8d85-41c0-a4dd-d30f7cfc8684 · outbound

This paper cites Self-interested automated mechanism design and implications for optimal combinatorial auctions.

Neural Double Auction Mechanism Self-interested automated mechanism design and implications for optimal combinatorial auctions

Reference 4

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T14:58:52.388754Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-08-11T14:58:52.054375Z digest=sha256:7e7f19a70e2bbc866d28054ca17479bafab9adca54a34768341bbed9ef7d0c21

Observation 6fb43476-25d6-491a-a6cb-f68503f243dd · outbound

This paper cites A scalable neural network for dsic affine maximizer auction design.

Neural Double Auction Mechanism A scalable neural network for dsic affine maximizer auction design

Reference 5

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T14:58:52.378395Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-08-11T14:58:52.058501Z digest=sha256:7c561d3cda27f2d9ef789857ff367dce098ff6f5fb425eae4d905e69b4b0109a

Observation 172d0682-5b44-4768-b5a9-a4199fb66ca5 · outbound

This paper cites Optimal auctions through deep learning.

Neural Double Auction Mechanism Optimal auctions through deep learning

Reference 6

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T14:58:52.368283Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-08-11T14:58:52.061904Z digest=sha256:b59ebb1e9af5bb7bc1da29ce78c0b2085463413187286345a5eda2109a3f2efc

Observation fbeec3e7-5dde-4e95-b1a9-7f127084ba81 · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Neural Double Auction Mechanism Unresolved cited work

Reference 7

Resolution
unresolved
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T14:58:52.357193Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-08-11T14:58:52.065481Z digest=sha256:afe0a07f8a6d2f01d9fb5c1232a042e1401c18a1e3bbf4363ac3512566f0a8b3

Observation 0c11a588-487b-4740-9489-3f8443f28393 · outbound

This paper cites The Double Auction Market: Institutions, Theories, and Evidence.

Neural Double Auction Mechanism The Double Auction Market: Institutions, Theories, and Evidence

Reference 8

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T14:58:52.346061Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-08-11T14:58:52.068677Z digest=sha256:9c61ae474f9e68f9aa7abc4baedc5b6dbd3ee004f6a513dbdf07bc71f9b6c274

Observation 7e2544ff-094e-474d-9244-7ca66749ebed · outbound

This paper cites Incentives in teams.

Neural Double Auction Mechanism Incentives in teams

Reference 9

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T14:58:52.334033Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-08-11T14:58:52.072193Z digest=sha256:89136a1db699809a7aa298b1a0fceafd88631505df9e356f51b06cb85cfe0eb6

Observation e3fa67b3-3f57-47ca-a59e-44afbe69f156 · outbound

This paper cites Computationally feasible automated mechanism design: General approach and case studies.

Neural Double Auction Mechanism Computationally feasible automated mechanism design: General approach and case studies

Reference 10

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T14:58:52.321796Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-08-11T14:58:52.075831Z digest=sha256:513d5b001836017a296f9fc590d5398373c6b6b669e7623e4a0d30a73e397ae2

Observation 044e45f1-51bc-48cb-a054-19406904a180 · outbound

This paper cites Optimal-er auctions through attention.

Neural Double Auction Mechanism Optimal-er auctions through attention

Reference 11

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T14:58:52.309558Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-08-11T14:58:52.079485Z digest=sha256:b040658213053e6506cd9ed820385407f91cbead844ad00fd08f14a1270ba9cf

Observation c2063244-a9bc-4f0f-a8a1-1cec9811e091 · outbound

This paper cites Neural auction: End-to-end learning of auction mechanisms for e-commerce advertising.

Neural Double Auction Mechanism Neural auction: End-to-end learning of auction mechanisms for e-commerce advertising

Reference 12

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T14:58:52.297549Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-08-11T14:58:52.083201Z digest=sha256:b3f7cd6303c991a3fc0eb55a4a75751e00ec42181a8bf9c5663c31382b7c40ce

Observation ce749b75-8af4-4711-a00e-ea0ba44b63dc · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Neural Double Auction Mechanism Unresolved cited work

Reference 13

Resolution
unresolved
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T14:58:52.285512Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-08-11T14:58:52.086962Z digest=sha256:bea057141ac0486521b89d61a052ca85c9408413441d6fba5bdb778462ca4277

Observation a3256bbb-9352-4b3a-a9b4-b22b9a116833 · outbound

This paper cites A dominant strategy double auction.

Neural Double Auction Mechanism A dominant strategy double auction

Reference 14

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T14:58:52.273920Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-08-11T14:58:52.090553Z digest=sha256:f4c9e2bdee2002a87986da4f8b330a67f279663ae7b0ee387a2c6eb6b8dab60f

Observation f06764fa-5083-433f-8caa-4dccfec6e145 · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Neural Double Auction Mechanism Unresolved cited work

Reference 15

Resolution
unresolved
no resolver link, observed 2026-08-11T14:58:52.093959Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-08-11T14:58:52.093959Z digest=sha256:97c433db0045eb8b31dc076adf2989bc35fcaebfb26f34ff40268e1d12d17ea3

Observation 1cd1c5cd-d407-4577-9b71-91f55d0df843 · outbound

This paper cites Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading.

Neural Double Auction Mechanism Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading

Reference 16

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T14:58:52.253393Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-08-11T14:58:52.097571Z digest=sha256:8bf269ec6deae735939b4ef49adb637a689130710a10c7e5be7b0615f81adcc1

Observation ba2af72a-e26e-423a-bb9f-e5e4e34fa196 · outbound

This paper cites Matthew Weinberg.

Neural Double Auction Mechanism Matthew Weinberg

Reference 17

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T14:58:52.241639Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-08-11T14:58:52.101358Z digest=sha256:76b7aa60cf9c0b65060023555b3c6675f0389468cf60e51fc1e3c6dbab883b6f

Observation ebc7f4de-ac5e-4d7b-a469-c0a3ef77f2f7 · outbound

This paper cites Matthew Weinberg.

Neural Double Auction Mechanism Matthew Weinberg

Reference 18

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T14:58:52.230772Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-08-11T14:58:52.104913Z digest=sha256:2f60b112a5a60e0c5b3941bff6eae87cf8712c7c2c6c6a5677440243f71c9af6

Observation 90526b19-472d-4f6b-9d03-12278ccc427b · outbound

This paper cites Deep Learning for Two-Sided Matching.

Neural Double Auction Mechanism Deep Learning for Two-Sided Matching

Reference 19

Resolution
unresolved
no resolver link, observed 2026-08-11T14:58:52.108439Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-08-11T14:58:52.108439Z digest=sha256:7459fc8b75bde26bd441dce6367eab3ddd70722af6c5899eb82594fd28c08d59

Observation 12d81c49-2d71-4da0-891a-3b70a1bb65f8 · outbound

This paper cites Deep false-name-proof auction mechanisms.

Neural Double Auction Mechanism Deep false-name-proof auction mechanisms

Reference 20

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T14:58:52.218844Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-08-11T14:58:52.112323Z digest=sha256:0a3cbd985a7d895c10a2b32a55efb37047116c8b64a4532819ed15a55de39289

Observation fc6036e7-9055-4b6e-8707-14b375fe5e3e · outbound

This paper cites Automated mechanism design: A new application area for search algorithms.

Neural Double Auction Mechanism Automated mechanism design: A new application area for search algorithms

Reference 21

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T14:58:52.206585Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-08-11T14:58:52.115904Z digest=sha256:c8573914721959eab0e7c52df5fcbc66e4737a09bd8dd70647ff9614e4a4f663

Observation 4045e630-faa6-467a-879d-114198198f65 · outbound

This paper cites Automated design of revenue-maximizing combinatorial auctions.

Neural Double Auction Mechanism Automated design of revenue-maximizing combinatorial auctions

Reference 22

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T14:58:52.195397Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-08-11T14:58:52.119497Z digest=sha256:8520c104460a5b4f53ca7d4aab3769fad98b72d6cb09fc77a236ba1832132ecd

Observation b0761a18-da29-4447-a957-139668071a54 · outbound

This paper cites Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders.

Neural Double Auction Mechanism Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders

Reference 23

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T14:58:52.183990Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-08-11T14:58:52.123664Z digest=sha256:25bad7d62fcb2c01cac880816eb535446283151c088cebce2b21b61d8347c06a

Observation 82d38a14-dd62-4642-9a5b-58a83a61d8fe · outbound

This paper cites Robust double auction protocol against false-name bids.

Neural Double Auction Mechanism Robust double auction protocol against false-name bids

Reference 24

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T14:58:52.172155Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-08-11T14:58:52.127453Z digest=sha256:94121a6fcc2f1d9a17c32a77a1eb22ba1e5531acae4c3098258ba17fbafb1b93

Pith citing papers

Observation 1695faf8-2291-4052-a6ca-0d59a82bee02 · inbound

Truthful and Trustworthy IoT AI Agents via Immediate-Penalty Enforcement under Approximate VCG Mechanisms cites this paper.

Truthful and Trustworthy IoT AI Agents via Immediate-Penalty Enforcement under Approximate VCG Mechanisms Neural Double Auction Mechanism

Reference 32

Resolution
unresolved
no resolver link, observed 2026-08-03T19:33:07.765926Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-03T19:33:07.765926Z digest=sha256:f2d088b841444c5f3609c91fbd4ddacb623785c9483195ebb88a5b3aef9804f5