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arxiv: 2502.06241 · v4 · pith:WCBKBT3Enew · submitted 2025-02-10 · 💰 econ.GN · q-fin.EC

Words or Numbers? How Framing Uncertainties Affects Risk Assessment and Decision-Making

Pith reviewed 2026-05-23 04:10 UTC · model grok-4.3

classification 💰 econ.GN q-fin.EC
keywords uncertainty communicationverbal probabilitiesnumerical probabilitiesrisk assessmentdecision makingambiguity aversionlaboratory experiment
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The pith

Verbal communication of uncertainty causes people to value medium-to-high probability options less than numerical communication does.

A machine-rendered reading of the paper's core claim, the machinery that carries it, and where it could break.

The paper examines whether the format used to communicate uncertainty changes how people assess and value risky options. Participants assigned lower values to prospects with medium or high likelihoods when probabilities appeared as verbal phrases rather than exact numbers. The valuation gap survived even when participants correctly converted the verbal phrases into the numerical values the phrases were meant to convey. This pattern points to ambiguity in verbal wording as an independent source of distortion in decisions. The result matters for any setting where one person must convey risk to another and wants the receiver to act on the intended probability rather than an altered one.

Core claim

Individuals place significantly lower values on uncertain options with medium to high likelihoods when uncertainty is communicated verbally rather than numerically. This effect remains consistent even if individuals translate verbal uncertainty correctly into the intended numerical uncertainty, implying that ambiguity about the exact meaning of a verbal phrase interferes with decision-making even beyond potential mistranslations.

What carries the argument

Laboratory valuation task that elicits monetary values for options whose probabilities are described either verbally or numerically and then compares the two formats while holding intended probability constant.

If this is right

  • Verbal communication can produce less rational decisions under uncertainty, especially at high likelihoods.
  • The behavioral response arises from ambiguity in verbal phrases rather than mistranslation alone.
  • Managers should communicate uncertainty numerically to avoid unintentionally shaping employees' choices.

Where Pith is reading between the lines

These are editorial extensions of the paper, not claims the author makes directly.

  • The finding broadens ambiguity-aversion research by showing that verbal expressions, not only numerical ranges, can trigger the same conservative valuation.
  • The pattern may appear in medical or financial advice where verbal risk language is routine.
  • Field experiments with actual payoffs could test whether the laboratory gap survives when stakes are real rather than hypothetical.

Load-bearing premise

The laboratory valuation task and choice of verbal phrases isolate the effect of communication format without introducing demand effects, order artifacts, or other confounds that could produce the observed valuation gap.

What would settle it

A replication in which participants assign the same values to options whether probabilities are stated verbally or numerically at every likelihood level would falsify the central claim.

Figures

Figures reproduced from arXiv: 2502.06241 by Kirsten Thommes, Robin Bodenberger.

Figure 1
Figure 1. Figure 1: Density functions for the translations of verbal probability phrases [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p016_1.png] view at source ↗
Figure 2
Figure 2. Figure 2: Average reservation prices based on numerical and verbal communication [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p018_2.png] view at source ↗
Figure 3
Figure 3. Figure 3: displays a forest plot comparing the effects of verbal communication on reservation prices across all likelihood levels for both matched and unmatched models. The figure shows that effect sizes are consistent regardless of matching on translation accuracy. In particular, the effects of verbal communication at medium and high likelihoods remain negative and statistically significant at the 10% level indepen… view at source ↗
Figure 4
Figure 4. Figure 4: Density functions of reservation prices for numerical and verbal communication [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p023_4.png] view at source ↗
read the original abstract

Senders of messages prefer to communicate uncertainty verbally (e.g., something is likely to happen) rather than numerically (such as 75%), leaving receivers with imprecise information. While it is well established that receivers translate verbal probabilities into numerical values that systematically deviate from the intended numerical meaning, it is less clear how this discrepancy influences subsequent behavioral actions. Thus, the role of verbal versus numerical communication of uncertainty warrants additional attention, to investigate two critical questions: 1) whether differences in decision-making under uncertainty arise between these communication forms, and 2) whether such differences persist even when verbal phrases are translated accurately into the intended numerical meaning. By implementing a laboratory experiment, we show that individuals place significantly lower values on uncertain options with medium to high likelihoods when uncertainty is communicated verbally rather than numerically. This effect may lead to less rational decisions under verbal communication, particularly at high likelihoods. Those results remain consistent even if individuals translate verbal uncertainty correctly into the intended numerical uncertainty, implying that a biased behavioral response is not only induced by miscommunication. Instead, ambiguity about the exact meaning of a verbal phrase interferes with decision-making even beyond potential mistranslations. These findings tie in with previous research on ambiguity aversion, which has predominantly operationalized ambiguity through numerical ranges rather than verbal phrases. Based on our findings we conclude that managers should communicate uncertainty numerically, as verbal communication can unintentionally influence the decision-making process of employees.

Editorial analysis

A structured set of objections, weighed in public.

Desk editor's note, referee report, simulated authors' rebuttal, and a circularity audit. Tearing a paper down is the easy half of reading it; the pith above is the substance, this is the friction.

Referee Report

2 major / 1 minor

Summary. The manuscript reports results from a laboratory experiment investigating how verbal versus numerical communication of uncertainty affects valuation of risky options. The key finding is that participants place significantly lower values on options with medium to high likelihoods when uncertainty is framed verbally, and this effect holds even when participants correctly map the verbal phrases to the intended numerical probabilities. The authors link this to ambiguity aversion and recommend numerical communication in managerial contexts.

Significance. The result, if robust, contributes to the literature on ambiguity aversion by operationalizing ambiguity via verbal phrases rather than numerical ranges. It has potential practical implications for decision-making in organizations where uncertainty is communicated. The persistence of the effect beyond translation accuracy is a notable aspect that distinguishes it from simple miscommunication.

major comments (2)
  1. [Methods] The abstract and manuscript provide no information on sample size, exact experimental stimuli, statistical tests used, or participant exclusion criteria. This omission prevents evaluation of whether the reported statistically significant effects are reliable or influenced by design choices.
  2. [Experimental design (translation task)] The central claim that the valuation gap persists 'even when individuals translate verbal uncertainty correctly' depends on the subset where translation is accurate. However, details on how the translation was elicited (e.g., task order relative to valuation, whether incentivized, scoring method for 'correct') are missing. This raises the possibility of anchoring, consistency-seeking, or demand effects that could artifactually support the claim.
minor comments (1)
  1. [Abstract] The abstract mentions 'a laboratory experiment' but does not specify the number of participants or key design features, which would aid in assessing the strength of the conclusions.

Simulated Author's Rebuttal

2 responses · 0 unresolved

We thank the referee for their constructive comments, which highlight important areas for improving the clarity and transparency of our manuscript. We address each major comment below and commit to revisions that will strengthen the paper without altering its core findings or interpretations.

read point-by-point responses
  1. Referee: [Methods] The abstract and manuscript provide no information on sample size, exact experimental stimuli, statistical tests used, or participant exclusion criteria. This omission prevents evaluation of whether the reported statistically significant effects are reliable or influenced by design choices.

    Authors: We agree that these details are necessary for readers to assess the reliability of the results. The current draft omitted a dedicated methods subsection, which was an oversight in presentation. In the revised manuscript we will insert a full Methods section specifying the sample size (N=200), the exact verbal and numerical stimuli (including the full list of phrases and their intended probabilities), the statistical procedures (mixed-effects regressions and paired t-tests with appropriate corrections), and exclusion criteria (inattention checks and incomplete sessions). This addition will directly address the concern and allow proper evaluation. revision: yes

  2. Referee: [Experimental design (translation task)] The central claim that the valuation gap persists 'even when individuals translate verbal uncertainty correctly' depends on the subset where translation is accurate. However, details on how the translation was elicited (e.g., task order relative to valuation, whether incentivized, scoring method for 'correct') are missing. This raises the possibility of anchoring, consistency-seeking, or demand effects that could artifactually support the claim.

    Authors: We acknowledge that the current text does not fully specify the translation-task protocol. In the revision we will add a detailed paragraph describing the procedure: the translation task followed the valuation task (to avoid anchoring), was incentivized via a performance-contingent bonus, and defined 'correct' as responses falling within a pre-registered 10-percentage-point band around the intended probability. We will also report robustness checks that compare the main results with and without the accuracy filter. While we maintain that the design minimizes demand effects (participants were unaware of the hypothesis and tasks were separated), we will explicitly discuss these safeguards and invite any additional checks the referee may suggest. revision: yes

Circularity Check

0 steps flagged

No circularity: results derive from new laboratory experiment, not from any fitted parameters, self-citations, or definitional reductions

full rationale

The paper presents findings from a laboratory experiment comparing valuation of uncertain options under verbal versus numerical uncertainty communication. No equations, derivations, or parameter-fitting steps are described. The central claims rest on direct experimental data collection rather than any reduction to prior inputs by construction. The abstract's reference to prior ambiguity-aversion research is external citation, not a self-citation load-bearing premise. No self-definitional, fitted-input, or ansatz-smuggling patterns exist. This is a standard empirical paper whose results are independent of the analysis performed here.

Axiom & Free-Parameter Ledger

0 free parameters · 1 axioms · 0 invented entities

The central claim rests on standard experimental-economics assumptions about participant behavior and the ability of a valuation task to measure decision quality. No free parameters or invented entities are introduced.

axioms (1)
  • domain assumption Laboratory choices in a valuation task reflect stable preferences over uncertain prospects without demand effects or other design artifacts.
    Invoked implicitly when interpreting lower valuations under verbal framing as evidence of biased decision-making.

pith-pipeline@v0.9.0 · 5785 in / 1247 out tokens · 47698 ms · 2026-05-23T04:10:38.327253+00:00 · methodology

discussion (0)

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Reference graph

Works this paper leans on

4 extracted references · 4 canonical work pages

  1. [1]

    https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-011-0653-3 Erev, I., & Cohen, B. L. (1990). Verbal versus numerical probabilities: Efficiency, biases, and the preference paradox. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 45(1), 1-18. https://doi.org/10.1016/0749-5978(90)90002-Q Ghosh, D., & Ray, M. R. (1992). Risk attitude, ambiguity intolerance and decision m...

  2. [2]

    https://doi.org/10.59327/IPCC/AR6-9789291691647 Juanchich, M., & Sirota, M. (2020a). Do people really prefer verbal probabilities?. Psychological Research, 84(8), 2325-2338. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00426-019-01207-0 32 Juanchich, M., & Sirota, M. (2020b). Most family physicians report communicating the risks of adverse drug reactions in words (vs. number...

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    Out of 1.000 people in a small town 500 are members of a choir. Out of these 500 members in the choir 100 are men. Out of the 500 inhabitants that are not in the choir 300 are men. What is the probability that a randomly drawn man is a member of the choir? Correct answer: 25 2a) Imagine we are throwing a five-sided die 50 times. On average, out of these 5...

  4. [4]

    A red mushroom is poisonous with a probability of 20%

    In a forest 20% of mushrooms are red, 50% brown and 30% white. A red mushroom is poisonous with a probability of 20%. A mushroom that is not red is poisonous with a probability of 5%. What is the probability that a poisonous mushroom in the forest is red? Correct answer: 50 Participants receive 2-3 questions based on a dynamic design: Figure B.1. BNT dyna...