Recognition: unknown
Controlling a Social Network of Individuals with Coevolving Actions and Opinions
read the original abstract
In this paper, we consider a population of individuals who have actions and opinions, which coevolve, mutually influencing one another on a complex network structure. In particular, we formulate a control problem for this social network, in which we assume that we can inject into the network a committed minority -- a set of stubborn nodes -- with the objective of steering the population, initially at a consensus, to a different consensus state. Our study focuses on two main objectives: i) determining the conditions under which the committed minority succeeds in its goal, and ii) identifying the optimal placement for such a committed minority. After deriving general monotone convergence result for the controlled dynamics, we leverage these results to build a computationally-efficient algorithm to solve the first problem and an effective heuristics for the second problem, which we prove to be NP-complete. For both algorithms, we establish theoretical guarantees. The proposed methodology is illustrated though academic examples, and demonstrated on a real-world case study.
This paper has not been read by Pith yet.
Forward citations
Cited by 1 Pith paper
-
Awareness in collective decision-making: Modeling and control in a game-theoretic framework
A tutorial review of game-theoretic and control-theoretic models showing how awareness of individual-societal tradeoffs can shape collective decision-making dynamics.
discussion (0)
Sign in with ORCID, Apple, or X to comment. Anyone can read and Pith papers without signing in.