Shortlisting Protection Configurations for HVDC Grids and Electrical Energy Hubs

Dirk Van Hertem; Geraint Chaffey; Merijn Van Deyck

REVIEW 3 major objections 4 minor 20 references

Shortlisting Protection Configurations for HVDC Grids and Electrical Energy Hubs

T0 review · 3 major / 4 minor · reviewed 2026-08-15 · deepseek-v4-flash

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Pith's one-line read Using only graph connectivity, HVDC protection configurations can be shortlisted and the minimum number of DC circuit breakers fixed.

desk verdict New approach to HVDC protection configuration search, but the headline DCCB counts rest on an unspecified and unvalidated flow model—treat as proof of concept until they specify and check it. read the letter →

arxiv 2505.05886 v1 pith:6AOANDEI submitted 2025-05-09 eess.SY cs.SY

Merijn Van Deyck , Geraint Chaffey , Dirk Van Hertem This is my paper · ORCID

classification eess.SYcs.SY

keywords HVDCgridprotectionelectricalenergyhubsislandssubstationplanningconfigurationshortlistingDCcircuitbreakersfaultimpactevaluationgraph-basedpowerflowmodel

verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal

The pith

A machine-rendered reading of the paper's core claim, the machinery that carries it, and where it could break.

The reading

This paper proposes turning HVDC protection design from an expert exercise into a systematic shortlisting problem. It models an offshore energy hub as a graph in which cables, converters, and fault-blocking DC circuit breakers are edges, so every possible arrangement of protection zones can be enumerated. Each configuration is scored by the worst-case loss of active-power infeed to connected AC zones, computed with a capacity-constrained matching of infeed to demand under maximal loading. Iteratively keeping only the lowest-impact configurations across power-flow scenarios and secondary metrics reduces many candidate options to a small set. On three test hubs of increasing size, the paper finds that three DCCBs for the small case and five for the medium and large cases suffice to hold fault impact at $1\,P$ in all considered scenarios, one fewer than a typical fully selective implementation.

What carries the argument

The machinery is the graph model together with the iterative filter built on it. Nodes are connection points; edges are cables, converters, and switchgear, with DCCBs marked as fault-blocking so that protection zones are the subgraphs separated by them. A fault in a zone is modeled by deleting that subgraph, and power flows before and during the fault are produced by a capacity-constrained shortest-path matching of infeed and demand nodes, so loss of infeed can be computed from connectivity and cable capacities alone. The filter evaluates, for each power-flow scenario, the worst-case total loss of power transfer and the worst-case loss per AC zone, keeps only minimal-impact configurations, and then applies secondary connectivity-derived metrics: length-weighted expected impact $P_{\mathrm{avg}}$ and average impact of primary protection failure $P_{\mathrm{bu}}$. Because the number of candidate configurations grows exponentially as $N = N_{\mathrm{con}}\cdot(N_{\mathrm{DC,con}})^{N_{\mathrm{cab}}+N_{\mathrm{conv}}}$, this cheap-to-evaluate filter is what makes the search over all zone arrangements practical.

What would settle it

Run EMT or full AC/DC load-flow simulations of the small test hub under maximal loading in power-flow scenarios PF1–PF3 for the shortlisted three-DCCB configuration and for configurations the filter rejected; if any rejected configuration shows a strictly lower worst-case loss of infeed than the shortlisted one, or if any cable fault in the shortlisted layout de-energizes more than $1\,P$ of infeed, the connectivity-only ranking and the derived minimum DCCB counts would not carry over.

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Extended reading notes

Core claim

The central claim is that protection-zone topology, not electrical detail, determines which HVDC switching-station designs can keep fault impacts low. Treating each converter and cable as an edge connected to one of the hub's internal DC nodes, and each DCCB as an edge that blocks fault current, the paper derives protection zones as the subgraphs that would be de-energized by a fault. Fault impact is quantified by $P_{\mathrm{LoI}} = \max_z \sum_G (P_{\mathrm{PreFault},G} - P_{\mathrm{Fault},G,z})$, the largest loss of active-power infeed across AC zones and protection zones, computed under maximal loading in several power-flow scenarios. After iterative filtering, the surviving configurations in the three test cases achieve worst-case impact $1\,P$ with three DCCBs in the small case and five in the medium and large cases. Compared with a typical fully selective implementation, the selected configurations reach the same worst-case and average fault impacts with one fewer DCCB and lower the average impact when a primary breaker fails.

Load-bearing premise

The shortlisting results stand on the assumption that the graph-based, capacity-constrained matching of infeed to demand ranks protection configurations by real fault impact in the same order that a detailed electromagnetic-transient or full AC/DC load-flow simulation would, and this ranking fidelity is not validated in the paper.

Editorial extensions

If this is right

System developers can size protection investment from the shortlist: extra DCCBs beyond the minimum do not change worst-case impact, but they do reduce the length-weighted expected impact and the impact of back-up protection failure, giving a concrete cost-versus-resilience trade-off.
The same filtering loop can be rerun with any metric that depends only on which parts of the grid stay connected during a fault, such as reactive-power availability or post-fault reconnection priority, without changing the graph model.
The design principles observed in the test cases, separating cables to the same AC zone into different protection zones and often separating the converters, become directly usable heuristics for early hub design.
For multi-hub MTDC grids, the graph representation already includes external DC nodes, so the shortlisting procedure extends from a single energy island to interconnected islands without reformulation.
A typical fully selective layout with one DCCB per cable and none on converters uses more breakers than the shortlisted layout while performing worse under primary-breaker failure, so configuration-level search is a cost-reducing alternative.

Reading between the lines

Editorial extensions of the paper, not claims the author makes directly.

If the ranking-fidelity assumption holds, a natural extension is to run the filter with AC frequency-stability limits as the stopping rule, directly reporting loss of infeed per synchronous zone to match grid-code dimensioning incidents.
The minimum-breaker counts are established only for three test topologies, so a testable conjecture is that the required DCCB count scales with the largest number of parallel cables feeding one synchronous zone rather than with total hub size.
Because the graph model allows external DC nodes and any connectivity-based metric, the shortlisting could be extended to compare hybrid designs that mix DCCBs, fault-blocking converters, and preventive decoupling without changing the search procedure.
The paper's one-fewer-DCCB result implies an economic corollary that is left implicit: if the ranking holds, the shortlisted layout dominates the typical fully selective layout on both equipment cost and back-up failure impact, so the cost-benefit comparison would favor the shortlisted design.

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Editorial analysis

A structured set of objections, weighed in public.

Desk editor's note, referee report, and a circularity audit.

Desk Editor's Note

read the letter

Colleague,

Here's my read on arXiv:2505.05886. The genuinely new thing is that protection design is treated as a search over graph configurations—where breakers go, which nodes cables and converters attach to—rather than applying a fixed strategy to a fixed topology. The filtering pipeline and the extra metrics (length-weighted expected impact, back-up failure impact) are sensible, and Table 3's design principles are the kind of output that could actually feed into planning. Credit where due: the paper is clear, the simplifications are acknowledged in Section 2.3, and there is no hidden curve-fitting; the metrics are defined independently of the conclusions.

The soft spot is exactly where the stress test puts it. The capacity-constrained shortest-path flow algorithm is described in a sentence, not specified. There is no objective function, no tie-breaking rule, no way to check path-splitting or parallel-path handling. No code or data are shipped. And no validation against EMT or a full load-flow shows that this connectivity-only model ranks configurations correctly. That matters because the paper's categorical statements—"at least three DCCBs", "at least five", and the one-fewer-breaker comparison with the fully selective baseline—all depend on the PLoI ranking being right. If the approximate flow model misorders even a few configurations near the Pareto front, the headline numbers don't transfer to a real switching station.

That said, the paper itself frames the graph model as a shortlisting precursor (Section 2.1), so the authors are not overclaiming the physics. The issue is that they then state the numerical results without hedging, and the method is not yet reproducible. This is fixable. A revised version needs (a) a complete specification of the flow algorithm, including tie-breaking and capacity handling; (b) code or at least detailed pseudocode and the data for the test cases; (c) a sensitivity check or a small EMT/load-flow benchmark on a few configurations to show the ranking is stable. Alternatively, the authors could explicitly relabel all numerical outcomes as proof-of-concept, which would lower the bar but also the value.

My verdict: this deserves a serious referee. The idea is worth engaging with, the field needs this kind of enumeration tool, and the shortcomings are about evidence, not about the approach being wrong. But I would not accept the paper in its current form. I'd ask for major revision along the lines above. For a reading group, it's a maybe: useful for people working on HVDC protection planning, less so for a general power-systems audience.

Referee Report

3 major / 4 minor

Summary. The paper proposes a graph-based shortlisting methodology for HVDC protection configurations in energy hubs. It models hubs as graphs, derives protection zones from fault-blocking edges, and evaluates worst-case loss of power infeed (PLoI) using a capacity-constrained shortest-path power-flow model. Iterative filtering across three power-flow scenarios and additional metrics (length-weighted expected impact Pavg and backup-protection failure impact Pbu) reduces the configuration space. Results for three test cases yield minimum DCCB counts (3 for the small case, 5 for the medium and large cases to achieve 1P worst-case impact) and a claim that shortlisted configurations achieve the same worst-case and average fault impacts as a typical fully selective implementation with one fewer DCCB, while lowering backup-protection failure impact (Section 3.4, Table 4).

Significance. If the graph-model ranking is trustworthy, the methodology is a valuable early-stage design tool: it systematically explores configuration space beyond expert-selected strategies, is transferable to hubs of different sizes, and introduces metrics—notably Pbu—that are sensible for comparing protection architectures. The paper is clearly written at a conceptual level and the problem framing is relevant to planned North Sea energy hubs. However, the absence of an algorithm specification, the lack of any validation against EMT or full load-flow studies, and unaddressed computational-scale questions prevent the numerical claims from being accepted as they stand.

major comments (3)

[Section 2.2, Eq. (1)] The power-flow model that produces PLoI is underspecified. The only description is that 'a graph theory-based shortest path algorithm that is adapted to include available line capacity is used to match demand and infeed nodes.' No objective function, tie-breaking rule, path-splitting method, or treatment of parallel paths and converter limits is given, and no code or data are provided. Because all headline results, including the minimum DCCB counts in Section 3.1 and the comparison with the fully selective implementation in Table 4, are outputs of this algorithm, the paper cannot be reproduced or audited without this specification or an accompanying implementation.
[Sections 2.1, 2.3, and 3.4] The ranking fidelity of the graph model is unvalidated. The paper itself states in Section 2.1 that the method is a 'precursor to more detailed protection design studies' and in Section 2.3 that 'in depth studies are required during the final phases.' Yet the categorical claims about the required number of DCCBs and the one-fewer-DCCB equivalence with the fully selective implementation are direct outputs of this unvalidated model. A validation against EMT or DC load-flow on at least a subset of the shortlisted configurations—for example, the finalists in Figs. 7–8 and Table 4—is necessary to support the claim that the shortlisting ranks configurations correctly. Without this, the central numerical conclusions could be artifacts of the approximate capacity-based flow model.
[Section 2.4 and Section 3.3 (Fig. 9)] The computational feasibility of enumerating and evaluating the large configuration sets is not established. Equation (2) predicts an exponential growth in the number of configurations, and Fig. 9 shows initial counts on the order of 10^9 for the large test case, but the paper provides no pseudo-code, no details of the pruning strategy beyond removing unused DC nodes and symmetry elimination, and no runtime or memory figures. This makes the shortlisting methodology impossible to verify and undermines the claimed scalability. The authors should either specify the generation and evaluation procedure in enough detail to be replicated or provide a clear account of how such large counts are processed.

minor comments (4)

[Section 2.4, Eq. (2)] The notation is confusing: Ncon is used for the number of DCCB arrangements while N total uses the same subscript, and NDC,con is introduced only in Eq. (3). Please clarify these definitions and include a concrete example showing how Eq. (2) is evaluated for one of the test cases.
[Figure 10] The heat maps lack axis labels and a legend explaining the meaning of the numeric entries (0, 1, 2). The text explains that entries count how often elements are in the same protection zone, but the figure alone is not interpretable; add explicit row/column labels and a colorbar with a clear caption.
[Section 3.2 and Fig. 8] The numeric values cited in the text (e.g., 1.66P, 0.66P, 1.17P) are not clearly aligned with individual bars in Fig. 8. Please annotate the figure or add a table that maps the reported values to each DCCB count and test case.
[Table 4] The table caption should explicitly state that AVG refers to the length-weighted expected impact (Eq. 4) and BU refers to the average impact of primary protection failure (Eq. 5), and that the numbers in parentheses are the shortlisting results with the corresponding DCCB counts.

Circularity Check

0 steps flagged · score 0.0 of 10

No circularity: the shortlisting metrics and results are outputs of an exhaustive enumeration under stated assumptions, not fitted inputs or self-imported conclusions.

full rationale

The paper's derivation chain is self-contained. The performance metrics PLoI, Pavg, and Pbu are defined independently in Eqs. (1), (4), and (5) in terms of pre-fault and faulted loss of infeed, cable-length weighting, and primary-breaker failure, respectively; none of these definitions presupposes the shortlisting outcome or the minimum DCCB counts. The shortlisting process enumerates configurations via Eq. (2), evaluates the defined metrics under the stated power-flow scenarios, and then filters to the lowest-impact configurations. The claims that the small case needs at least three DCCBs, that medium and large cases need at least five, and that the shortlisted configurations match a typical fully selective implementation with one fewer DCCB are outputs of this enumeration under the model assumptions, not parameters fitted to the results and then reported as predictions. The cited works used in the assumptions, notably [14] and [16] for loss-of-infeed as a planning metric and [20] for converter ride-through behavior, provide background justification but do not themselves deliver the paper's numerical conclusions or exclude alternative configurations. The graph-based shortest-path flow model is indeed underspecified and unvalidated against EMT or full AC/DC load-flow studies, and this creates a real fidelity risk for the ranking of configurations; however, an unvalidated or approximate model is not the same as a circular derivation, because the reported results do not reduce by construction to the model inputs. No circular step can be demonstrated from the paper's own equations or citations, so the appropriate score is 0.

Assumptions & free parameters 3 free parameters · 7 assumptions · 0 invented entities

The central claim rests on standard HVDC protection behavior assumptions, such as zone de-energization and healthy zones staying online, and on the unvalidated assumption that a connectivity-based shortest-path power flow model ranks configurations correctly. The free parameters are hand-chosen scenarios and cable lengths used to illustrate the metrics.

free parameters (3)

Cable lengths for Pavg = 100 km, 700 km, 250 km (Zone 1, 2, 3)
Hand-chosen lengths used in Eq. 4 for the length-weighted expected impact metric; they directly affect the Pavg values in Fig. 8 and subsequent filtering.
Power flow scenarios PF1-PF3 = Tab. 1 example: AC1 +2P, AC6 -2P
Hand-selected scenario set representing high wind infeed and different export zones; the minimum DCCB counts are conditional on this scenario set.
Uniform capacity 1P per element = 1P (e.g., 1 GW per pole)
Normalizing assumption that allows expressing all impacts in multiples of P; chosen by the authors as a simplification, not fitted.

assumptions (7)

domain assumption A fault in a protection zone de-energizes the entire zone.
Used in the fault impact evaluation (Section 2.2, Fig. 2): the protected zone subgraph is removed from the network during the fault.
domain assumption Healthy elements outside the faulted protection zone remain in continuous operation.
Section 2.3 states this assumption, allowing power flow to persist in remaining grid elements during the faulted state.
domain assumption Infeed and demand setpoints remain at pre-fault values during fault and restoration.
Section 2.3: no reserve activation, demand curtailment, or converter re-dispatch is modeled; this makes loss-of-infeed a connectivity-only calculation.
domain assumption Worst-case loss of active power infeed is an accurate metric for comparing protection designs.
Section 2.3, with reference [14], ties PLoI to AC grid frequency stability; the paper's DCCB count conclusions depend on this metric being the right objective.
domain assumption Cables in the same protection zone can be modeled as connected to a single DC node.
Section 2.4: 'Cables in a single protection zone can be considered to be connected to the same node...', reducing nodes to the number of protection zones.
domain assumption The capacity-constrained shortest-path matching yields indicative power flows that rank configurations correctly.
Section 2.2 introduces the algorithm without specification and Section 2.3 asserts the simplified representation is effective for shortlisting without validation against EMT; this is the core unvalidated premise.
domain assumption All cables and converters have equal capacity 1P, single-pole representation.
Section 2.2 assumes uniform capacity and per-pole representation; extensions to mixed ratings and bipolar systems are mentioned but not demonstrated.

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Cite this review

Pith. "Pith review of Shortlisting Protection Configurations for HVDC Grids and Electrical Energy Hubs." pith.science (2026). https://pith.science/paper/6AOANDEI

@misc{pith2026250505886,
  author       = {Pith},
  title        = {Pith review of: Shortlisting Protection Configurations for HVDC Grids and Electrical Energy Hubs},
  year         = {2026},
  howpublished = {\url{https://pith.science/paper/6AOANDEI}},
  note         = {Machine review of arXiv:2505.05886}
}

read the original abstract

This paper proposes a methodology for shortlisting protection system configurations for large HVDC switching stations, which are expected in multiterminal HVDC grids and electrical energy hubs (or energy islands). This novel approach focuses on the configuration of protection equipment and the arrangement of lines and converters in various protection zones, instead of expert decisions on protection strategies based on numerous simulations. A graph-based approach that allows high-level evaluation of possible DC fault impacts is presented. This fault impact evaluation method can evaluate many possible protection configurations allowing the selection of less obvious choices, as experts cannot consider all possible configurations, especially when the switching station size increases. A filtering process is applied to reduce the number of possible configurations based on multiple protection performance metrics which are evaluated for different power flow scenarios. The results for these performance metrics can be compared for configurations with different numbers of HVDC circuit breakers to assess the benefit of increasing the amount of protection equipment in different network topologies. It is also shown that, through continued filtering using additional performance metrics or fault scenarios, the number of possible breaker, cable and converter configurations can be further reduced, leading to a protection design that is well suited for many operational scenarios. The results of the shortlisting process provide insights on the required number of HVDC circuit breakers to limit fault impacts to a given value. Moreover, observed trends in the results could, in future studies, contribute to new design principles and priorities, allowing system developers to more effectively design HVDC protection systems for different operational scenarios and possible investment levels.

Figures

Figures reproduced from arXiv: 2505.05886 by the authors.

**Figure 2.** Grid representation for the evaluation of fault impacts. [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p007_2.png] view at source ↗

**Figure 3.** Availability of controlled active power during the fault clearin [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p008_3.png] view at source ↗

Figures from the paper (7 more)

**Figure 4.** Figure 4: System-level diagram for medium and large electrical ener [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p012_4.png]

**Figure 5.** Figure 5: Example power flow scenarios used to illustrate the shortlis [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p013_5.png]

**Figure 6.** Figure 6: Filtering steps in the considered example of the shortlisting [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p013_6.png]

**Figure 7.** Figure 7: Total worst-case loss of power transfer in each conside [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p014_7.png]

**Figure 8.** Figure 8: Length-weighted expected impact and average impact of [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p016_8.png]

**Figure 9.** Figure 9: Number of possible protection configurations in the consid [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p017_9.png]

**Figure 10.** Figure 10: Number of times elements are located in the same protect [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p018_10.png]

Discussion (0). Continue with ORCID to comment.

Reference graph

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Pith tools

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Ostend declaration of energy ministers on the north seas as europe’s green power plant: Delivering cross-border projects and anchor - ing the renewable oﬀshore industry in europe

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50Hertz, Ampiron, Elia, Energinet, Gasunie, and Tennet, “The e sbjerg cooperation, transforming the north sea into europe’s green pow er plant,” 2023

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D. Van Hertem and M. Ghandhari, “Multi-terminal vsc hvdc for th e eu- ropean supergrid: Obstacles,” Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews , vol. 14, no. 9, pp. 3156–3163, 2010

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W. Leterme, I. Jahn, P. Ruﬃng, K. Sharifabadi, and D. Van Hert em, “De- signing for high-voltage dc grid protection: Fault clearing strategie s and protection algorithms,” IEEE Power and Energy Magazine , vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 73–81, 2019

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