Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.
Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-07T12:17:57.774806Z
Paper Citation Record · LEDGER
Two-Sided Manipulation Games in Stable Matching Markets
As of 8 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 32 of 32 outbound references and 0 inbound Pith citation observations for arXiv:2506.00554.
A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.
Coverage vector
One-hop event checks from named stored sources.
Source: scholarly_work_events, retraction_status_cache, observed 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00
Pith citing papers itemized under the disclosed page cap.
Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links
A source-named dated measurement, never combined with another source.
Source: cited_works
Reference resolution
32 of 32 outbound references displayed
- verified exact0
- verified fuzzy31
- unresolved1
- parse uncertain0
- malformed identifier0
- metadata mismatch0
External citation measurements
No source-named external measurement is stored.
Outbound references
Observation c5c9e5d4-135a-4ea0-88cc-7ba8ce4e7e4b · outbound
This paper cites The New York City High School Match.
Two-Sided Manipulation Games in Stable Matching Markets The New York City High School Match
Reference 1
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T12:18:03.894712Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.
Observation 4aa669be-4e53-4a0d-b9c5-a4986f4ad047 · outbound
This paper cites The Boston Public School Match.
Two-Sided Manipulation Games in Stable Matching Markets The Boston Public School Match
Reference 2
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T12:18:03.693600Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.
Observation 6eb73e67-dbcb-40e9-b35f-3921bf4e319f · outbound
This paper cites Unbalanced random matching markets: The stark effect of competition.
Two-Sided Manipulation Games in Stable Matching Markets Unbalanced random matching markets: The stark effect of competition
Reference 3
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T12:18:03.542388Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.
Observation ba253add-c5d9-4f4d-bb48-7faa7d44359a · outbound
This paper cites Ride Sharing.
Two-Sided Manipulation Games in Stable Matching Markets Ride Sharing
Reference 4
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T12:18:03.349732Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.
Observation 035abb32-2a8b-439b-9bbe-674c49a77236 · outbound
This paper cites Partners in Crime: Manipulating the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm through an Accomplice.
Two-Sided Manipulation Games in Stable Matching Markets Partners in Crime: Manipulating the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm through an Accomplice
Reference 5
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T12:18:03.178992Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.
Observation 636e3de5-a578-4c55-b0e6-362369506614 · outbound
This paper cites Fair stable matching meets correlated preferences.
Two-Sided Manipulation Games in Stable Matching Markets Fair stable matching meets correlated preferences
Reference 6
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T12:18:02.987643Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.
Observation a5998f6f-55a8-4af9-ba33-c8b44f4124e0 · outbound
This paper cites Machiavelli and the G ale- S hapley algorithm.
Two-Sided Manipulation Games in Stable Matching Markets Machiavelli and the G ale- S hapley algorithm
Reference 7
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T12:18:02.756596Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.
Observation 1fbbbb99-8e99-44b0-9f83-506082b60c9f · outbound
This paper cites Using stable matching to optimize the balance between accuracy and diversity in recommendation.
Two-Sided Manipulation Games in Stable Matching Markets Using stable matching to optimize the balance between accuracy and diversity in recommendation
Reference 8
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T12:18:02.548116Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.
Observation 52143e6e-3a58-4e37-80a8-358c82f92362 · outbound
This paper cites College admissions and the stability of marriage.
Two-Sided Manipulation Games in Stable Matching Markets College admissions and the stability of marriage
Reference 9
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T12:18:02.341163Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.
Observation 4fc30b61-abe1-455b-8df6-c9acde5e8efb · outbound
This paper cites Total stability in stable matching games.
Two-Sided Manipulation Games in Stable Matching Markets Total stability in stable matching games
Reference 10
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T12:18:02.145322Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.
Observation 78f09d28-a8a2-4992-8de1-4418c6a652cf · outbound
This paper cites Total Stability in Stable Matching Games.
Two-Sided Manipulation Games in Stable Matching Markets Total Stability in Stable Matching Games
Reference 11
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T12:18:01.952471Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.
Observation 6597696f-46d6-43cb-ae1a-5e573e1b734d · outbound
This paper cites Improving Schools through School Choice: A Market Design Approach.
Two-Sided Manipulation Games in Stable Matching Markets Improving Schools through School Choice: A Market Design Approach
Reference 12
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T12:18:01.767390Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.
Observation 2edb10f7-9b76-4cc1-b505-4a0cec77451f · outbound
This paper cites Strategic aspects of stable matching markets: A survey.
Two-Sided Manipulation Games in Stable Matching Markets Strategic aspects of stable matching markets: A survey
Reference 13
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T12:18:01.623865Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.
Observation c2c4ce03-9eaa-4a7c-a1ed-9ab6b5754480 · outbound
This paper cites Accomplice Manipulation of the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm.
Two-Sided Manipulation Games in Stable Matching Markets Accomplice Manipulation of the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm
Reference 14
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T12:18:01.421439Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.
Observation d1b9d92c-6362-44ab-8743-10568b076280 · outbound
This paper cites Two for one & one for all: Two-sided manipulation in matching markets.
Two-Sided Manipulation Games in Stable Matching Markets Two for one & one for all: Two-sided manipulation in matching markets
Reference 15
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T12:18:01.249811Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.
Observation c4c28bc0-f66b-4aa0-82b6-8663c5cded12 · outbound
This paper cites Cheating by men in the gale-shapley stable matching algorithm.
Two-Sided Manipulation Games in Stable Matching Markets Cheating by men in the gale-shapley stable matching algorithm
Reference 16
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T12:18:01.037328Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.
Observation f0be6bf9-82fc-4412-9a5d-2a8fd44badb6 · outbound
This paper cites Stable Marriage and its Relation to Other Combinatorial Problems: An Introduction to the Mathematical Analysis of Algorithms , volume 10.
Two-Sided Manipulation Games in Stable Matching Markets Stable Marriage and its Relation to Other Combinatorial Problems: An Introduction to the Mathematical Analysis of Algorithms , volume 10
Reference 17
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T12:18:00.861646Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.
Observation e4ee5acc-9b87-4a20-aaa0-abfa253a7397 · outbound
This paper cites Novel uses of the Mallows model in coloring and matching.
Two-Sided Manipulation Games in Stable Matching Markets Novel uses of the Mallows model in coloring and matching
Reference 18
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T12:18:00.710815Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.
Observation f742de6b-6cc7-4f77-ba3b-4b55b4fa6869 · outbound
This paper cites Non-null ranking models.
Two-Sided Manipulation Games in Stable Matching Markets Non-null ranking models
Reference 19
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T12:18:00.579089Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.
Observation 7a748baf-5541-4b86-9337-67de7dd0f3e9 · outbound
This paper cites The stable marriage problem.
Two-Sided Manipulation Games in Stable Matching Markets The stable marriage problem
Reference 20
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T12:18:00.451367Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.
Observation d05d602d-5da3-41b5-b263-dea0aff1e347 · outbound
This paper cites The average number of stable matchings.
Two-Sided Manipulation Games in Stable Matching Markets The average number of stable matchings
Reference 21
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T12:18:00.350872Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.
Observation 13681434-fad4-4895-a4fc-e98696d3c6ed · outbound
This paper cites The redesign of the matching market for american physicians: Some engineering aspects of economic design.
Two-Sided Manipulation Games in Stable Matching Markets The redesign of the matching market for american physicians: Some engineering aspects of economic design
Reference 22
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T12:18:00.215736Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.
Observation 9d106152-a43a-468e-aad1-8c472379a785 · outbound
This paper cites Truncation Strategies in Matching Markets---In Search of Advice for Participants.
Two-Sided Manipulation Games in Stable Matching Markets Truncation Strategies in Matching Markets---In Search of Advice for Participants
Reference 23
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T12:17:59.948915Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.
Observation 90318cf0-6344-4807-9890-bc306c4975b7 · outbound
This paper cites Truncation strategies in matching markets—in search of advice for participants.
Two-Sided Manipulation Games in Stable Matching Markets Truncation strategies in matching markets—in search of advice for participants
Reference 24
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T12:17:59.592108Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.
Observation 20e022bf-a0e1-409d-bb57-98f791769d31 · outbound
This paper cites The economics of matching: Stability and incentives.
Two-Sided Manipulation Games in Stable Matching Markets The economics of matching: Stability and incentives
Reference 25
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T12:17:59.324478Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.
Observation ed6eb1a1-ecc1-4c23-b0c9-51c156febe5b · outbound
This paper cites Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem.
Two-Sided Manipulation Games in Stable Matching Markets Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem
Reference 26
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T12:17:59.067951Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.
Observation ae076cdc-dde0-40e4-9278-0cedfbc8b4f5 · outbound
This paper cites Coalition manipulation of gale-shapley algorithm.
Two-Sided Manipulation Games in Stable Matching Markets Coalition manipulation of gale-shapley algorithm
Reference 27
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T12:17:58.792506Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.
Observation 0f3c021e-eba4-4b6f-b324-834927133581 · outbound
This paper cites Coalitional permutation manipulations in the gale-shapley algorithm.
Two-Sided Manipulation Games in Stable Matching Markets Coalitional permutation manipulations in the gale-shapley algorithm
Reference 28
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T12:17:58.590498Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.
Observation b0dfcbe1-429a-42c7-b98b-c85742b60632 · outbound
This paper cites Gale-shapley stable marriage problem revisited: Strategic issues and applications.
Two-Sided Manipulation Games in Stable Matching Markets Gale-shapley stable marriage problem revisited: Strategic issues and applications
Reference 29
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T12:17:58.398750Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.
Observation d675f3fc-d847-4651-8bbf-b81ac4fec189 · outbound
This paper cites Manipulating gale-shapley algorithm: Preserving stability and remaining inconspicuous.
Two-Sided Manipulation Games in Stable Matching Markets Manipulating gale-shapley algorithm: Preserving stability and remaining inconspicuous
Reference 30
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T12:17:58.215979Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.
Observation d0752272-7e76-4983-9622-cd288888a3c2 · outbound
This paper cites Stable matchings and equilibrium outcomes of the gale-shapley's algorithm for the marriage problem.
Two-Sided Manipulation Games in Stable Matching Markets Stable matchings and equilibrium outcomes of the gale-shapley's algorithm for the marriage problem
Reference 31
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T12:17:57.994051Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.
Observation 110a6953-7f95-446f-bf40-d543e2e46dac · outbound
This paper cites write newline.
Two-Sided Manipulation Games in Stable Matching Markets write newline
Reference 32
- Resolution
- unresolved
- no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T12:17:57.774806Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Pith citing papers
No inbound Pith citation observations are available.