Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.
Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-07T11:38:21.018963Z
Paper Citation Record · LEDGER
The power of mediators: Price of anarchy and stability in Bayesian games with submodular social welfare
As of 8 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 4 of 4 outbound references and 0 inbound Pith citation observations for arXiv:2506.02655.
A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.
Coverage vector
One-hop event checks from named stored sources.
Source: scholarly_work_events, retraction_status_cache, observed 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00
Pith citing papers itemized under the disclosed page cap.
Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links
A source-named dated measurement, never combined with another source.
Source: cited_works
Reference resolution
4 of 4 outbound references displayed
- verified exact0
- verified fuzzy3
- unresolved1
- parse uncertain0
- malformed identifier0
- metadata mismatch0
External citation measurements
No source-named external measurement is stored.
Outbound references
Observation c3a66db9-b893-4c2d-bc2d-cb1d969e017c · outbound
This paper cites Each option r has an increasing concave function ur,t : Z → R representing the comfort or service quality for commuters of type t.
The power of mediators: Price of anarchy and stability in Bayesian games with submodular social welfare Each option r has an increasing concave function ur,t : Z → R representing the comfort or service quality for commuters of type t
Reference 1
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T11:38:21.705308Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.
Observation ff7c0c0d-c9ea-4972-a996-97d5dc50ed9b · outbound
This paper cites The participant selects a task ai ∈ Aθi i , where Aθi i ⊆ E is the set of feasible tasks for type θi.
The power of mediators: Price of anarchy and stability in Bayesian games with submodular social welfare The participant selects a task ai ∈ Aθi i , where Aθi i ⊆ E is the set of feasible tasks for type θi
Reference 2
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T11:38:21.480838Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.
Observation 484527cd-ef0b-4f71-af4f-39878b284bca · outbound
This paper cites E a∼π(θ) [vi(a)] # ≥ E θ−i∼ρ|θi.
The power of mediators: Price of anarchy and stability in Bayesian games with submodular social welfare E a∼π(θ) [vi(a)] # ≥ E θ−i∼ρ|θi
Reference 3
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T11:38:21.245132Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.
Observation 32236e64-b1d8-4401-85c5-a6493817322c · outbound
This paper cites Bayes correlated equilibria, no-regret dynamics in Bayesian games, and the price of anarchy.
The power of mediators: Price of anarchy and stability in Bayesian games with submodular social welfare Bayes correlated equilibria, no-regret dynamics in Bayesian games, and the price of anarchy
Reference 2008
- Resolution
- unresolved
- no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T11:38:20.640968Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Pith citing papers
No inbound Pith citation observations are available.