Paper Citation Record · LEDGER

Value-Set Iteration: Computing Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Infinite-Horizon Multi-Player Stochastic Games

As of 8 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 4 of 4 outbound references and 0 inbound Pith citation observations for arXiv:2506.07186.

A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.

pith.paper-citation-record.v1
2506.07186 v1

Coverage vector

measured 4 of 4 reference resolution

Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-07T05:56:14.786092Z

measured 4 of 4 standing notices

One-hop event checks from named stored sources.

Source: scholarly_work_events, retraction_status_cache, observed 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00

measured 0 of 0 inbound itemization

Pith citing papers itemized under the disclosed page cap.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links

measured 0 of 1 external citation measurements

A source-named dated measurement, never combined with another source.

Source: cited_works

Reference resolution

4 of 4 outbound references displayed

verified exact0
verified fuzzy4
unresolved0
parse uncertain0
malformed identifier0
metadata mismatch0

External citation measurements

No source-named external measurement is stored.

Outbound references

Observation a8395e4c-8c69-4f29-8496-afd40f15b2f9 · outbound

This paper cites achievability.

Value-Set Iteration: Computing Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Infinite-Horizon Multi-Player Stochastic Games achievability

Reference 1

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:56:14.844118Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

Observation 327ab802-2e3f-404f-9921-a7e5ec66f6ee · outbound

This paper cites Every time a new states is generated following historyσ, every player i receives a reward˜ri(σ; s), in addition to their original rewards given byr.

Value-Set Iteration: Computing Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Infinite-Horizon Multi-Player Stochastic Games Every time a new states is generated following historyσ, every player i receives a reward˜ri(σ; s), in addition to their original rewards given byr

Reference 2

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:56:14.834314Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

Observation fd0484c3-a098-4673-89e4-f8af7644f2d1 · outbound

This paper cites Additionally, we terminate it at time stept + 1.

Value-Set Iteration: Computing Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Infinite-Horizon Multi-Player Stochastic Games Additionally, we terminate it at time stept + 1

Reference 3

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:56:14.824968Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

Observation 9038a45d-98ed-43bf-b68f-a8539110c8ef · outbound

This paper cites Subsidized vs.

Value-Set Iteration: Computing Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Infinite-Horizon Multi-Player Stochastic Games Subsidized vs

Reference 4

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:56:14.814810Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

Pith citing papers

No inbound Pith citation observations are available.