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arxiv: 2507.16997 · v2 · submitted 2025-07-22 · 💰 econ.TH

Revealed and Concealed Repression: Theory and Measurement

Maria Titova , Nathan Canen , Emily Hencken Ritter , Mehdi Shadmehr This is my paper

Pith reviewed 2026-05-19 03:40 UTC · model grok-4.3

classification 💰 econ.TH
keywords repressionconcealmentmeasurement biasgame theoryauthoritarianismdeterrenceempirical indicesRussia
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The pith

Observed repression can be negatively correlated with total repression when regimes conceal some acts.

A machine-rendered reading of the paper's core claim, the machinery that carries it, and where it could break.

The paper shows that visible repression and total repression may move in opposite directions because regimes strategically hide some of their actions while activists decide whether to challenge. A reader would care because this means everyday counts of arrests or crackdowns can give the wrong signal about overall levels of control, and policies meant to cut visible repression might increase hidden repression instead. The authors build a model in which the regime chooses concealment and activists choose challenges, identifying two distinct measurement problems: one from hidden acts and one from deterrence that prevents challenges from occurring. Equilibrium conditions in the model let the authors rewrite indices for total repression using only observable quantities such as challenge rates and revealed repression. They outline an estimation approach and apply it to monthly Russian data from 2020 to 2025.

Core claim

In a model where regimes decide whether to conceal repression and activists decide whether to challenge, observed repression is negatively correlated with total repression. The negative correlation arises because regimes balance the benefits of concealment against the costs of deterrence, while high total repression reduces the number of observable challenges. Two measurement problems follow: concealment bias, which misses hidden acts, and deterrence bias, which undercounts repression when challenges are prevented. Equilibrium relationships allow the total repression index to be expressed solely in terms of observable variables such as the frequency of challenges and the share of repression,

What carries the argument

The equilibrium relationship between regime concealment choices and activist challenge decisions, which rewrites total repression indices using only observables like challenge frequency and revealed repression rates.

If this is right

  • Policy interventions that reduce observed repression may increase total repression by altering concealment incentives.
  • Standard observed-repression data will misestimate both the causes and the consequences of repression.
  • Adjusted indices can be estimated at monthly frequency from data on challenges and reported repression events.
  • Application to Russia reveals time variation in total repression not visible in raw observed counts.

Where Pith is reading between the lines

These are editorial extensions of the paper, not claims the author makes directly.

  • International efforts focused on visible repression may push regimes toward greater use of covert tactics.
  • The same equilibrium adjustment could be applied to measure hidden censorship or surveillance in other settings.
  • Cross-country comparisons of raw repression statistics will remain unreliable unless concealment incentives are accounted for.

Load-bearing premise

The model assumes regimes and activists play equilibrium strategies that let the repression indices be rewritten using only observable variables without extra untestable parameters.

What would settle it

Collect independent verification of concealment levels, such as through leaks or defector testimony, and test whether the derived indices reverse the observed correlation between visible repression and estimated total repression.

Figures

Figures reproduced from arXiv: 2507.16997 by Emily Hencken Ritter, Maria Titova, Mehdi Shadmehr, Nathan Canen.

Figure 1
Figure 1. Figure 1: Negative correlation between total and revealed repression. Basing analysis or policy on the observable revealed repression can lead to perverse outcomes. Left Panel: G = U[0, 1] and H = U[c, 1]; Right Panel: G = U[ρ, 1] and H = U[0, 1]. Parameters: q = 0.65, γ = 0.4 βG = 2.5, βB = −1, αG = 0.6, and αB > 0.6. they risk drawing misleading inferences about the overall prevalence of repression. To illustrate … view at source ↗
read the original abstract

Regimes routinely conceal acts of repression. We show that observed repression may be negatively correlated with total repression, consisting of both revealed and concealed acts. This distortion can generate perverse effects for policy interventions designed to reduce repression and complicates inference about the causes and consequences of repression. We develop a model in which regimes choose whether to conceal repression and activists decide whether to challenge the regime. We identify two measurement problems - one due to concealment and one to deterrence. We construct indices of repression that account for these problems and show how these indices can be expressed in terms of observable variables by leveraging equilibrium relationships. We then propose an empirical strategy to estimate these indices. As a proof of concept, we apply this approach to Russia, estimating repression indices at a monthly frequency for 2020-2025.

Editorial analysis

A structured set of objections, weighed in public.

Desk editor's note, referee report, simulated authors' rebuttal, and a circularity audit. Tearing a paper down is the easy half of reading it; the pith above is the substance, this is the friction.

Referee Report

2 major / 3 minor

Summary. The manuscript develops a game-theoretic model in which regimes choose whether to conceal repression and activists decide whether to challenge the regime. It identifies two measurement problems—one due to concealment and one due to deterrence—and constructs indices of total repression (revealed plus concealed) that are rewritten solely in terms of observable variables by substituting equilibrium conditions. An empirical strategy is proposed to estimate these indices, with a proof-of-concept application to monthly Russian data for 2020-2025 demonstrating that observed repression may be negatively correlated with total repression.

Significance. If the central derivation holds, the paper offers a valuable contribution to the measurement of repression by showing how strategic concealment can produce a negative correlation between observed and total repression, with direct implications for policy interventions and causal inference. The equilibrium-based rewriting of indices to eliminate unobservables is a technically interesting approach that could extend to other settings with hidden actions. The Russia application illustrates the method at high frequency, though its validity depends on the equilibrium assumptions.

major comments (2)
  1. [§3.2] §3.2 (Equilibrium Indices): The rewriting of the total repression index as a function of observables substitutes the equilibrium concealment probability and challenge decision for the latent variables. This substitution holds only if the equilibrium is unique, interior, and stable; the manuscript provides no proof of uniqueness, no discussion of multiplicity or corner solutions, and no analysis of potential belief updating by activists about concealment. This assumption is load-bearing for the claim that observed repression is negatively correlated with total repression and for the subsequent empirical indices.
  2. [§5] §5 (Russia Application): The estimated monthly series for 2020-2025 are treated as valid measures of total repression without an independent validation that the observed challenge and reported-repression data satisfy the exact equilibrium mapping used in the derivation. No checks are reported for whether the data are consistent with interior equilibria in all periods or whether omitted strategic interactions remain.
minor comments (3)
  1. [§3] The notation for the deterrence effect in Eq. (8) is introduced after its first use in the index derivation; a forward reference or earlier definition would improve readability.
  2. [§5] Figure 2 (Russia time series) would benefit from shaded regions indicating periods of potential corner solutions or data limitations to aid interpretation of the negative correlation.
  3. [§1] The literature review could add citations to recent work on strategic information transmission in authoritarian settings to better situate the concealment mechanism.

Simulated Author's Rebuttal

2 responses · 0 unresolved

We thank the referee for their detailed and insightful comments. We believe the suggestions will improve the clarity and robustness of our analysis. Below, we respond to each major comment and outline the revisions we plan to make.

read point-by-point responses

  1. Referee: [§3.2] §3.2 (Equilibrium Indices): The rewriting of the total repression index as a function of observables substitutes the equilibrium concealment probability and challenge decision for the latent variables. This substitution holds only if the equilibrium is unique, interior, and stable; the manuscript provides no proof of uniqueness, no discussion of multiplicity or corner solutions, and no analysis of potential belief updating by activists about concealment. This assumption is load-bearing for the claim that observed repression is negatively correlated with total repression and for the subsequent empirical indices.

    Authors: We appreciate the referee highlighting the importance of equilibrium properties. The model is constructed such that for the parameter space considered, there exists a unique interior mixed strategy equilibrium, as the best response functions intersect once in (0,1)^2. We will add a new proposition in §3.2 proving uniqueness and asymptotic stability of this equilibrium under the maintained assumptions on payoffs. We will also explicitly discuss corner solutions and show that they do not arise in the empirically relevant range. Regarding belief updating, the model employs the standard rational expectations assumption where activists correctly anticipate the regime's strategy; we will add a brief discussion clarifying this and noting that dynamic belief updating is left for future work. These additions will strengthen the foundation for the negative correlation result. revision: yes

  2. Referee: [§5] §5 (Russia Application): The estimated monthly series for 2020-2025 are treated as valid measures of total repression without an independent validation that the observed challenge and reported-repression data satisfy the exact equilibrium mapping used in the derivation. No checks are reported for whether the data are consistent with interior equilibria in all periods or whether omitted strategic interactions remain.

    Authors: We agree that additional validation would enhance confidence in the application. In the revised manuscript, we will include a new subsection in §5 reporting the estimated equilibrium probabilities for each month, confirming that they remain interior (strictly between 0 and 1) throughout the sample period. We will also add robustness checks, such as sensitivity to alternative parameter calibrations and comparisons with external indicators of repression. While fully independent validation data is scarce, we will discuss the consistency of our estimates with qualitative accounts of Russian politics during this period. Regarding omitted strategic interactions, we will note this as a limitation and suggest it as an avenue for future research. revision: partial

Circularity Check

0 steps flagged

No significant circularity: theoretical model derives observable indices via equilibrium without self-referential reduction

full rationale

The paper first specifies a game-theoretic model of regime concealment choice and activist challenge decision. It then derives equilibrium conditions from that model and substitutes them to rewrite repression indices solely in observables. This is a standard forward derivation from stated primitives rather than a reduction of the target quantity to its own fitted inputs or a self-citation chain. No equations are shown that define an index by construction from the very observables it is later claimed to predict, nor is a uniqueness theorem imported from the authors' prior work to force the mapping. The Russia application treats the resulting series as a proof-of-concept measurement exercise; absent explicit evidence that parameters were fitted to the target correlation and then relabeled as a prediction, the derivation remains self-contained against external benchmarks.

Axiom & Free-Parameter Ledger

0 free parameters · 1 axioms · 0 invented entities

The central claim rests on a game-theoretic model of rational regime and activist choices plus equilibrium conditions that map unobservables to observables; no free parameters or invented entities are described in the abstract.

axioms (1)
  • domain assumption Regimes and activists choose concealment and challenges to maximize their objectives under equilibrium conditions.
    Standard rational-choice premise invoked to derive the measurement indices from the model.

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Reference graph

Works this paper leans on

5 extracted references · 5 canonical work pages

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