Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.
Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-15T16:47:41.372208Z
Paper Citation Record · LEDGER
Harnessing Information in Incentive Design
As of 17 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 30 of 30 outbound references and 0 inbound Pith citation observations for arXiv:2509.02493.
A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.
Coverage vector
One-hop event checks from named stored sources.
Source: scholarly_work_events, retraction_status_cache, observed 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00
Pith citing papers itemized under the disclosed page cap.
Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links
A source-named dated measurement, never combined with another source.
Source: cited_works
Reference resolution
30 of 30 outbound references displayed
- verified exact0
- verified fuzzy26
- unresolved4
- parse uncertain0
- malformed identifier0
- metadata mismatch0
External citation measurements
No source-named external measurement is stored.
Outbound references
Observation 34b11175-2214-4071-9605-41c9586b4b47 · outbound
This paper cites Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors.
Harnessing Information in Incentive Design Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors
Reference 1
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-15T16:47:41.829195Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 3838d428-0d6d-4297-98c9-27201e2bba1e · outbound
This paper cites The market for “lemons”: Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism.
Harnessing Information in Incentive Design The market for “lemons”: Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism
Reference 2
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-15T16:47:41.815568Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation f2592a98-c856-475e-8fc4-6d771ee63777 · outbound
This paper cites Consumer control and privacy policies.
Harnessing Information in Incentive Design Consumer control and privacy policies
Reference 3
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-15T16:47:41.800181Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 5d6e1f21-3320-4e2b-93b0-10544aedccf7 · outbound
This paper cites Repeated Games with Incomplete Information.
Harnessing Information in Incentive Design Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
Reference 4
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-15T16:47:41.788579Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 1861891b-d4f5-44e6-803b-6f60ba3c0958 · outbound
This paper cites General theory for S tackelberg games with partial state information.
Harnessing Information in Incentive Design General theory for S tackelberg games with partial state information
Reference 5
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-15T16:47:41.776967Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 9b5c76d2-c277-426e-a1c6-1fae4b1f951f · outbound
This paper cites Affine incentive schemes for stochastic systems with dynamic information.
Harnessing Information in Incentive Design Affine incentive schemes for stochastic systems with dynamic information
Reference 6
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-15T16:47:41.765753Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 1e4768a9-36dc-4943-bf7e-8ee7d527fe17 · outbound
This paper cites Inducement of desired behavior via soft policies.
Harnessing Information in Incentive Design Inducement of desired behavior via soft policies
Reference 7
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-15T16:47:41.640477Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation c3e0aca5-8427-4e96-96c4-b122f70185e3 · outbound
This paper cites The limits of price discrimination.
Harnessing Information in Incentive Design The limits of price discrimination
Reference 8
- Resolution
- unresolved
- no resolver link, observed 2026-08-15T16:47:41.280385Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation d432e85f-876f-49cc-bd09-7da779a5d2f5 · outbound
This paper cites Contract theory.
Harnessing Information in Incentive Design Contract theory
Reference 9
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-15T16:47:41.624180Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 4dcb08f1-b18d-4737-a1fe-6c321eda1815 · outbound
This paper cites Screening with Persuasion.
Harnessing Information in Incentive Design Screening with Persuasion
Reference 10
- Resolution
- unresolved
- no resolver link, observed 2026-08-15T16:47:41.290566Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation 57ddf86e-e118-44ca-99fb-f1f0daed89c2 · outbound
This paper cites Dynamic Noncooperative Game Theory.
Harnessing Information in Incentive Design Dynamic Noncooperative Game Theory
Reference 11
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-15T16:47:41.614579Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 8bd64c36-de9a-4d9e-8f98-da576dc830e3 · outbound
This paper cites A minimum sensitivity approach to incentive design problems.
Harnessing Information in Incentive Design A minimum sensitivity approach to incentive design problems
Reference 12
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-15T16:47:41.604264Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation b02b0e68-fe31-4a5d-9d61-a1569b13b818 · outbound
This paper cites Optimum/near-optimum incentive policies for stochastic decision problems involving parametric uncertainty.
Harnessing Information in Incentive Design Optimum/near-optimum incentive policies for stochastic decision problems involving parametric uncertainty
Reference 13
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-15T16:47:41.592430Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 18100648-3bd4-47d0-8a70-b01ea0c6a93c · outbound
This paper cites Computing the optimal strategy to commit to.
Harnessing Information in Incentive Design Computing the optimal strategy to commit to
Reference 14
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-15T16:47:41.581852Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 8b885b22-0a26-42f8-95ca-418447a1eb34 · outbound
This paper cites Algorithmic B ayesian P ersuasion.
Harnessing Information in Incentive Design Algorithmic B ayesian P ersuasion
Reference 15
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-15T16:47:41.571285Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation b1c26cf0-c28b-4774-9a9a-4784cad18d89 · outbound
This paper cites Game Theory.
Harnessing Information in Incentive Design Game Theory
Reference 16
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-15T16:47:41.560718Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 8e399495-ca09-4aa9-9eff-005c0baea457 · outbound
This paper cites Costly persuasion.
Harnessing Information in Incentive Design Costly persuasion
Reference 17
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-15T16:47:41.546543Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation e0d824d1-d97b-43a2-91b7-97f3a2657a16 · outbound
This paper cites Incentives in teams.
Harnessing Information in Incentive Design Incentives in teams
Reference 18
- Resolution
- unresolved
- no resolver link, observed 2026-08-15T16:47:41.324418Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation 0b1e2a62-e05a-4091-a7f5-e7027a8de0bb · outbound
This paper cites Bayesian persuasion.
Harnessing Information in Incentive Design Bayesian persuasion
Reference 19
- Resolution
- unresolved
- no resolver link, observed 2026-08-15T16:47:41.328825Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation 41506040-c48a-47cd-8bbd-98cc0be8e376 · outbound
This paper cites Bayesian persuasion with costly information acquisition.
Harnessing Information in Incentive Design Bayesian persuasion with costly information acquisition
Reference 20
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-15T16:47:41.520735Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation bf59e5d4-db4c-4fe1-886e-3197d128dcfb · outbound
This paper cites Monopoly and product quality.
Harnessing Information in Incentive Design Monopoly and product quality
Reference 21
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-15T16:47:41.510700Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 5fef97f1-0b7c-4c82-bf05-6de0efbe12a5 · outbound
This paper cites Rationalizability, learning, and equilibrium in games with strategic complementarities.
Harnessing Information in Incentive Design Rationalizability, learning, and equilibrium in games with strategic complementarities
Reference 22
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-15T16:47:41.500726Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation e75caf2a-1ad4-4fbe-9ea7-a7c65656997a · outbound
This paper cites Buyer-optimal learning and monopoly pricing.
Harnessing Information in Incentive Design Buyer-optimal learning and monopoly pricing
Reference 23
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-15T16:47:41.490206Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 7e752ef1-a541-40b9-a8b3-0f126327e98e · outbound
This paper cites Persuasion-based robust sensor design against attackers with unknown control objectives.
Harnessing Information in Incentive Design Persuasion-based robust sensor design against attackers with unknown control objectives
Reference 24
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-15T16:47:41.478549Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation f00096b4-18d2-4b82-9f50-104c7c9db958 · outbound
This paper cites An incentive model of duopoly with government coordination.
Harnessing Information in Incentive Design An incentive model of duopoly with government coordination
Reference 25
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-15T16:47:41.467420Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 5c9b8144-2fb2-4ff9-84de-aea35dd9b6aa · outbound
This paper cites Job market signaling.
Harnessing Information in Incentive Design Job market signaling
Reference 26
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-15T16:47:41.457436Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 6c005bf2-dfc8-4c8e-bd0d-cf25c5ff6a36 · outbound
This paper cites Bayesian persuasion with quadratic preferences.
Harnessing Information in Incentive Design Bayesian persuasion with quadratic preferences
Reference 27
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-15T16:47:41.448758Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 447c3feb-edf3-477e-8182-aa7544ff1c9c · outbound
This paper cites Value of information in games with multiple strategic information providers.
Harnessing Information in Incentive Design Value of information in games with multiple strategic information providers
Reference 28
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-15T16:47:41.439453Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 1b271332-c75e-4a32-9861-d1c568026b7a · outbound
This paper cites Signaling in B ayesian S tackelberg G ames.
Harnessing Information in Incentive Design Signaling in B ayesian S tackelberg G ames
Reference 29
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-15T16:47:41.429543Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 8076bc38-b7d6-4246-8ee4-3d247ba80052 · outbound
This paper cites Existence and derivation of optimal affine incentive schemes for S tackelberg games with partial information: A geometric approach.
Harnessing Information in Incentive Design Existence and derivation of optimal affine incentive schemes for S tackelberg games with partial information: A geometric approach
Reference 30
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-15T16:47:41.419278Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Pith citing papers
No inbound Pith citation observations are available.