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Paper Citation Record · LEDGER

Equilibria in Large Position-Optimization Games

As of 23 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 7 of 7 outbound references and 0 inbound Pith citation observations for arXiv:2602.15225.

A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.

pith.paper-citation-record.v1
2602.15225 v2

Coverage vector

measured 7 of 7 reference resolution

Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-02T23:08:00.652785Z

measured 7 of 7 standing notices

One-hop event checks from named stored sources.

Source: scholarly_work_events, retraction_status_cache, observed 2026-08-23T06:30:58.430688+00:00

measured 0 of 0 inbound itemization

Pith citing papers itemized under the disclosed page cap.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links

measured 0 of 1 external citation measurements

A source-named dated measurement, never combined with another source.

Source: cited_works

Reference resolution

7 of 7 outbound references displayed

  • verified exact0
  • verified fuzzy0
  • unresolved6
  • parse uncertain0
  • malformed identifier1
  • metadata mismatch0

External citation measurements

No source-named external measurement is stored.

Outbound references

Observation fc57c427-2829-4bf6-abc2-75b1edf1ecba · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Equilibria in Large Position-Optimization Games Unresolved cited work

Reference 1

Resolution
unresolved
no resolver link, observed 2026-08-02T23:07:59.931171Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-02T23:07:59.931171Z digest=sha256:2e0c64e7da387c551d251a26652da2e728f286ffdaa1d9da01f8e2dead311025

Observation 76846fc4-09d1-45f3-89f1-c5fbb97d769a · outbound

This paper cites Specifically,u i(xi,x −i) = 2−ϵ 2n , and deviating tox 3 leads to utility n−4+3ϵ n(n−2) > 2−ϵ 2n forϵ > 4 n+4.

Equilibria in Large Position-Optimization Games Specifically,u i(xi,x −i) = 2−ϵ 2n , and deviating tox 3 leads to utility n−4+3ϵ n(n−2) > 2−ϵ 2n forϵ > 4 n+4

Reference 2

Resolution
unresolved
no resolver link, observed 2026-08-02T23:08:00.039949Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-02T23:08:00.039949Z digest=sha256:cef8b69c630089926f5cecd184406930b078f278bf8e02043076c6a955fe7f74

Observation 0d013990-a418-4fcc-b2cc-f006449bc70b · outbound

This paper cites Specifically,u i(xi,x −i) = 2−2ϵ 2n , while deviating tox 2 leads to utility 2−ϵ 2n > 2−2ϵ 2n.

Equilibria in Large Position-Optimization Games Specifically,u i(xi,x −i) = 2−2ϵ 2n , while deviating tox 2 leads to utility 2−ϵ 2n > 2−2ϵ 2n

Reference 3

Resolution
unresolved
no resolver link, observed 2026-08-02T23:08:00.262616Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-02T23:08:00.262616Z digest=sha256:7d772d8df23271225cd4aefd49a247bb769ec5651fabc45f0ada9c87683d2e53

Observation 322e2dd1-3c19-4208-a95c-ed6665be3f5c · outbound

This paper cites Specifically,u i(xi,x −i) = 1−ϵ n , and deviating tox 3 leads to utility n−4+3ϵ n(n−3) > 1−ϵ n forϵ > 1 n.

Equilibria in Large Position-Optimization Games Specifically,u i(xi,x −i) = 1−ϵ n , and deviating tox 3 leads to utility n−4+3ϵ n(n−3) > 1−ϵ n forϵ > 1 n

Reference 4

Resolution
unresolved
no resolver link, observed 2026-08-02T23:08:00.339928Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-02T23:08:00.339928Z digest=sha256:b09c539d9a760cf5b206d009e5a6313e7d02519093251782a1a24f2a16ea85ca

Observation f3cde260-b564-4ede-8d85-e5cad1caccd9 · outbound

This paper cites Then1 x∈Xmin(x,y) = 1, and whenkother agents are onx, sinceQ({y: x∗(y)|>1}) = 0,|X min(x, y)|=k+ 1.

Equilibria in Large Position-Optimization Games Then1 x∈Xmin(x,y) = 1, and whenkother agents are onx, sinceQ({y: x∗(y)|>1}) = 0,|X min(x, y)|=k+ 1

Reference 5

Resolution
unresolved
no resolver link, observed 2026-08-02T23:08:00.403343Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-02T23:08:00.403343Z digest=sha256:92e22bbceb925bd797609cc2fcec0432d10d0e9eb36ad6bafcd87d44268216b3

Observation c28510d7-af6f-4900-be03-b62164e221e1 · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Equilibria in Large Position-Optimization Games Unresolved cited work

Reference 6

Resolution
unresolved
no resolver link, observed 2026-08-02T23:08:00.520416Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-02T23:08:00.520416Z digest=sha256:17f13945a39e8208e7f124ab11e4a41c110ffbd202bce6f7946fd3b301cf0a4f

Observation d4f4dd43-948d-4843-96e0-3d3b5d2a43d1 · outbound

This paper cites ideal position.

Equilibria in Large Position-Optimization Games ideal position

Reference 7

Resolution
malformed identifier
no resolver link, observed 2026-08-02T23:08:00.652785Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-02T23:08:00.652785Z digest=sha256:48df518e18a71d8d731f6775cfba19d2761d8cee294b069f58564aa430e639af

Pith citing papers

No inbound Pith citation observations are available.