Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.
Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-02T23:08:00.652785Z
Paper Citation Record · LEDGER
As of 23 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 7 of 7 outbound references and 0 inbound Pith citation observations for arXiv:2602.15225.
A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.
Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.
Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-02T23:08:00.652785Z
One-hop event checks from named stored sources.
Source: scholarly_work_events, retraction_status_cache, observed 2026-08-23T06:30:58.430688+00:00
Pith citing papers itemized under the disclosed page cap.
Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links
A source-named dated measurement, never combined with another source.
Source: cited_works
7 of 7 outbound references displayed
External citation measurements
No source-named external measurement is stored.
Observation fc57c427-2829-4bf6-abc2-75b1edf1ecba · outbound
Equilibria in Large Position-Optimization Games Unresolved cited work
Reference 1
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation 76846fc4-09d1-45f3-89f1-c5fbb97d769a · outbound
Equilibria in Large Position-Optimization Games Specifically,u i(xi,x −i) = 2−ϵ 2n , and deviating tox 3 leads to utility n−4+3ϵ n(n−2) > 2−ϵ 2n forϵ > 4 n+4
Reference 2
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation 0d013990-a418-4fcc-b2cc-f006449bc70b · outbound
Equilibria in Large Position-Optimization Games Specifically,u i(xi,x −i) = 2−2ϵ 2n , while deviating tox 2 leads to utility 2−ϵ 2n > 2−2ϵ 2n
Reference 3
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation 322e2dd1-3c19-4208-a95c-ed6665be3f5c · outbound
Equilibria in Large Position-Optimization Games Specifically,u i(xi,x −i) = 1−ϵ n , and deviating tox 3 leads to utility n−4+3ϵ n(n−3) > 1−ϵ n forϵ > 1 n
Reference 4
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation f3cde260-b564-4ede-8d85-e5cad1caccd9 · outbound
Equilibria in Large Position-Optimization Games Then1 x∈Xmin(x,y) = 1, and whenkother agents are onx, sinceQ({y: x∗(y)|>1}) = 0,|X min(x, y)|=k+ 1
Reference 5
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation c28510d7-af6f-4900-be03-b62164e221e1 · outbound
Equilibria in Large Position-Optimization Games Unresolved cited work
Reference 6
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation d4f4dd43-948d-4843-96e0-3d3b5d2a43d1 · outbound
Equilibria in Large Position-Optimization Games ideal position
Reference 7
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
No inbound Pith citation observations are available.