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Paper Citation Record · LEDGER

Strategyproof Mechanisms for Euclidean Facility Location Problems under $L_p$-norm Social Cost

As of 18 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 29 of 29 outbound references and 1 inbound Pith citation observation for arXiv:2606.08621.

A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.

pith.paper-citation-record.v1
2606.08621 v2

Coverage vector

measured 29 of 29 reference resolution

Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-06-30T11:19:40.617501Z

measured 30 of 30 standing notices

One-hop event checks from named stored sources.

Source: scholarly_work_events, retraction_status_cache, observed 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00

measured 1 of 1 inbound itemization

Pith citing papers itemized under the disclosed page cap.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-01T10:38:08.238807Z

measured 0 of 1 external citation measurements

A source-named dated measurement, never combined with another source.

Source: cited_works

Reference resolution

29 of 29 outbound references displayed

  • verified exact3
  • verified fuzzy26
  • unresolved0
  • parse uncertain0
  • malformed identifier0
  • metadata mismatch0

External citation measurements

No source-named external measurement is stored.

Outbound references

Observation ae4f7660-ccb7-4eb8-9fab-7197efa0d723 · outbound

This paper cites Learning- augmented mechanism design: leveraging predictions for facility location.

Strategyproof Mechanisms for Euclidean Facility Location Problems under $L_p$-norm Social Cost Learning- augmented mechanism design: leveraging predictions for facility location

Reference 1

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verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-09T10:56:11.822468Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-06-30T11:19:40.617501Z digest=sha256:ab6ddbf0a4e2c76abfb3aeb7acd6145004b7d8060a32433c55c699c2c49bc520

Observation 4ec7dec3-c26a-433a-8436-ef59ee180adf · outbound

This paper cites Strategyproof ap- proximation of the minimax on networks.Mathematics of Operations Research, 35(3):513– 526, 2010.

Strategyproof Mechanisms for Euclidean Facility Location Problems under $L_p$-norm Social Cost Strategyproof ap- proximation of the minimax on networks.Mathematics of Operations Research, 35(3):513– 526, 2010

Reference 2

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raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-09T10:56:11.844530Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-06-30T11:19:40.617501Z digest=sha256:f70edbbae69c9c0eeb4903c4ebe83a6787759af71d81b2b1f5a00a7bf39ffd62

Observation 82fa21e4-75dd-4782-851c-29acb3078bad · outbound

This paper cites Facility Location Mechanism Design: Breaking The Deterministic Barrier.

Strategyproof Mechanisms for Euclidean Facility Location Problems under $L_p$-norm Social Cost Facility Location Mechanism Design: Breaking The Deterministic Barrier

Reference 3

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verified exact
local_arxiv, observed 2026-06-30T11:24:38.161505Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-06-30T11:19:40.617501Z digest=sha256:4dc5ffca7c6a1bed6df67fd2f4b4470a8f10601bf11a2c90643621b18b480e34

Observation 1cd27999-e9b3-4d46-956d-14918620fc06 · outbound

This paper cites Mechanism design for facility location problems: a survey.

Strategyproof Mechanisms for Euclidean Facility Location Problems under $L_p$-norm Social Cost Mechanism design for facility location problems: a survey

Reference 4

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verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-09T10:56:11.861485Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-06-30T11:19:40.617501Z digest=sha256:74623b61f540757fdd72b34ce3a1efa976a3a0b45d76953e4acc66dc4479685a

Observation 0ee1c493-b9e4-444e-af3d-fff386e1a373 · outbound

This paper cites Obnoxious facility location problems: Strate- gyproof mechanisms optimizingl p-aggregated utilities and costs.

Strategyproof Mechanisms for Euclidean Facility Location Problems under $L_p$-norm Social Cost Obnoxious facility location problems: Strate- gyproof mechanisms optimizingl p-aggregated utilities and costs

Reference 5

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verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-09T10:56:11.851888Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-06-30T11:19:40.617501Z digest=sha256:968211b386b50afb2b7cd7be8a598f062fcfd34e1ba3c29138b336d5bd6b24a6

Observation 8f601bd6-0be2-44af-a108-1a1e7bfe6b93 · outbound

This paper cites Strategyproof facility location with prediction: minimizing the maximum cost.Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 40(1):22, 2026.

Strategyproof Mechanisms for Euclidean Facility Location Problems under $L_p$-norm Social Cost Strategyproof facility location with prediction: minimizing the maximum cost.Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 40(1):22, 2026

Reference 6

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raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-09T10:56:11.850188Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-06-30T11:19:40.617501Z digest=sha256:1e1581a9ff3b308efcbdfa53fb24ed51c80d15cbe43cad70866abd2eda49ca27

Observation 8aa15cce-9c91-4b36-bf75-8910d62ffa20 · outbound

This paper cites Mechanism Design without Money via Stable Matching.

Strategyproof Mechanisms for Euclidean Facility Location Problems under $L_p$-norm Social Cost Mechanism Design without Money via Stable Matching

Reference 7

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verified exact
local_arxiv, observed 2026-06-30T11:24:38.158902Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-06-30T11:19:40.617501Z digest=sha256:2d95675775bf6db8113c1f2e090634694d5e5da24f3f5a833642ed60b1dd647c

Observation 768f9f65-21ca-48ed-87c5-5310d01b3744 · outbound

This paper cites Strategy-proof approximation mechanisms for an obnoxious facility game on networks.Theoretical Computer Science, 497:154–163, 2013.

Strategyproof Mechanisms for Euclidean Facility Location Problems under $L_p$-norm Social Cost Strategy-proof approximation mechanisms for an obnoxious facility game on networks.Theoretical Computer Science, 497:154–163, 2013

Reference 8

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verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-09T10:56:11.855030Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-06-30T11:19:40.617501Z digest=sha256:e93f82068622ba9c62227d570380ea5181e3697b021f44718506d212b6ad93bd

Observation b431a28d-eb1c-4885-90a3-6c800434641f · outbound

This paper cites Generalized assignment problem: Truthful mechanism design without money.Operations Research Letters, 45(1):72–76, 2017.

Strategyproof Mechanisms for Euclidean Facility Location Problems under $L_p$-norm Social Cost Generalized assignment problem: Truthful mechanism design without money.Operations Research Letters, 45(1):72–76, 2017

Reference 9

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raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-09T10:56:11.830847Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-06-30T11:19:40.617501Z digest=sha256:313a55640ab55626d91ee157241969dcf3c5c37f23a9a8f73727e86d5111fbd1

Observation 5b86793a-7986-42e3-81c3-5d3b750eb82e · outbound

This paper cites Heterogeneous facility location games with fractional preferences and limited resources.Autonomous Agents and Multi- Agent Systems, 39(2):41, 2025.

Strategyproof Mechanisms for Euclidean Facility Location Problems under $L_p$-norm Social Cost Heterogeneous facility location games with fractional preferences and limited resources.Autonomous Agents and Multi- Agent Systems, 39(2):41, 2025

Reference 10

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raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-09T10:56:11.859637Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-06-30T11:19:40.617501Z digest=sha256:e4bcbd4f341ff4bd9a5552a6712493042e3ffe0935c67426d239495ee87b0039

Observation 213d75e6-d75d-420e-8247-28ee1130f05f · outbound

This paper cites Approximately optimal mechanisms for strategyproof facility location: minimizing lp norm of costs.Mathematics of Operations Research, 42(2):434–447, 2017.

Strategyproof Mechanisms for Euclidean Facility Location Problems under $L_p$-norm Social Cost Approximately optimal mechanisms for strategyproof facility location: minimizing lp norm of costs.Mathematics of Operations Research, 42(2):434–447, 2017

Reference 11

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raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-09T10:56:11.829179Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-06-30T11:19:40.617501Z digest=sha256:d81493ad9a9c3794f63683a32c825c562f235afc2df4944c74c0f5772d27a6f4

Observation 5f9f7c5d-edf5-4ba2-a6d5-85381a040339 · outbound

This paper cites Strategyproof facility location and the least squares ob- jective.

Strategyproof Mechanisms for Euclidean Facility Location Problems under $L_p$-norm Social Cost Strategyproof facility location and the least squares ob- jective

Reference 12

Resolution
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raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-09T10:56:11.853450Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-06-30T11:19:40.617501Z digest=sha256:e7ca4488a80f4198fb75ceee114ea2436eec5a782933ab3854cec12934a3b3f8

Observation 17170dbc-3f9d-4b5b-b7fa-1662cecad3b1 · outbound

This paper cites Truthful approximations to range voting.

Strategyproof Mechanisms for Euclidean Facility Location Problems under $L_p$-norm Social Cost Truthful approximations to range voting

Reference 13

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verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-09T10:56:11.848157Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-06-30T11:19:40.617501Z digest=sha256:494cc82b0a082f45b9d00cdf98b4ba3eb4f119bd43a2c1664fa4739fd67a6b84

Observation a6774a0b-ac5f-4ca7-93b6-b26fe3b87066 · outbound

This paper cites Facility location games with fractional preferences.

Strategyproof Mechanisms for Euclidean Facility Location Problems under $L_p$-norm Social Cost Facility location games with fractional preferences

Reference 14

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raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-09T10:56:11.863459Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-06-30T11:19:40.617501Z digest=sha256:f136c874048e55257cdf384d25ade597a8ab3eb8fa87474d82184ba8cbddb5c8

Observation d910dbf8-e75d-4c99-925e-1ca394c4f18c · outbound

This paper cites Strategyproof facility location for concave cost functions.

Strategyproof Mechanisms for Euclidean Facility Location Problems under $L_p$-norm Social Cost Strategyproof facility location for concave cost functions

Reference 15

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-09T10:56:11.842901Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-06-30T11:19:40.617501Z digest=sha256:f4c5cd9ab6ad27d4b1f8dfae37dfb17f53ebcd9fe143d9884237a41d1d8bd8ee

Observation c90e70e0-e9e6-4d61-bd5f-d67d8636a546 · outbound

This paper cites Winner-imposing strategyproof mechanisms for multiple facility location games.Theoretical Computer Science, 472:90–103, 2013.

Strategyproof Mechanisms for Euclidean Facility Location Problems under $L_p$-norm Social Cost Winner-imposing strategyproof mechanisms for multiple facility location games.Theoretical Computer Science, 472:90–103, 2013

Reference 16

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raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-09T10:56:11.856628Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-06-30T11:19:40.617501Z digest=sha256:18d189c741dff828c8b901b02315b6ad969355b8fa7c14d554553dcfc8ea50f7

Observation 3da97673-ca79-4675-bfd7-04b3c5258ba6 · outbound

This paper cites Optimality of the coordinate-wise median mech- anism for strategyproof facility location in two dimensions.Social Choice and Welfare, 61(1):11–34, 2023.

Strategyproof Mechanisms for Euclidean Facility Location Problems under $L_p$-norm Social Cost Optimality of the coordinate-wise median mech- anism for strategyproof facility location in two dimensions.Social Choice and Welfare, 61(1):11–34, 2023

Reference 17

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raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-09T10:56:11.832540Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-06-30T11:19:40.617501Z digest=sha256:e485c9508732aa4023c67536eb83ac80c3f22837921fe8bb6c4a2e9ca1ab792f

Observation 4bf8ec57-b3ac-468a-8a7d-942f0aa0ba9f · outbound

This paper cites Approximation guarantees of median mechanism inR d.

Strategyproof Mechanisms for Euclidean Facility Location Problems under $L_p$-norm Social Cost Approximation guarantees of median mechanism inR d

Reference 18

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raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-09T10:56:11.858089Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-06-30T11:19:40.617501Z digest=sha256:96f6cad159e953c3e5d422b6b7aa3f0a53fb34a22bdfc8780a4a1c53c32e4f82

Observation 42b6ea54-ba2c-4a56-8ca8-2d1ac9fae266 · outbound

This paper cites Strategy-proof allocation of multiple items between two agents without payments or priors.

Strategyproof Mechanisms for Euclidean Facility Location Problems under $L_p$-norm Social Cost Strategy-proof allocation of multiple items between two agents without payments or priors

Reference 19

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raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-09T10:56:11.839881Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-06-30T11:19:40.617501Z digest=sha256:e4917ce3f5c78e64ec51b93cff02833f003fb0703947bde3ff2f48fd4d6ad1ca

Observation 68eb1fed-3dd2-45e8-be8d-2cf82428260c · outbound

This paper cites Hardy, J.

Strategyproof Mechanisms for Euclidean Facility Location Problems under $L_p$-norm Social Cost Hardy, J

Reference 20

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raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-09T10:56:11.841358Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-06-30T11:19:40.617501Z digest=sha256:2382e48d80d7c7b22d89ffa600e67a702e7772c9a66d054728587c4ac9dfbeff

Observation db325c78-164b-4cd0-94f6-f253b99e9947 · outbound

This paper cites Strategic Facility Location with $p$-Norm Social Costs.

Strategyproof Mechanisms for Euclidean Facility Location Problems under $L_p$-norm Social Cost Strategic Facility Location with $p$-Norm Social Costs

Reference 21

Resolution
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local_arxiv, observed 2026-06-30T11:24:38.156184Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-06-30T11:19:40.617501Z digest=sha256:8029fd8daadb7abc70e370f008b468d5e5dca9ff59833ff2cd348543bbf46ee6

Observation 9b7b5ccf-0ce9-4636-b9e8-e923f9f32573 · outbound

This paper cites Constrained truthful obnoxious two-facility location with optional preferences: P.

Strategyproof Mechanisms for Euclidean Facility Location Problems under $L_p$-norm Social Cost Constrained truthful obnoxious two-facility location with optional preferences: P

Reference 22

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raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-09T10:56:11.825799Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-06-30T11:19:40.617501Z digest=sha256:f2678e9a14cf33306eb9d7ed8c35351022c794c28bc4c4a710d1cfed99791461

Observation bbac693a-7424-4f81-bd70-659600594ce3 · outbound

This paper cites Scheduling without payments.Theory of Computing Systems, 54(3):375– 387, 2014.

Strategyproof Mechanisms for Euclidean Facility Location Problems under $L_p$-norm Social Cost Scheduling without payments.Theory of Computing Systems, 54(3):375– 387, 2014

Reference 23

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raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-09T10:56:11.846277Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-06-30T11:19:40.617501Z digest=sha256:846fec7248c52a72d804a578fde1c189a3fc33d69645eb4d535c92a9ee59eaf5

Observation d08e940e-c511-4ca9-a513-d6815cca7956 · outbound

This paper cites Nearly complete characterization of 2-agent deterministic strategyproof mech- anisms for single facility location inl p space.

Strategyproof Mechanisms for Euclidean Facility Location Problems under $L_p$-norm Social Cost Nearly complete characterization of 2-agent deterministic strategyproof mech- anisms for single facility location inl p space

Reference 24

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raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-09T10:56:11.838193Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-06-30T11:19:40.617501Z digest=sha256:6f8148e1842757219ff0360be0a92728ff3de07fdf41c9536b71d7fb685b3264

Observation 40313856-baf6-418f-96c7-4d72b49197a6 · outbound

This paper cites Strategyproof facility location for three agents on a circle.

Strategyproof Mechanisms for Euclidean Facility Location Problems under $L_p$-norm Social Cost Strategyproof facility location for three agents on a circle

Reference 25

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-09T10:56:11.827482Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-06-30T11:19:40.617501Z digest=sha256:ef72b394f38c2c004437e23c8a3db37ad580d9cd04678565512fa2dd832b154e

Observation 0e787de0-086b-4dce-a210-756dcb841bb8 · outbound

This paper cites Approximate mechanism design without money.

Strategyproof Mechanisms for Euclidean Facility Location Problems under $L_p$-norm Social Cost Approximate mechanism design without money

Reference 26

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-09T10:56:11.836350Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-06-30T11:19:40.617501Z digest=sha256:968b43a3bcb42cc27f19276b4d4dbfcfb16d60c26bdaf2a1c4dbd6275978cbe5

Observation b08e47a3-849f-4cef-a1a4-c9bba39249b2 · outbound

This paper cites Characterization of group-strategyproof mechanisms for facility location in strictly convex space.

Strategyproof Mechanisms for Euclidean Facility Location Problems under $L_p$-norm Social Cost Characterization of group-strategyproof mechanisms for facility location in strictly convex space

Reference 27

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-09T10:56:11.865239Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-06-30T11:19:40.617501Z digest=sha256:cd927ff7f6a237fb70f91304782770d742245d46c7469e5c5b38b38ede9f7b46

Observation 1b90ed7d-670e-4597-9cad-71077c31f5b3 · outbound

This paper cites Equitable mechanism design for facility location.

Strategyproof Mechanisms for Euclidean Facility Location Problems under $L_p$-norm Social Cost Equitable mechanism design for facility location

Reference 28

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-09T10:56:11.824106Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-06-30T11:19:40.617501Z digest=sha256:fca4b477d6c58321107beadd8842a968cf5028aa5bf16c64457a9841a51e45e9

Observation 72b31d5e-4ccb-4edb-9504-68eb218a1736 · outbound

This paper cites Strategy-proof mechanism for obnoxious facility location on a line.

Strategyproof Mechanisms for Euclidean Facility Location Problems under $L_p$-norm Social Cost Strategy-proof mechanism for obnoxious facility location on a line

Reference 29

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-09T10:56:11.834359Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-06-30T11:19:40.617501Z digest=sha256:8fa20eb5f3a331c0aa9fbc69e1c72245d8186464a78855876d1c602bb090a45a

Pith citing papers

Observation 66df83fd-9730-410e-82b2-1323885b7581 · inbound

Improved Lower Bounds and Output Augmentation for Facility Location Mechanisms cites this paper.

Improved Lower Bounds and Output Augmentation for Facility Location Mechanisms Strategyproof Mechanisms for Euclidean Facility Location Problems under $L_p$-norm Social Cost

Reference 7

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no resolver link, observed 2026-08-01T10:38:08.238807Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-01T10:38:08.238807Z digest=sha256:a60c1f66b4c213882dde82162aedb8cd8499e95f080308eaa9935a950797aa2e