Paper Citation Record · LEDGER

Exit-and-Join Dynamics and Equilibrium in Continuum Cooperative Games

As of 21 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 38 of 38 outbound references and 0 inbound Pith citation observations for arXiv:2606.28824.

A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.

pith.paper-citation-record.v1
2606.28824 v1

Coverage vector

measured 38 of 38 reference resolution

Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-06-30T08:38:13.015794Z

measured 38 of 38 standing notices

One-hop event checks from named stored sources.

Source: scholarly_work_events, retraction_status_cache, observed 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00

measured 0 of 0 inbound itemization

Pith citing papers itemized under the disclosed page cap.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links

measured 0 of 1 external citation measurements

A source-named dated measurement, never combined with another source.

Source: cited_works

Reference resolution

38 of 38 outbound references displayed

verified exact5
verified fuzzy30
unresolved3
parse uncertain0
malformed identifier0
metadata mismatch0

External citation measurements

No source-named external measurement is stored.

Outbound references

Observation e2572573-7a53-4688-af48-4c247223e927 · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Exit-and-Join Dynamics and Equilibrium in Continuum Cooperative Games Unresolved cited work

Reference 1

Resolution: unresolved; raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T15:37:20.956341Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation 1a3dc6dc-4be4-4a92-b21c-944801493f8c · outbound

This paper cites The shapley value.Handbook of game theory with economic applications, 3:2025–2054, 2002.

Exit-and-Join Dynamics and Equilibrium in Continuum Cooperative Games The shapley value.Handbook of game theory with economic applications, 3:2025–2054, 2002

Reference 2

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T15:37:20.949718Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation 641b19a1-9b81-4004-9f1b-f13083798d35 · outbound

This paper cites Values of markets with a continuum of traders.Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, pages 611–646, 1975.

Exit-and-Join Dynamics and Equilibrium in Continuum Cooperative Games Values of markets with a continuum of traders.Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, pages 611–646, 1975

Reference 3

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T15:37:20.951441Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation 364d605a-d2ee-4264-b4b7-aed749eaa6df · outbound

This paper cites Princeton University Press, 2015.

Exit-and-Join Dynamics and Equilibrium in Continuum Cooperative Games Princeton University Press, 2015

Reference 4

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T15:37:20.944380Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation 296938e7-4442-47dd-b9f3-4d87bb0812d0 · outbound

This paper cites Cooperative games with coalition structures.International Journal of game theory, 3(4):217–237, 1974.

Exit-and-Join Dynamics and Equilibrium in Continuum Cooperative Games Cooperative games with coalition structures.International Journal of game theory, 3(4):217–237, 1974

Reference 5

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T15:37:20.942603Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation b3440ff7-2e51-47db-bab8-7ca42731d837 · outbound

This paper cites Aumann and Jacques H.

Exit-and-Join Dynamics and Equilibrium in Continuum Cooperative Games Aumann and Jacques H

Reference 6

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T15:37:20.946078Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation 8388c7cb-e93f-4a36-836f-89d3cfce5027 · outbound

This paper cites Dynamic cooperative games.International Game Theory Review, 2(01):47–65, 2000.

Exit-and-Join Dynamics and Equilibrium in Continuum Cooperative Games Dynamic cooperative games.International Game Theory Review, 2(01):47–65, 2000

Reference 7

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T15:37:20.938830Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation 0a5caa1f-3ae8-4b18-bf26-b674ecd39b5d · outbound

This paper cites Robust dynamic cooperative games.International Journal of Game Theory, 38(1):23–36, 2009.

Exit-and-Join Dynamics and Equilibrium in Continuum Cooperative Games Robust dynamic cooperative games.International Journal of Game Theory, 38(1):23–36, 2009

Reference 8

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T15:37:20.935203Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation 905654ea-5e45-4819-9120-ec66b917d46d · outbound

This paper cites A generic approach to coalition formation.International game theory review, 11(03):347–367, 2009.

Exit-and-Join Dynamics and Equilibrium in Continuum Cooperative Games A generic approach to coalition formation.International game theory review, 11(03):347–367, 2009

Reference 9

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T15:37:20.940747Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation 0c107c40-53ad-44f1-b771-2f9e27a60beb · outbound

This paper cites Coalition formation as a dynamic process.Journal of Economic theory, 110(1):1– 41, 2003.

Exit-and-Join Dynamics and Equilibrium in Continuum Cooperative Games Coalition formation as a dynamic process.Journal of Economic theory, 110(1):1– 41, 2003

Reference 10

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T15:37:20.947845Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation 7c61c0f5-c397-4426-a31a-393bd7448218 · outbound

This paper cites Bargaining and value.Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, pages 357–380, 1996.

Exit-and-Join Dynamics and Equilibrium in Continuum Cooperative Games Bargaining and value.Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, pages 357–380, 1996

Reference 11

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T15:37:20.925602Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation 5b593e3f-4951-41ff-9f5e-ff192a55f5ed · outbound

This paper cites On the computation of the nucleolus of a cooperative game.

Exit-and-Join Dynamics and Equilibrium in Continuum Cooperative Games On the computation of the nucleolus of a cooperative game

Reference 12

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T15:37:20.927283Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation 145402ba-036f-4386-bbb1-1e31f62b1e7e · outbound

This paper cites A bayesian monte carlo method for computing the shapley value: Application to weighted voting and bin packing games.Computers & Operations Research, 125:105094, 2021.

Exit-and-Join Dynamics and Equilibrium in Continuum Cooperative Games A bayesian monte carlo method for computing the shapley value: Application to weighted voting and bin packing games.Computers & Operations Research, 125:105094, 2021

Reference 13

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T15:37:20.931248Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation 08471cbe-a312-4b80-a491-6628b2444da4 · outbound

This paper cites Evolution and control system design.

Exit-and-Join Dynamics and Equilibrium in Continuum Cooperative Games Evolution and control system design

Reference 14

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T15:37:20.933044Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation 661f3356-9583-411c-80f3-7c8af5efc735 · outbound

This paper cites Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Exit-and-Join Dynamics and Equilibrium in Continuum Cooperative Games Cambridge University Press, 2005

Reference 15

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T15:37:20.954599Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation 2b1f1110-a769-448c-a5db-b34b8d133e93 · outbound

This paper cites MIT press.

Exit-and-Join Dynamics and Equilibrium in Continuum Cooperative Games MIT press

Reference 16

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T15:37:20.970515Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation 24f22dd5-bf26-4b07-9298-21b37dce6d78 · outbound

This paper cites Evolutionary Games for Multiple Access Control.

Exit-and-Join Dynamics and Equilibrium in Continuum Cooperative Games Evolutionary Games for Multiple Access Control

Reference 17

Resolution: verified exact; local_arxiv, observed 2026-06-30T08:44:27.624236Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation b39e463f-a719-45f8-8dba-ea64610abca8 · outbound

This paper cites Evolutionary Poisson Games for Controlling Large Population Behaviors.

Exit-and-Join Dynamics and Equilibrium in Continuum Cooperative Games Evolutionary Poisson Games for Controlling Large Population Behaviors

Reference 18

Resolution: verified exact; local_arxiv, observed 2026-06-30T08:44:27.620976Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation f7e92561-51be-4679-aec8-c581884ac053 · outbound

This paper cites Herd Behaviors in Epidemics: A Dynamics-Coupled Evolutionary Games Approach.

Exit-and-Join Dynamics and Equilibrium in Continuum Cooperative Games Herd Behaviors in Epidemics: A Dynamics-Coupled Evolutionary Games Approach

Reference 19

Resolution: verified exact; arxiv_id, observed 2026-06-30T08:44:27.620218Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation 1e0b38fa-f84c-40d7-b0e6-b2571f5ff05a · outbound

This paper cites On Poisoned Wardrop Equilibrium in Congestion Games.

Exit-and-Join Dynamics and Equilibrium in Continuum Cooperative Games On Poisoned Wardrop Equilibrium in Congestion Games

Reference 20

Resolution: verified exact; arxiv_id, observed 2026-06-30T08:44:27.613323Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation 76c7ac8c-9c30-43e9-9c30-5d09c2767742 · outbound

This paper cites On the Resilience of Traffic Networks under Non-Equilibrium Learning.

Exit-and-Join Dynamics and Equilibrium in Continuum Cooperative Games On the Resilience of Traffic Networks under Non-Equilibrium Learning

Reference 21

Resolution: verified exact; arxiv_id, observed 2026-06-30T08:44:27.610322Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation 714e6524-a2bc-4ad2-a9f3-1e4e274983e2 · outbound

This paper cites John Wiley & Sons.

Exit-and-Join Dynamics and Equilibrium in Continuum Cooperative Games John Wiley & Sons

Reference 22

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T15:37:20.917515Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation b31d66bf-1e81-40bc-96f5-bdaade0bbc54 · outbound

This paper cites Some theoretical aspects of road traffic research.Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers, 1(3):325–362, 1952.

Exit-and-Join Dynamics and Equilibrium in Continuum Cooperative Games Some theoretical aspects of road traffic research.Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers, 1(3):325–362, 1952

Reference 23

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T15:37:20.913643Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation 25cd8fef-280a-4901-910b-def7c4a78266 · outbound

This paper cites The tragedy of the commons.Science, 162(3859):1243–1248, 1968.

Exit-and-Join Dynamics and Equilibrium in Continuum Cooperative Games The tragedy of the commons.Science, 162(3859):1243–1248, 1968

Reference 24

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T15:37:20.915925Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation 533c7ad2-9235-41d1-adfc-3a8d221b4769 · outbound

This paper cites Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1965.

Exit-and-Join Dynamics and Equilibrium in Continuum Cooperative Games Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1965

Reference 25

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T15:37:20.919201Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation 7cdb5647-3bb6-4e73-acd7-1d81bb7431fb · outbound

This paper cites Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Exit-and-Join Dynamics and Equilibrium in Continuum Cooperative Games Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Reference 26

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T15:37:20.920936Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation 0fb9f408-870b-4717-8255-699167ba3827 · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Exit-and-Join Dynamics and Equilibrium in Continuum Cooperative Games Unresolved cited work

Reference 27

Resolution: unresolved; raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T15:37:20.972068Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation 7f31e7ff-1993-4f1b-8b94-1abb5fe34cfb · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Exit-and-Join Dynamics and Equilibrium in Continuum Cooperative Games Unresolved cited work

Reference 28

Resolution: unresolved; raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T15:37:20.973674Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation dac49281-2feb-45a0-93e5-8e472ac9c3c2 · outbound

This paper cites Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982.

Exit-and-Join Dynamics and Equilibrium in Continuum Cooperative Games Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982

Reference 29

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T15:37:20.965574Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation 3ff707e3-9948-4ebc-bcbc-2b011a88264f · outbound

This paper cites Taylor and Leo B.

Exit-and-Join Dynamics and Equilibrium in Continuum Cooperative Games Taylor and Leo B

Reference 30

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T15:37:20.967296Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation 85674ba8-11a3-4e00-98f2-cafeb3fa973e · outbound

This paper cites Weibull.Evolutionary Game Theory.

Exit-and-Join Dynamics and Equilibrium in Continuum Cooperative Games Weibull.Evolutionary Game Theory

Reference 31

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T15:37:20.959985Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation 91776c94-b338-4053-8416-373b89f0ec2d · outbound

This paper cites Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998.

Exit-and-Join Dynamics and Equilibrium in Continuum Cooperative Games Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998

Reference 32

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T15:37:20.961798Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation 18d233b8-4c8f-435a-b419-81aa8ce09859 · outbound

This paper cites Nowak.Evolutionary Dynamics: Exploring the Equations of Life.

Exit-and-Join Dynamics and Equilibrium in Continuum Cooperative Games Nowak.Evolutionary Dynamics: Exploring the Equations of Life

Reference 33

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T15:37:20.963718Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation d19a234d-f3b6-4d81-b30d-c3941bfc53c5 · outbound

This paper cites Birkhäuser, 1991.

Exit-and-Join Dynamics and Equilibrium in Continuum Cooperative Games Birkhäuser, 1991

Reference 34

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T15:37:20.977056Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation 778d214c-013d-43b1-9c87-fc658c33a43a · outbound

This paper cites Birkhäuser, 2001.

Exit-and-Join Dynamics and Equilibrium in Continuum Cooperative Games Birkhäuser, 2001

Reference 35

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T15:37:20.952998Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation 6e7c803c-42c4-4ddb-8a7a-caf7cf3de923 · outbound

This paper cites Springer, New York, 2003.

Exit-and-Join Dynamics and Equilibrium in Continuum Cooperative Games Springer, New York, 2003

Reference 36

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T15:37:20.968905Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation 5f865ff1-293f-4bd3-8000-c64d54ccce08 · outbound

This paper cites Game-theoretic learning and allocations in robust dynamic coalitional games.SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization, 57(4):2902–2923, 2019.

Exit-and-Join Dynamics and Equilibrium in Continuum Cooperative Games Game-theoretic learning and allocations in robust dynamic coalitional games.SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization, 57(4):2902–2923, 2019

Reference 37

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T15:37:20.975452Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation 610c5292-e3b1-4f8d-8123-0d48ed61bb32 · outbound

This paper cites Distributed learning dynamics for coalitional games.

Exit-and-Join Dynamics and Equilibrium in Continuum Cooperative Games Distributed learning dynamics for coalitional games

Reference 38

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T15:37:20.958100Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Pith citing papers

No inbound Pith citation observations are available.