Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors | Paper Citation Record

Observation 20a6912d-51b3-4837-b04f-60313fd8643b · outbound

This paper cites Auto-bidding and auctions in online advertising: A survey.

Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors Auto-bidding and auctions in online advertising: A survey

Reference 1

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T10:42:19.000160Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 3dc7bfc1-308f-4a72-ae33-e7bde294ee53 · outbound

This paper cites Single crossing properties and the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games of incomplete information.

Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors Single crossing properties and the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games of incomplete information

Reference 2

Resolution: verified exact; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T10:42:24.755427Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.

Observation 90da8cda-b5b0-46fd-b330-df2427480308 · outbound

This paper cites Monotone comparative statics under uncertainty.

Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors Monotone comparative statics under uncertainty

Reference 3

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-07T10:42:22.389012Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.

Observation 5a3fca90-5c3e-44ba-a8dc-1d1ffcec4487 · outbound

This paper cites Nonparametric approaches to auctions.

Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors Nonparametric approaches to auctions

Reference 4

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-07T10:42:22.360754Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.

Observation 78750d94-9c6a-4644-9ec5-cf6a2bb5faf1 · outbound

This paper cites Agreeing to disagree.

Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors Agreeing to disagree

Reference 5

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T10:42:19.440976Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 3524b59b-02fc-4181-b2e7-92e86293baf8 · outbound

This paper cites First-price auctions with general information structures: Implications for bidding and revenue.

Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors First-price auctions with general information structures: Implications for bidding and revenue

Reference 6

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-07T10:42:22.340301Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.

Observation 91e3e61f-ff2b-4f62-bb8a-210eb33ab829 · outbound

This paper cites Optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design: Reducing revenue to welfare maximization.

Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors Optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design: Reducing revenue to welfare maximization

Reference 7

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T10:42:19.653922Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 807203f0-9e09-4859-b823-f8c44e7f891a · outbound

This paper cites Asymmetry in first-price auctions with affiliated private values.

Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors Asymmetry in first-price auctions with affiliated private values

Reference 8

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-07T10:42:22.300599Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.

Observation ef8854b7-8f56-4e47-939c-0d278b3e1d35 · outbound

This paper cites Hartline.

Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors Hartline

Reference 9

Resolution: metadata mismatch; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T10:42:24.591487Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.

Observation 2dd72bda-24f8-48e1-8d54-26d15554a9bb · outbound

This paper cites Complexity of equilibria in first-price auctions under general tie-breaking rules.

Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors Complexity of equilibria in first-price auctions under general tie-breaking rules

Reference 10

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T10:42:20.010079Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 2a25c6f1-4d4d-4c38-9606-595a80789bb8 · outbound

This paper cites The discrete bid first auction.

Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors The discrete bid first auction

Reference 11

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-07T10:42:22.283321Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.

Observation 958552fa-c39e-44a4-b245-f40547b652ce · outbound

This paper cites Multiplicative pacing equilibria in auction markets.

Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors Multiplicative pacing equilibria in auction markets

Reference 12

Resolution: verified exact; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T10:42:24.416471Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.

Observation d224835e-bdd5-4927-a7da-36a8933098b4 · outbound

This paper cites de Castro.

Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors de Castro

Reference 13

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T10:42:24.966290Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.

Observation cf421dc8-e1c0-47b8-bb0c-a4141f935dd0 · outbound

This paper cites de Castro and Harry J.

Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors de Castro and Harry J

Reference 14

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-07T10:42:22.072540Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.

Observation 1c97b623-86e5-4ed3-937a-ff6c183507fe · outbound

This paper cites First-price auctions in online display advertising.

Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors First-price auctions in online display advertising

Reference 15

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-07T10:42:22.038230Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.

Observation 16f68daa-2f32-426c-9e3c-4c441b0ccf4e · outbound

This paper cites Interdependent values without single-crossing.

Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors Interdependent values without single-crossing

Reference 17

Resolution: metadata mismatch; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T10:42:24.229756Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.

Observation 8c284165-41b9-4571-b51d-c643120b786b · outbound

This paper cites Poa of simple auctions with interdependent values.

Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors Poa of simple auctions with interdependent values

Reference 18

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T10:42:21.024241Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation dd1d0f17-864d-4b8b-bc33-474d4bb009f0 · outbound

This paper cites Combinatorial Auctions with Interdependent Valuations: SOS to the Rescue.

Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors Combinatorial Auctions with Interdependent Valuations: SOS to the Rescue

Reference 19

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T10:42:21.031978Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation b6e0497f-7684-4aa9-b5af-42bcaa899741 · outbound

This paper cites On the complexity of equilibrium computation in first-price auctions.

Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors On the complexity of equilibrium computation in first-price auctions

Reference 20

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-07T10:42:21.978404Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.

Observation b1068c04-4320-441d-83b0-607fcb8d4db7 · outbound

This paper cites On the computation of equilibria in discrete first-price auctions.

Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors On the computation of equilibria in discrete first-price auctions

Reference 21

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T10:42:21.047376Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation b5c330c3-e65a-4861-83f3-850921fbf8b3 · outbound

This paper cites Optimal auctions for correlated buyers with sampling.

Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors Optimal auctions for correlated buyers with sampling

Reference 22

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T10:42:21.059791Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 757a1758-3d58-40fd-ae4d-0c80ca6c83be · outbound

This paper cites Garey and David S.

Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors Garey and David S

Reference 23

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T10:42:24.948633Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.

Observation b7e25a58-19cc-46f3-b813-007ba944a6f8 · outbound

This paper cites Griesmer, Richard E.

Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors Griesmer, Richard E

Reference 24

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-07T10:42:21.947587Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.

Observation 1fb88295-bc97-4983-8b9c-a16b250568a7 · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors Unresolved cited work

Reference 25

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T10:42:21.079642Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation d7029ffc-5aea-4827-8cdc-00fd6463a591 · outbound

This paper cites Harsanyi.

Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors Harsanyi

Reference 26

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T10:42:21.085886Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 0ce813b1-e336-4b01-9beb-0a1a5edf27f6 · outbound

This paper cites Games with incomplete information played by ``Bayesian'' players part II.

Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors Games with incomplete information played by ``Bayesian'' players part II

Reference 27

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T10:42:21.093426Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 7fbc5a2e-678f-48b8-a092-b1a0bdf23b61 · outbound

This paper cites Harsanyi.

Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors Harsanyi

Reference 28

Resolution: verified exact; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T10:42:23.826243Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.

Observation 86d230c8-fb79-424b-b48e-84a6c4c6d6cf · outbound

This paper cites Jehle and Philip J.

Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors Jehle and Philip J

Reference 30

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T10:42:24.923261Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.

Observation a96722bf-8ce6-4e48-bb01-d2d41ae126b0 · outbound

This paper cites Information impact and allocation rules in auctions with affiliated private values: A laboratory study.

Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors Information impact and allocation rules in auctions with affiliated private values: A laboratory study

Reference 31

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-07T10:42:21.866307Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.

Observation 50748681-ecb2-44a3-984d-f14df1f00ac4 · outbound

This paper cites A generalization of brouwer's fixed point theorem.

Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors A generalization of brouwer's fixed point theorem

Reference 32

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T10:42:21.126992Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 4ddbc026-8161-436f-acae-b1ed0f01dc97 · outbound

This paper cites Classes of orderings of measures and related correlation inequalities.

Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors Classes of orderings of measures and related correlation inequalities

Reference 33

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T10:42:21.134619Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 83d6070f-f1f9-4a9f-847e-7329c85d4e5f · outbound

This paper cites Auction Theory.

Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors Auction Theory

Reference 34

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T10:42:24.906223Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.

Observation bdc4b0df-6938-47fa-aef1-a15a968d7e88 · outbound

This paper cites Existence of an equilibrium in first price auctions.

Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors Existence of an equilibrium in first price auctions

Reference 35

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-07T10:42:21.783709Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.

Observation a0dccca0-0d08-49b8-8965-9e0baf93fb0a · outbound

This paper cites First price auctions in the asymmetric N bidder case.

Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors First price auctions in the asymmetric N bidder case

Reference 36

Resolution: verified exact; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T10:42:23.629957Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.

Observation 39263c29-4988-4eb9-8c60-c9a95939cc86 · outbound

This paper cites Uniqueness of the equilibrium in first-price auctions.

Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors Uniqueness of the equilibrium in first-price auctions

Reference 37

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-07T10:42:21.758014Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.

Observation 8627aca0-4e45-4338-bc86-0c85179bead2 · outbound

This paper cites Testing for affiliation in first-price auctions using entry behavior.

Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors Testing for affiliation in first-price auctions using entry behavior

Reference 38

Resolution: verified exact; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T10:42:23.554206Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.

Observation 99ab0882-0c1a-4379-b4ef-5a436c81f03e · outbound

This paper cites Uniqueness and existence of equilibrium in auctions with a reserve price.

Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors Uniqueness and existence of equilibrium in auctions with a reserve price

Reference 39

Resolution: verified exact; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T10:42:23.448796Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.

Observation ef5e50c4-f3c3-4f3d-8707-c88906c141fd · outbound

This paper cites Marshall, Michael J.

Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors Marshall, Michael J

Reference 40

Resolution: verified exact; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T10:42:23.351495Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.

Observation 9c45e5b0-9d61-43f9-aa86-e5a5bb2de5fe · outbound

This paper cites Equilibrium in sealed high bid auctions.

Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors Equilibrium in sealed high bid auctions

Reference 41

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-07T10:42:21.726006Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.

Observation 1a395dbd-1ce2-44dc-90a7-4a516a059b70 · outbound

This paper cites Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions.

Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions

Reference 42

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-07T10:42:21.704159Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.

Observation 6a5e0630-3d66-4bab-aa5e-f94bce09a155 · outbound

This paper cites Maskin and John G.

Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors Maskin and John G

Reference 43

Resolution: verified exact; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T10:42:23.231966Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.

Observation c2f8f83f-7bad-4bd3-a739-74ef2ebfad24 · outbound

This paper cites Monotonicity in asymmetric first-price auctions with affiliation.

Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors Monotonicity in asymmetric first-price auctions with affiliation

Reference 44

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-07T10:42:21.667896Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.

Observation 79872a46-3551-4060-9484-a344597e9d27 · outbound

This paper cites Menezes and Paulo K.

Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors Menezes and Paulo K

Reference 45

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-07T10:42:21.628765Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.

Observation f6a75bad-a1e1-4587-9047-41ec3aff63a5 · outbound

This paper cites Putting Auction Theory to Work.

Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors Putting Auction Theory to Work

Reference 46

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-07T10:42:21.588331Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.

Observation e5505d0d-8368-4248-9514-cd3427f43375 · outbound

This paper cites Monotone comparative statics.

Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors Monotone comparative statics

Reference 47

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T10:42:21.257871Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 8844f147-7433-427a-9c46-bef631ea4e69 · outbound

This paper cites Milgrom and Robert J.

Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors Milgrom and Robert J

Reference 48

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T10:42:21.266673Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 86b04108-6be2-4639-abba-26f18d9b49bd · outbound

This paper cites Comments on ``Games with Incomplete Information Played by ``Bayesian'' Players, I--III Harsanyi's Games with Incoplete Information''.

Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors Comments on ``Games with Incomplete Information Played by ``Bayesian'' Players, I--III Harsanyi's Games with Incoplete Information''

Reference 49

Resolution: verified exact; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T10:42:23.075152Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.

Observation 59d48eaf-d199-45f2-9319-b52e45ae0273 · outbound

This paper cites Why do competitive markets converge to first-price auctions? In Proceedings of The World Wide Web Conference (WWW), pages 596--605, 2020.

Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors Why do competitive markets converge to first-price auctions? In Proceedings of The World Wide Web Conference (WWW), pages 596--605, 2020

Reference 50

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T10:42:21.281968Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 0c609646-46b0-4b82-b1ab-0e1c0afbaed9 · outbound

This paper cites On optimal single-item auctions.

Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors On optimal single-item auctions

Reference 51

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T10:42:21.290289Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation d78b8ad2-a23f-4709-8221-0a06df302a67 · outbound

This paper cites The affiliation effect in first-price auctions.

Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors The affiliation effect in first-price auctions

Reference 52

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T10:42:21.303792Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 2c08c2fc-ff29-463a-9c74-50b1e2795308 · outbound

This paper cites Characterization and computation of Nash -equilibria for auctions with incomplete information.

Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors Characterization and computation of Nash -equilibria for auctions with incomplete information

Reference 53

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-07T10:42:21.530852Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.

Observation cfd6641f-147c-489c-a0b4-601d62d555e8 · outbound

This paper cites Reny and Shmuel Zamir.

Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors Reny and Shmuel Zamir

Reference 54

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T10:42:21.321979Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 8679c606-504d-4c7c-9066-3fbe7a5e5739 · outbound

This paper cites Riley and William F.

Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors Riley and William F

Reference 55

Resolution: verified exact; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T10:42:22.790230Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.

Observation 7e1d0e4b-76c0-4e71-b003-8e14d62d80f8 · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors Unresolved cited work

Reference 56

Resolution: unresolved; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T10:42:24.888270Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.

Observation 16e80ee0-6568-4bbe-8821-217c119e5ed9 · outbound

This paper cites Optimal and robust mechanism design with interdependent values.

Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors Optimal and robust mechanism design with interdependent values

Reference 57

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-07T10:42:21.503749Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.

Observation 6865a141-8efe-48ed-a916-6d186274c5fe · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors Unresolved cited work

Reference 58

Resolution: unresolved; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T10:42:24.865741Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.

Observation 15e13350-7c48-4c4c-889b-bf02d1c8cdc4 · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors Unresolved cited work

Reference 59

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T10:42:21.364773Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation e798eaf4-0a73-4c05-aae1-21dbd07ec819 · outbound

This paper cites Counterspeculation, auctions and competitive sealed tenders.

Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors Counterspeculation, auctions and competitive sealed tenders

Reference 60

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T10:42:21.370452Z

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Observation 1c3aa07b-b5ea-4b26-8af7-6fc34fe597f9 · outbound

This paper cites Auctions and bidding games.

Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors Auctions and bidding games

Reference 61

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T10:42:24.846623Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.

Observation b168b64a-36a8-465b-b505-5dfc3e703af9 · outbound

This paper cites Bayesian Nash equilibrium in first-price auction with discrete value distributions.

Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors Bayesian Nash equilibrium in first-price auction with discrete value distributions

Reference 62

Resolution: metadata mismatch; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T10:42:22.610510Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.

Observation 56d65df0-5526-4184-90a8-c6a78b6d2f76 · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors Unresolved cited work

Reference 63

Resolution: verified exact; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T10:42:22.515458Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.

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