Paper Citation Record · LEDGER

Learning to Lead: Incentivizing Strategic Agents in the Dark

As of 8 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 37 of 37 outbound references and 0 inbound Pith citation observations for arXiv:2506.08438.

A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.

pith.paper-citation-record.v1
2506.08438 v1

Coverage vector

measured 37 of 37 reference resolution

Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-07T05:20:38.233399Z

measured 37 of 37 standing notices

One-hop event checks from named stored sources.

Source: scholarly_work_events, retraction_status_cache, observed 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00

measured 0 of 0 inbound itemization

Pith citing papers itemized under the disclosed page cap.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links

measured 0 of 1 external citation measurements

A source-named dated measurement, never combined with another source.

Source: cited_works

Reference resolution

37 of 37 outbound references displayed

verified exact0
verified fuzzy21
unresolved14
parse uncertain0
malformed identifier2
metadata mismatch0

External citation measurements

No source-named external measurement is stored.

Outbound references

Observation 2479d0f1-1aff-41ad-8b12-0272281af2ec · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Learning to Lead: Incentivizing Strategic Agents in the Dark Unresolved cited work

Reference 1

Resolution: unresolved; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:20:38.712622Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation 2bddfc84-82fc-4c64-8956-13530a13af31 · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Learning to Lead: Incentivizing Strategic Agents in the Dark Unresolved cited work

Reference 2

Resolution: unresolved; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:20:38.700116Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation 91a7b429-df29-4196-b158-1871c6f7cca6 · outbound

This paper cites Proof of Theorem B.1.We defer the proof of the theorem to Appendix C.6.

Learning to Lead: Incentivizing Strategic Agents in the Dark Proof of Theorem B.1.We defer the proof of the theorem to Appendix C.6

Reference 3

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:20:38.687557Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation ff6b92e6-79d2-410a-be73-5f4f81022459 · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Learning to Lead: Incentivizing Strategic Agents in the Dark Unresolved cited work

Reference 4

Resolution: unresolved; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:20:38.572679Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation 11dabd4f-4858-4b9a-b8d9-813cf6518f04 · outbound

This paper cites Forn∈ [nk ·(⌈logn k⌉2 + 1)], we denote byR2,k,n the total regret that arises from the firstnrounds of the pessimistic- optimistic planning stage.

Learning to Lead: Incentivizing Strategic Agents in the Dark Forn∈ [nk ·(⌈logn k⌉2 + 1)], we denote byR2,k,n the total regret that arises from the firstnrounds of the pessimistic- optimistic planning stage

Reference 5

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:20:38.673032Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation d6f609cf-34aa-47a9-9403-1618e348550b · outbound

This paper cites We make the convention thatχd−2 =eχd−2 =∞.

Learning to Lead: Incentivizing Strategic Agents in the Dark We make the convention thatχd−2 =eχd−2 =∞

Reference 6

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:20:38.659048Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation 6700eec9-3f5f-4c16-a20f-e2d0e41a21a4 · outbound

This paper cites 46 We note that Assumption 3.1 implies thatχi,eχi, χi are all strictly positive.

Learning to Lead: Incentivizing Strategic Agents in the Dark 46 We note that Assumption 3.1 implies thatχi,eχi, χi are all strictly positive

Reference 7

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:20:38.646754Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation b6ad2b01-521e-4e0a-8d5f-9170ea7b511c · outbound

This paper cites Namely,(A2) holds throughout the firstjrounds.

Learning to Lead: Incentivizing Strategic Agents in the Dark Namely,(A2) holds throughout the firstjrounds

Reference 8

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:20:38.634865Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation c5d9bbeb-1fea-43c8-9ea1-326c3b21c0f5 · outbound

This paper cites Namely,(A3)holds throughout the firstjrounds.

Learning to Lead: Incentivizing Strategic Agents in the Dark Namely,(A3)holds throughout the firstjrounds

Reference 9

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:20:38.623012Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation 0f49d751-1d7f-41d5-8f4a-c6a618a783b2 · outbound

This paper cites Then (a) Ifα > π/2andα θt i ∈[α−δ, π], then the agent will never report typer= 1in roundt.

Learning to Lead: Incentivizing Strategic Agents in the Dark Then (a) Ifα > π/2andα θt i ∈[α−δ, π], then the agent will never report typer= 1in roundt

Reference 10

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:20:38.610646Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation 6b15a792-6f34-42be-be90-85197d7465ef · outbound

This paper cites Then (a) Ifα > π/2andα θt i ∈(α, π], then the agent will report typer= 2in roundt.

Learning to Lead: Incentivizing Strategic Agents in the Dark Then (a) Ifα > π/2andα θt i ∈(α, π], then the agent will report typer= 2in roundt

Reference 11

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:20:38.597621Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation 5a581d88-e58a-409d-af0d-f7f28c603169 · outbound

This paper cites Then (a) Ifα > π/2andα θt i ∈(α−δ, α], then the agent will report typer= 1in roundt.

Learning to Lead: Incentivizing Strategic Agents in the Dark Then (a) Ifα > π/2andα θt i ∈(α−δ, α], then the agent will report typer= 1in roundt

Reference 12

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:20:38.585054Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation fd033409-dbb7-40fd-9b0e-67dcd7433dfb · outbound

This paper cites Then (a) Ifα θt i ∈[0, α), then the agent will never reportr= 2in roundt.

Learning to Lead: Incentivizing Strategic Agents in the Dark Then (a) Ifα θt i ∈[0, α), then the agent will never reportr= 2in roundt

Reference 14

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:20:38.560719Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation 7f7ac0cf-3553-4c17-8db6-db7106da8dd0 · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Learning to Lead: Incentivizing Strategic Agents in the Dark Unresolved cited work

Reference 15

Resolution: unresolved; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:20:38.549048Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation 459012eb-71dc-42a9-808b-5c01b92b88ba · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Learning to Lead: Incentivizing Strategic Agents in the Dark Unresolved cited work

Reference 16

Resolution: unresolved; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:20:38.537613Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation 27d78f6b-d57c-4d87-9f5e-8c32ac94a341 · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Learning to Lead: Incentivizing Strategic Agents in the Dark Unresolved cited work

Reference 17

Resolution: unresolved; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:20:38.526486Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation f4885917-5375-4134-b992-3689b53b34b6 · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Learning to Lead: Incentivizing Strategic Agents in the Dark Unresolved cited work

Reference 18

Resolution: unresolved; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:20:38.514686Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation a1af3af0-314b-4aaa-99a8-4ab008332519 · outbound

This paper cites The probability that typebn(q1)does not appear in a total number of⌈logn⌉ 4 rounds is upper bounded by(1−f min)⌈logn⌉ 4.

Learning to Lead: Incentivizing Strategic Agents in the Dark The probability that typebn(q1)does not appear in a total number of⌈logn⌉ 4 rounds is upper bounded by(1−f min)⌈logn⌉ 4

Reference 19

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:20:38.503158Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation 9d22c02f-a741-4b97-99ea-3e6991d65fb2 · outbound

This paper cites Similarly, we havec+ 2 = 0.

Learning to Lead: Incentivizing Strategic Agents in the Dark Similarly, we havec+ 2 = 0

Reference 20

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:20:38.491360Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation ee31d913-ea16-488f-ad94-55c4eb1924bc · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Learning to Lead: Incentivizing Strategic Agents in the Dark Unresolved cited work

Reference 21

Resolution: unresolved; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:20:38.479612Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation 20e3bccd-15f9-4bfe-810a-00f64cf0cae2 · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Learning to Lead: Incentivizing Strategic Agents in the Dark Unresolved cited work

Reference 22

Resolution: unresolved; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:20:38.467877Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation 98698f12-a8ca-4179-b3a2-835fcc95a3fb · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Learning to Lead: Incentivizing Strategic Agents in the Dark Unresolved cited work

Reference 23

Resolution: unresolved; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:20:38.456206Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation 062a28fa-eeb2-4d07-84b1-89cf40244ae3 · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Learning to Lead: Incentivizing Strategic Agents in the Dark Unresolved cited work

Reference 24

Resolution: unresolved; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:20:38.443409Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation 0d8092dc-6b25-40aa-941e-1cace4fecb54 · outbound

This paper cites This implies that the “if” condition in line 4 of Algorithm 11 does not hold for allα−π/2 =u, u+ι,· · ·, u+mιandq∈ {q1, q2}.

Learning to Lead: Incentivizing Strategic Agents in the Dark This implies that the “if” condition in line 4 of Algorithm 11 does not hold for allα−π/2 =u, u+ι,· · ·, u+mιandq∈ {q1, q2}

Reference 25

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:20:38.431092Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation 6122dc32-6b6d-47b4-9fe2-829223cc1427 · outbound

This paper cites In addition, ifα bn(s|Θ|−1) i ∈((u j 1 +u j 2)/2−L j/2,(u j 1 +u j 2)/2)then c− >0, otherwisec − = 0.

Learning to Lead: Incentivizing Strategic Agents in the Dark In addition, ifα bn(s|Θ|−1) i ∈((u j 1 +u j 2)/2−L j/2,(u j 1 +u j 2)/2)then c− >0, otherwisec − = 0

Reference 26

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:20:38.417520Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation 8e3a175d-deb8-4232-9046-3034a5d067d1 · outbound

This paper cites Ifc − = 0in thej-th round of the while loop, thenuj+1 1 = (uj 1 +u j 2)/2andu j+1 2 =u j.

Learning to Lead: Incentivizing Strategic Agents in the Dark Ifc − = 0in thej-th round of the while loop, thenuj+1 1 = (uj 1 +u j 2)/2andu j+1 2 =u j

Reference 27

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:20:38.404779Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation 975f3e00-2f2b-4064-a735-e8cbc3b5d571 · outbound

This paper cites Similar to the proof for the base case, we can show that(A1′)-(A6′)hold for the modified conditional sector test that appears in the (j+ 1)-th round of the while loop.

Learning to Lead: Incentivizing Strategic Agents in the Dark Similar to the proof for the base case, we can show that(A1′)-(A6′)hold for the modified conditional sector test that appears in the (j+ 1)-th round of the while loop

Reference 28

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:20:38.391212Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation e9bf6d0f-3b05-4280-80e6-c1cd66aada0a · outbound

This paper cites In addition, if α bn(s|Θ|−1) i ∈((u j 1 +u j 2)/2−L j/2,(u j 1 +u j 2)/2)thenc + = 0andc − >0, otherwisec + >0.

Learning to Lead: Incentivizing Strategic Agents in the Dark In addition, if α bn(s|Θ|−1) i ∈((u j 1 +u j 2)/2−L j/2,(u j 1 +u j 2)/2)thenc + = 0andc − >0, otherwisec + >0

Reference 29

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:20:38.377545Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation b20cd300-3252-4dee-a8d6-f7c5865ac6ad · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Learning to Lead: Incentivizing Strategic Agents in the Dark Unresolved cited work

Reference 30

Resolution: unresolved; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:20:38.362959Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation 4eba0df7-12a3-41df-9f96-bb93ea91592d · outbound

This paper cites Proof of Lemma D.9.By symmetry, it suffices to prove the first claim.

Learning to Lead: Incentivizing Strategic Agents in the Dark Proof of Lemma D.9.By symmetry, it suffices to prove the first claim

Reference 31

Resolution: malformed identifier; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:20:38.350661Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation 3c6d8023-cd03-43f1-9fb9-038ce540b366 · outbound

This paper cites Here, c∗ := max j∈[|Θ|−1] ⟨ξi+1(α bn(s|Θ|) (i+1):(d−2)), ξi+1(αbn(sj ) (i+1):(d−2))⟩, e∗ := max{−c ∗,0}+ (logn) −1.

Learning to Lead: Incentivizing Strategic Agents in the Dark Here, c∗ := max j∈[|Θ|−1] ⟨ξi+1(α bn(s|Θ|) (i+1):(d−2)), ξi+1(αbn(sj ) (i+1):(d−2))⟩, e∗ := max{−c ∗,0}+ (logn) −1

Reference 32

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:20:38.338029Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation 3de90740-99c4-477c-8cb8-03808ac7b256 · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Learning to Lead: Incentivizing Strategic Agents in the Dark Unresolved cited work

Reference 33

Resolution: unresolved; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:20:38.324152Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation c1155e74-6e2b-4026-958d-31d6179fb858 · outbound

This paper cites In the next lemma, we show that the sign ofα bn(s|Θ|) i −π/2can be consistently estimated.

Learning to Lead: Incentivizing Strategic Agents in the Dark In the next lemma, we show that the sign ofα bn(s|Θ|) i −π/2can be consistently estimated

Reference 34

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:20:38.309943Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation d9c70791-eb82-4ffe-acdb-50f9b8870f17 · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Learning to Lead: Incentivizing Strategic Agents in the Dark Unresolved cited work

Reference 35

Resolution: unresolved; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:20:38.296708Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation ca94ec42-293b-4dec-bc57-8632c8db70b0 · outbound

This paper cites Proof of Lemma E.1.We first look at the first claim.

Learning to Lead: Incentivizing Strategic Agents in the Dark Proof of Lemma E.1.We first look at the first claim

Reference 36

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:20:38.284220Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation 5a7930cb-7cce-4db9-90d9-9115395df672 · outbound

This paper cites oracle mechanism.

Learning to Lead: Incentivizing Strategic Agents in the Dark oracle mechanism

Reference 37

Resolution: malformed identifier; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:20:38.270248Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation 2e0125b2-4014-4146-b13e-b5856dbaf0ee · outbound

This paper cites episodes.

Learning to Lead: Incentivizing Strategic Agents in the Dark episodes

Reference 2011

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:20:38.724760Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Pith citing papers

No inbound Pith citation observations are available.