Paper Citation Record · LEDGER

Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Unobserved Agent Rewards and Perfect-Knowledge Agents

As of 22 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 0 of 0 outbound references and 4 inbound Pith citation observations for arXiv:2304.07407.

A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.

pith.paper-citation-record.v1
2304.07407 v2

Coverage vector

measured 0 of 0 reference resolution

Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links

measured 4 of 4 standing notices

One-hop event checks from named stored sources.

Source: scholarly_work_events, retraction_status_cache, observed 2026-08-22T06:32:14.747728+00:00

measured 4 of 4 inbound itemization

Pith citing papers itemized under the disclosed page cap.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-15T19:37:03.054598Z

measured 0 of 1 external citation measurements

A source-named dated measurement, never combined with another source.

Source: arxiv_reference, observed 2026-05-11T15:21:06.821575Z

Reference resolution

0 of 0 outbound references displayed

verified exact0
verified fuzzy0
unresolved0
parse uncertain0
malformed identifier0
metadata mismatch0

External citation measurements

No source-named external measurement is stored.

Outbound references

No outbound reference observations are available for this paper version.

Pith citing papers

Observation 7ded677a-d13d-44ba-baab-4df13c707633 · inbound

Principal-Agent Bandit Games with Self-Interested and Exploratory Learning Agents cites this paper.

Principal-Agent Bandit Games with Self-Interested and Exploratory Learning Agents Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Unobserved Agent Rewards and Perfect-Knowledge Agents

Reference 9

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-11T10:53:10.707423Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 8535712b-1ea0-4538-81e9-31e4fd8f4e20 · inbound

Learning to Incentivize in Repeated Principal-Agent Problems with Adversarial Agent Arrivals cites this paper.

Learning to Incentivize in Repeated Principal-Agent Problems with Adversarial Agent Arrivals Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Unobserved Agent Rewards and Perfect-Knowledge Agents

Reference 9

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T13:03:55.983445Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation e65a9ead-0e87-4635-9a43-a5b7001469e8 · inbound

Fair Contracts in Principal-Agent Games with Heterogeneous Types cites this paper.

Fair Contracts in Principal-Agent Games with Heterogeneous Types Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Unobserved Agent Rewards and Perfect-Knowledge Agents

Reference 12

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-15T19:37:03.054598Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 07ad2b84-b1e0-4a59-9d82-a2ba423bb492 · inbound

Moral Hazard in LTI Dynamics: A Hypothesis Testing Approach cites this paper.

Moral Hazard in LTI Dynamics: A Hypothesis Testing Approach Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Unobserved Agent Rewards and Perfect-Knowledge Agents

Reference 11

Resolution: verified exact; arxiv_id, observed 2026-05-11T15:21:06.833028Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-22T06:32:14.747728+00:00.