Pith. sign in

REVIEW

On Fair Division of Indivisible Items

Not yet reviewed by Pith; the record is open.

This paper has not been read by Pith yet. Machine review is queued; the pith claim, tier, and objections will appear here once it completes.

SPECIMEN: schema-true, not a live event

T0 review · schema-true

One-sentence machine reading of the paper's core claim.

pith:XXXXXXXX · record.json · timestamp

arxiv 1805.06232 v5 pith:477LNOCV submitted 2018-05-16 cs.DS

classification cs.DS
keywords itemsagentutilityagentsbundlefactorfairgood
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal

Signed reviews

No signed human review yet.

0 comments
abstract

We consider the task of assigning indivisible goods to a set of agents in a fair manner. Our notion of fairness is Nash social welfare, i.e., the goal is to maximize the geometric mean of the utilities of the agents. Each good comes in multiple items or copies, and the utility of an agent diminishes as it receives more items of the same good. The utility of a bundle of items for an agent is the sum of the utilities of the items in the bundle. Each agent has a utility cap beyond which he does not value additional items. We give a polynomial time approximation algorithm that maximizes Nash social welfare up to a factor of $e^{1/{e}} \approx 1.445$. The computed allocation is Pareto-optimal and approximates envy-freeness up to one item up to a factor of $2 + \eps$

Discussion (0). Continue with ORCID to comment.

Pith tools