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arxiv: 1907.10484 · v1 · pith:4QOVZKZ4new · submitted 2019-07-21 · 💻 cs.DC

Secure and Transparent Audit Logs with BlockAudit

Ashar Ahmad , Muhammad Saad , Aziz Mohaisen This is my paper

Pith reviewed 2026-05-24 18:52 UTC · model grok-4.3

classification 💻 cs.DC
keywords audit logsblockchaintamper-proofPBFTsecurity attacksdata integrityenterprise systems
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The pith

BlockAudit integrates audit logs with a PBFT blockchain to create tamper-proof records that defend against physical access and remote vulnerability attacks.

A machine-rendered reading of the paper's core claim, the machinery that carries it, and where it could break.

The paper presents BlockAudit as a system that applies blockchain properties to enterprise audit logs to prevent undetected tampering. It targets two specific attacks: physical access that uses root privileges and remote attacks that exploit database vulnerabilities. The authors build a design schema and implement it on a custom PBFT blockchain, then measure performance across latency, network size, payload size, and transaction rate. Results indicate that existing audit logs can move to this setup while gaining resistance to the listed attacks. A sympathetic reader would see this as a way to make audit records trustworthy without redesigning the underlying data systems.

Core claim

BlockAudit is a scalable and tamper-proof system that leverages the design properties of audit logs and security guarantees of blockchain to enable secure and trustworthy audit logs and defend against the known attacks on audit logs. The authors construct the design schema, outline functional and operational procedures, implement on a PBFT blockchain, and show through evaluation that conventional logs can transition to achieve higher security.

What carries the argument

The BlockAudit design schema implemented on a Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT) blockchain system.

If this is right

  • Audit logs resist tampering from physical access attacks that exploit root privileges.
  • Remote vulnerability attacks that compromise database systems are defended against.
  • The system maintains performance across varying network sizes, payload sizes, and transaction rates.
  • Conventional audit logs can transition to the BlockAudit approach without major redesign.

Where Pith is reading between the lines

These are editorial extensions of the paper, not claims the author makes directly.

  • The same blockchain integration pattern could apply to other types of enterprise logging that face similar tampering risks.
  • If performance holds at larger scales, the approach might support real-time auditing in high-volume environments.
  • Adoption would depend on whether existing databases can feed logs into the PBFT layer with minimal code changes.

Load-bearing premise

The PBFT blockchain actually provides tamper-proof properties against physical access and remote attacks without creating new attack surfaces or performance problems that undermine the guarantees.

What would settle it

An experiment in which an adversary with root privileges or a known database exploit successfully alters data and logs in the BlockAudit implementation without detection would falsify the central claim.

Figures

Figures reproduced from arXiv: 1907.10484 by Ashar Ahmad, Aziz Mohaisen, Muhammad Saad.

Figure 1
Figure 1. Figure 1: Audit log generation in an OLTP system. We an [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p002_1.png] view at source ↗
Figure 2
Figure 2. Figure 2: An overview of Blockchain structure consisting [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p003_2.png] view at source ↗
Figure 3
Figure 3. Figure 3: The network overview of nodes employing Block￾Audit. Notice that each node maintains an interface that con￾nects them to the audit log application. They exchange trans￾actions with one another during the application life-cycle. The audit log system architecture should be modular and service￾oriented so that it is possible for various types of applications to par￾ticipate and benefit from this system. Moreo… view at source ↗
Figure 5
Figure 5. Figure 5: Since the audit log data is consolidated, therefore, it is [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p008_5.png] view at source ↗
Figure 6
Figure 6. Figure 6: Audit Entry generation for a object. Object A is a [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p008_6.png] view at source ↗
Figure 7
Figure 7. Figure 7: An overview of PBFT protocol with client issues a [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p009_7.png] view at source ↗
Figure 9
Figure 9. Figure 9: Time taken to reach consensus at different types of audit transaction with varying transaction rate [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p012_9.png] view at source ↗
Figure 10
Figure 10. Figure 10: Audit log block chain detection vs recovery, there [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p013_10.png] view at source ↗
read the original abstract

Audit logs serve as a critical component in enterprise business systems and are used for auditing, storing, and tracking changes made to the data. However, audit logs are vulnerable to a series of attacks enabling adversaries to tamper data and corresponding audit logs without getting detected. Among them, two well-known attacks are "the physical access attack," which exploits root privileges, and "the remote vulnerability attack," which compromises known vulnerabilities in database systems. In this paper, we present BlockAudit: a scalable and tamper-proof system that leverages the design properties of audit logs and security guarantees of blockchain to enable secure and trustworthy audit logs. Towards that, we construct the design schema of BlockAudit and outline its functional and operational procedures. We implement our design on a custom-built Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT) blockchain system and evaluate the performance in terms of latency, network size, payload size, and transaction rate. Our results show that conventional audit logs can seamlessly transition into BlockAudit to achieve higher security and defend against the known attacks on audit logs.

Editorial analysis

A structured set of objections, weighed in public.

Desk editor's note, referee report, simulated authors' rebuttal, and a circularity audit. Tearing a paper down is the easy half of reading it; the pith above is the substance, this is the friction.

Referee Report

2 major / 1 minor

Summary. The paper presents BlockAudit, a system that uses a custom PBFT blockchain to make audit logs tamper-proof against physical-access (root-privilege) and remote-vulnerability attacks. It outlines a design schema, functional procedures, an implementation on PBFT, and reports performance results on latency, payload size, network size, and transaction rate, claiming that conventional audit logs can transition to this architecture for higher security.

Significance. If the security properties were demonstrated, the work would provide a concrete systems-level integration of blockchain guarantees with audit logging, potentially useful for enterprise environments where tamper resistance is required. The performance evaluation supplies concrete metrics that could serve as a baseline for similar designs.

major comments (2)
  1. [Abstract and §1] Abstract and §1: The central claim that BlockAudit 'defend[s] against the known attacks on audit logs' (physical access and remote vulnerability) is unsupported; the manuscript supplies neither a threat model, a security argument showing how PBFT integration prevents root-level tampering or vulnerability exploitation, nor any evaluation against those attack classes. Only the design sketch and performance numbers are given.
  2. [Implementation and evaluation sections] Implementation and evaluation sections: The reliance on 'security guarantees of blockchain' and external PBFT properties is stated without analyzing whether the custom PBFT implementation or its integration with the audit source introduces new attack surfaces or fails to preserve tamper evidence when an adversary controls a logging node.
minor comments (1)
  1. [Design schema] Notation for the design schema and operational procedures could be clarified with explicit diagrams or pseudocode to make the functional flow reproducible from the text alone.

Simulated Author's Rebuttal

2 responses · 0 unresolved

We thank the referee for the detailed and constructive feedback. We address each major comment below and indicate planned revisions to strengthen the security claims.

read point-by-point responses

  1. Referee: [Abstract and §1] Abstract and §1: The central claim that BlockAudit 'defend[s] against the known attacks on audit logs' (physical access and remote vulnerability) is unsupported; the manuscript supplies neither a threat model, a security argument showing how PBFT integration prevents root-level tampering or vulnerability exploitation, nor any evaluation against those attack classes. Only the design sketch and performance numbers are given.

    Authors: We agree the claims require explicit support. The manuscript presents the design and performance results but does not include a formal threat model or security argument mapping PBFT properties to the two attack classes. We will add a new section (likely §3) that defines the threat model, explains how the blockchain integration prevents root-privilege tampering and remote vulnerability exploitation, and discusses the assumptions under which these defenses hold. revision: yes

  2. Referee: [Implementation and evaluation sections] Implementation and evaluation sections: The reliance on 'security guarantees of blockchain' and external PBFT properties is stated without analyzing whether the custom PBFT implementation or its integration with the audit source introduces new attack surfaces or fails to preserve tamper evidence when an adversary controls a logging node.

    Authors: The current text invokes blockchain guarantees without examining the custom PBFT implementation or integration points for new vulnerabilities. We will revise the implementation and evaluation sections to include an analysis of potential attack surfaces (e.g., compromised logging nodes, consensus manipulation) and how tamper evidence is maintained or could be lost under those conditions. revision: yes

Circularity Check

0 steps flagged

No circularity; systems design relies on external PBFT properties without self-referential derivations.

full rationale

The paper is a systems description and implementation report. It sketches a design schema for BlockAudit, outlines procedures, implements on a custom PBFT blockchain, and reports performance metrics (latency, payload size, transaction rate). No mathematical derivations, fitted parameters, predictions, or equations exist that could reduce to inputs by construction. Security claims rest on the external, pre-existing properties of PBFT rather than any self-defined or self-cited result within the paper. No self-citation load-bearing steps or ansatz smuggling are present. This is a standard non-circular systems paper.

Axiom & Free-Parameter Ledger

0 free parameters · 0 axioms · 0 invented entities

The paper is a systems-design and implementation study. It introduces no free parameters, mathematical axioms, or new postulated entities; security is assumed to follow from the use of an existing PBFT blockchain.

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Reference graph

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