Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.
Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-07-31T23:47:37.347691Z
Paper Citation Record · LEDGER
As of 19 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 18 of 18 outbound references and 0 inbound Pith citation observations for arXiv:2607.23367.
A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.
Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.
Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-07-31T23:47:37.347691Z
One-hop event checks from named stored sources.
Source: scholarly_work_events, retraction_status_cache, observed 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00
Pith citing papers itemized under the disclosed page cap.
Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links
A source-named dated measurement, never combined with another source.
Source: cited_works
18 of 18 outbound references displayed
External citation measurements
No source-named external measurement is stored.
Observation 95a1566c-942d-4f0d-b304-916eaa97b567 · outbound
Fair Division with Strictly Increasing Valuations: A Tight Threshold for Two-Agent EF1 and PO Voudouris, and Xiaowei Wu
Reference 1
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation acfde9af-4910-41e9-a360-55aef46ea6e9 · outbound
Fair Division with Strictly Increasing Valuations: A Tight Threshold for Two-Agent EF1 and PO Fair allocation of indivisible goods and chores.Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 36(3), 2022
Reference 2
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation c0ab039a-b3ae-41d0-98ea-a823aa082fc7 · outbound
Fair Division with Strictly Increasing Valuations: A Tight Threshold for Two-Agent EF1 and PO Compatibility of fairness and Nash welfare under subadditive valuations
Reference 3
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation 40397f21-3d0a-4e49-99c0-300ec78409fb · outbound
Fair Division with Strictly Increasing Valuations: A Tight Threshold for Two-Agent EF1 and PO Finding fair and efficient allocations
Reference 4
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation b8ca8e61-6397-46db-ab47-f2f00e927c7f · outbound
Fair Division with Strictly Increasing Valuations: A Tight Threshold for Two-Agent EF1 and PO Finding fair and efficient allocations for matroid rank valuations.ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, 9: 1–41, 2021
Reference 5
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation c466ed0c-8d99-4110-9f3e-b8ecfa8e131c · outbound
Fair Division with Strictly Increasing Valuations: A Tight Threshold for Two-Agent EF1 and PO Unresolved cited work
Reference 6
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation 555f36bd-ac78-4499-9190-ce0c070f4e83 · outbound
Fair Division with Strictly Increasing Valuations: A Tight Threshold for Two-Agent EF1 and PO Fair Division with Binary Valuations: Characterizations
Reference 7
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation ea7bf989-8d67-4543-842a-9129b1144acc · outbound
Fair Division with Strictly Increasing Valuations: A Tight Threshold for Two-Agent EF1 and PO The combinatorial assignment problem: Approximate competitive equilibrium from equal incomes.Journal of Political Economy, 119(6):1061–1103, 2011
Reference 8
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation bb4d1711-d7b1-446e-9e84-682bf0f603ef · outbound
Fair Division with Strictly Increasing Valuations: A Tight Threshold for Two-Agent EF1 and PO Procaccia, Nisarg Shah, and Junxing Wang
Reference 9
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation 78756d7d-3afa-487f-89ad-0963f624b8b8 · outbound
Fair Division with Strictly Increasing Valuations: A Tight Threshold for Two-Agent EF1 and PO Nonexistence of Simultaneously EF1 and Pareto Optimal Allocations for Submodular Valuations
Reference 10
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation cb846b07-924b-4077-89d2-b25135a8fa44 · outbound
Fair Division with Strictly Increasing Valuations: A Tight Threshold for Two-Agent EF1 and PO Computing the optimal strategy to commit to
Reference 11
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation 211cb80b-1854-4d59-bb3d-afd1613f4f72 · outbound
Fair Division with Strictly Increasing Valuations: A Tight Threshold for Two-Agent EF1 and PO Fair distribution of delivery orders.Artificial Intelligence, 347:104389, 2025
Reference 12
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation 974654d1-a515-4d16-b743-656a6b18e982 · outbound
Fair Division with Strictly Increasing Valuations: A Tight Threshold for Two-Agent EF1 and PO The cost of EFX: Generalized-mean welfare and complexity dichotomies with few surplus items.arXiv preprint arXiv:2601.12849, 2026
Reference 13
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation 85f201ad-58ae-4bfa-90e8-fb73912af3f5 · outbound
Fair Division with Strictly Increasing Valuations: A Tight Threshold for Two-Agent EF1 and PO Lipton, Evangelos Markakis, Elchanan Mossel, and Amin Saberi
Reference 14
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation e3e59866-db37-4f07-bfb4-4bb2745c9bc8 · outbound
Fair Division with Strictly Increasing Valuations: A Tight Threshold for Two-Agent EF1 and PO When One Good Is Not Enough: EF1 and Pareto Optimality Are Not Compatible for Submodular Valuations
Reference 15
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation 986f1b89-4e60-4ea0-bcbb-bdd34628a8b8 · outbound
Fair Division with Strictly Increasing Valuations: A Tight Threshold for Two-Agent EF1 and PO Existence of fair and efficient allocation of indivisible chores
Reference 16
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation 0f859d8c-c067-4235-8119-76e4d9905da9 · outbound
Fair Division with Strictly Increasing Valuations: A Tight Threshold for Two-Agent EF1 and PO Almost envy-freeness with general valuations.SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics, 34(2):1039–1068, 2020
Reference 17
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation 12957142-3bb1-4331-9181-e805ec5e981f · outbound
Fair Division with Strictly Increasing Valuations: A Tight Threshold for Two-Agent EF1 and PO Computing fair and efficient indivisible chore allocations with bounded surplus
Reference 18
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
No inbound Pith citation observations are available.