Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.
Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-06T12:35:21.404768Z
Paper Citation Record · LEDGER
Non-coercive extortion in game theory
As of 7 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 52 of 52 outbound references and 0 inbound Pith citation observations for arXiv:2507.21795.
A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.
Coverage vector
One-hop event checks from named stored sources.
Source: scholarly_work_events, retraction_status_cache, observed 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00
Pith citing papers itemized under the disclosed page cap.
Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links
A source-named dated measurement, never combined with another source.
Source: cited_works
Reference resolution
52 of 52 outbound references displayed
- verified exact1
- verified fuzzy37
- unresolved14
- parse uncertain0
- malformed identifier0
- metadata mismatch0
External citation measurements
No source-named external measurement is stored.
Outbound references
Observation 8c6c89e6-e59c-4b64-9093-1083b0cd99bc · outbound
This paper cites Von Neumann and O.
Non-coercive extortion in game theory Von Neumann and O
Reference 1
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T12:35:22.365698Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.
Observation 7f4df02e-84ed-46e4-8b6b-79830fb16b21 · outbound
This paper cites Maschler, S.
Non-coercive extortion in game theory Maschler, S
Reference 2
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T12:35:22.350722Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.
Observation 1696b63a-6f2c-4e51-89c4-f4746507a1cc · outbound
This paper cites González-Díaz, I.
Non-coercive extortion in game theory González-Díaz, I
Reference 3
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T12:35:22.335500Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.
Observation 9be361ed-0ba0-4ff7-8a79-8c275afd2ce6 · outbound
This paper cites Schelling, The strategy of conflict(Harvard University Press, 1960).
Non-coercive extortion in game theory Schelling, The strategy of conflict(Harvard University Press, 1960)
Reference 4
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T12:35:22.320296Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.
Observation f3512e0b-17c5-4b13-8753-e945da774c97 · outbound
This paper cites an unresolved cited work.
Non-coercive extortion in game theory Unresolved cited work
Reference 5
- Resolution
- unresolved
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T12:35:22.304150Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.
Observation 24f6b51d-b4ae-43fd-9606-585e342f4094 · outbound
This paper cites Sobel, Distortion of utilities and the bargaining problem, Econo- metrica, 597 (1981).
Non-coercive extortion in game theory Sobel, Distortion of utilities and the bargaining problem, Econo- metrica, 597 (1981)
Reference 6
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T12:35:22.289348Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.
Observation 38a2e994-fa88-4d21-94f9-02fb0d35ee1a · outbound
This paper cites Fudenberg and J.
Non-coercive extortion in game theory Fudenberg and J
Reference 7
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T12:35:22.274574Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.
Observation 4eaf9f1f-1b79-4a3f-b726-f62880e71d92 · outbound
This paper cites Vickers, Delegation and the theory of the firm, The Economic Journal 95, 138 (1985).
Non-coercive extortion in game theory Vickers, Delegation and the theory of the firm, The Economic Journal 95, 138 (1985)
Reference 8
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T12:35:22.259275Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.
Observation 91ec6073-8e07-4535-b9ff-ed1ab2c789d5 · outbound
This paper cites Fershtman and K.
Non-coercive extortion in game theory Fershtman and K
Reference 9
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T12:35:22.243918Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.
Observation ddca4335-d898-421e-add1-96f7f79617f3 · outbound
This paper cites Fershtman, K.
Non-coercive extortion in game theory Fershtman, K
Reference 10
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T12:35:22.229263Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.
Observation 3c5798a7-cc0d-4784-9a7d-bcda50cf31c7 · outbound
This paper cites an unresolved cited work.
Non-coercive extortion in game theory Unresolved cited work
Reference 11
- Resolution
- unresolved
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T12:35:22.214210Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.
Observation 0929d60d-0408-4959-b503-7ead1f553988 · outbound
This paper cites Stackelberg, Marktform und gleichgewicht (Julius Springer, 1934).
Non-coercive extortion in game theory Stackelberg, Marktform und gleichgewicht (Julius Springer, 1934)
Reference 12
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T12:35:22.198696Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.
Observation b807572d-d22a-4b48-8331-1f2fc5ec3315 · outbound
This paper cites an unresolved cited work.
Non-coercive extortion in game theory Unresolved cited work
Reference 13
- Resolution
- unresolved
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T12:35:22.182989Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.
Observation 74306435-c130-46bf-b56c-11e181e507ef · outbound
This paper cites Van Damme and S.
Non-coercive extortion in game theory Van Damme and S
Reference 14
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T12:35:22.168386Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.
Observation d022be96-367b-4e5e-9619-0be882c62567 · outbound
This paper cites Van Damme and S.
Non-coercive extortion in game theory Van Damme and S
Reference 15
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T12:35:22.154185Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.
Observation ab7b7e2d-fb17-4138-9441-90ab14436335 · outbound
This paper cites Commitment and extortion.
Non-coercive extortion in game theory Commitment and extortion
Reference 16
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T12:35:22.139123Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.
Observation 152d6f77-87e9-404b-8776-731289e9e254 · outbound
This paper cites Renou, Commitment games, Games and Economic Behavior66, 488 (2009).
Non-coercive extortion in game theory Renou, Commitment games, Games and Economic Behavior66, 488 (2009)
Reference 17
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T12:35:22.123730Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.
Observation 828324b6-1627-4b87-aa74-ac93da899288 · outbound
This paper cites an unresolved cited work.
Non-coercive extortion in game theory Unresolved cited work
Reference 18
- Resolution
- unresolved
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T12:35:22.108382Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.
Observation b7fe0752-5957-4736-bcd4-8e9e985643ec · outbound
This paper cites Prat and A.
Non-coercive extortion in game theory Prat and A
Reference 19
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T12:35:22.093425Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.
Observation 22d1e054-9e90-40b3-87f4-4722c302a21d · outbound
This paper cites Calvó-Armengol and M.
Non-coercive extortion in game theory Calvó-Armengol and M
Reference 20
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T12:35:22.079139Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.
Observation 07713cb6-4f9e-4147-893c-8bc060324e67 · outbound
This paper cites an unresolved cited work.
Non-coercive extortion in game theory Unresolved cited work
Reference 21
- Resolution
- unresolved
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T12:35:22.063836Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.
Observation 76916a44-3f79-4f39-8d6d-330067bbf822 · outbound
This paper cites an unresolved cited work.
Non-coercive extortion in game theory Unresolved cited work
Reference 22
- Resolution
- unresolved
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T12:35:22.047751Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.
Observation cd03e72b-0a16-490f-8685-daaee28784e6 · outbound
This paper cites Andreoni and H.
Non-coercive extortion in game theory Andreoni and H
Reference 23
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T12:35:22.032916Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.
Observation a7bebf64-be2b-46c6-9adf-32b85d4fb760 · outbound
This paper cites Charness, G.
Non-coercive extortion in game theory Charness, G
Reference 24
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T12:35:22.017454Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.
Observation 8bb47d80-3ba3-4479-a625-803d99eda2b0 · outbound
This paper cites Fong and J.
Non-coercive extortion in game theory Fong and J
Reference 25
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T12:35:22.001847Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.
Observation 53f22aa0-0d10-47aa-ac78-e61f2ed3ff67 · outbound
This paper cites Ellsberg, The theory and practice of blackmail, Lecture at the Lowell Institute, Boston, MA, March10 (1959).
Non-coercive extortion in game theory Ellsberg, The theory and practice of blackmail, Lecture at the Lowell Institute, Boston, MA, March10 (1959)
Reference 26
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T12:35:21.986011Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.
Observation 72facaa2-bba9-4a63-81ae-7968a217a9f5 · outbound
This paper cites Rahwan et al., Machine behaviour, Nature568, 477 (2019).
Non-coercive extortion in game theory Rahwan et al., Machine behaviour, Nature568, 477 (2019)
Reference 27
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T12:35:21.970695Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.
Observation 47fb93ab-ffc4-43da-99ac-73b1fc16a244 · outbound
This paper cites Open Problems in Cooperative AI.
Non-coercive extortion in game theory Open Problems in Cooperative AI
Reference 28
- Resolution
- unresolved
- no resolver link, observed 2026-08-06T12:35:21.284173Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation f71db82d-be45-4024-abab-33b2c2df15da · outbound
This paper cites Hammond et al., Multi-agent risks from advanced ai, tech.
Non-coercive extortion in game theory Hammond et al., Multi-agent risks from advanced ai, tech
Reference 29
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T12:35:21.954957Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.
Observation 18249245-30c1-48d4-8bf8-8f659448d656 · outbound
This paper cites an unresolved cited work.
Non-coercive extortion in game theory Unresolved cited work
Reference 30
- Resolution
- unresolved
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T12:35:21.939010Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.
Observation 8ffafa90-825b-4c13-8895-cf4993735b4d · outbound
This paper cites Hilbe, M.
Reference 31
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T12:35:21.923809Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.
Observation c423dbcf-bb5a-4c16-9ed2-2ea27925875c · outbound
This paper cites Hilbe, A.
Reference 32
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T12:35:21.907828Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.
Observation 7304ceff-55ce-4245-adf3-b03cbf660a54 · outbound
This paper cites Gamemining:howtomakemoney from those about to play a game.
Non-coercive extortion in game theory Gamemining:howtomakemoney from those about to play a game
Reference 33
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T12:35:21.891896Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.
Observation fd71878f-f214-4ada-bfaa-2b4861785825 · outbound
This paper cites an unresolved cited work.
Non-coercive extortion in game theory Unresolved cited work
Reference 34
- Resolution
- unresolved
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T12:35:21.875879Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.
Observation 5b271842-5d14-4d94-8dcb-117b1f0d8477 · outbound
This paper cites an unresolved cited work.
Non-coercive extortion in game theory Unresolved cited work
Reference 35
- Resolution
- unresolved
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T12:35:21.860790Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.
Observation a8a0763c-3030-48bd-a317-9c1b58a7a776 · outbound
This paper cites an unresolved cited work.
Non-coercive extortion in game theory Unresolved cited work
Reference 36
- Resolution
- unresolved
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T12:35:21.846571Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.
Observation ab406e7d-206d-48a3-8a2f-f1ce60b5f310 · outbound
This paper cites an unresolved cited work.
Non-coercive extortion in game theory Unresolved cited work
Reference 37
- Resolution
- unresolved
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T12:35:21.832361Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.
Observation 5828a772-5399-407e-bbe6-d8ecf381ce00 · outbound
This paper cites Robinson and D.
Non-coercive extortion in game theory Robinson and D
Reference 38
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T12:35:21.816664Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.
Observation 3bd6a5da-32e8-47a3-99de-fb535df53a74 · outbound
This paper cites Bruns, Atlas of 2x2 games: transforming conflict and coopera- tion, (2015).
Non-coercive extortion in game theory Bruns, Atlas of 2x2 games: transforming conflict and coopera- tion, (2015)
Reference 39
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T12:35:21.801818Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.
Observation 8ca4af1c-4f1d-4bc7-afe7-bc735e5f6567 · outbound
This paper cites Buterin et al., Ethereum white paper, GitHub repository 1, 5 (2013).
Non-coercive extortion in game theory Buterin et al., Ethereum white paper, GitHub repository 1, 5 (2013)
Reference 40
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T12:35:21.669885Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.
Observation 511ba264-10e1-49a1-b045-f6ac6564d458 · outbound
This paper cites Hawk: theblockchainmodelofcryptographyandprivacy-preservingsmart contracts.
Non-coercive extortion in game theory Hawk: theblockchainmodelofcryptographyandprivacy-preservingsmart contracts
Reference 41
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T12:35:21.655300Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.
Observation 2ad2b8e3-367a-489c-a723-e42e166d211d · outbound
This paper cites Di Pierro, What is the blockchain?, Computing in Science & Engineering 19, 92 (2017).
Non-coercive extortion in game theory Di Pierro, What is the blockchain?, Computing in Science & Engineering 19, 92 (2017)
Reference 42
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T12:35:21.639616Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.
Observation 210161fb-034c-4d4e-bc63-8456e723eb8a · outbound
This paper cites Tennenholtz, Program equilibrium, Games and Economic Be- havior 49, 363 (2004).
Non-coercive extortion in game theory Tennenholtz, Program equilibrium, Games and Economic Be- havior 49, 363 (2004)
Reference 43
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T12:35:21.621185Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.
Observation 474ef516-42f4-4f26-8a25-0600fd6fb006 · outbound
This paper cites Program equilibrium in the prisoner’s dilemma via löb’s theorem.
Non-coercive extortion in game theory Program equilibrium in the prisoner’s dilemma via löb’s theorem
Reference 44
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T12:35:21.605681Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.
Observation 5de6c423-e496-4599-9bc7-613d8c660db7 · outbound
This paper cites Making smart contracts smarter.
Non-coercive extortion in game theory Making smart contracts smarter
Reference 45
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T12:35:21.589477Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.
Observation 9367b466-3a10-48b1-98e1-0e8c550674fa · outbound
This paper cites Oesterheld, Robust program equilibrium, Theory and Decision 86, 143 (2019).
Non-coercive extortion in game theory Oesterheld, Robust program equilibrium, Theory and Decision 86, 143 (2019)
Reference 46
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T12:35:21.571277Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.
Observation 82415ee4-6fdd-4b6e-996c-8d97409fa161 · outbound
This paper cites Smart contracts for bribing miners.
Non-coercive extortion in game theory Smart contracts for bribing miners
Reference 47
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T12:35:21.555769Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.
Observation 48492132-4ecb-4741-a7b7-763fc2eb76d7 · outbound
This paper cites Flash boys 2.0: frontrunning in decentralized exchanges, miner extractable value, and consensus instability.
Non-coercive extortion in game theory Flash boys 2.0: frontrunning in decentralized exchanges, miner extractable value, and consensus instability
Reference 48
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T12:35:21.539488Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.
Observation b120d877-b9e2-48d1-bd8f-0266ccc6868e · outbound
This paper cites Cooperative AI via Decentralized Commitment Devices.
Non-coercive extortion in game theory Cooperative AI via Decentralized Commitment Devices
Reference 49
- Resolution
- unresolved
- no resolver link, observed 2026-08-06T12:35:21.389327Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation 3aad96c2-d7d8-4720-8538-1b15b22b76c0 · outbound
This paper cites an unresolved cited work.
Non-coercive extortion in game theory Unresolved cited work
Reference 50
- Resolution
- unresolved
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T12:35:21.521582Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.
Observation e6e60f76-7081-4251-9a3d-8b2239e8f675 · outbound
This paper cites K-implementation.
Non-coercive extortion in game theory K-implementation
Reference 51
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T12:35:21.504460Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.
Observation b725959c-228d-4491-ac12-03f08ceffa8a · outbound
This paper cites Game Manipulators -- the Strategic Implications of Binding Contracts.
Non-coercive extortion in game theory Game Manipulators -- the Strategic Implications of Binding Contracts
Reference 52
- Resolution
- verified exact
- local_arxiv, observed 2026-08-06T12:35:21.451273Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.
Pith citing papers
No inbound Pith citation observations are available.