Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.
Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-07T11:20:51.259894Z
Paper Citation Record · LEDGER
Cost of institutional incentives for promoting cooperation in $2\times2$ games and collective risk games
As of 22 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 40 of 40 outbound references and 0 inbound Pith citation observations for arXiv:2506.02968.
A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.
Coverage vector
One-hop event checks from named stored sources.
Source: scholarly_work_events, retraction_status_cache, observed 2026-08-22T06:32:14.747728+00:00
Pith citing papers itemized under the disclosed page cap.
Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links
A source-named dated measurement, never combined with another source.
Source: cited_works
Reference resolution
40 of 40 outbound references displayed
- verified exact0
- verified fuzzy34
- unresolved6
- parse uncertain0
- malformed identifier0
- metadata mismatch0
External citation measurements
No source-named external measurement is stored.
Outbound references
Observation 7764f495-4b3a-4bc9-b387-4a63ca902fa5 · outbound
This paper cites Mathematical foundations of moral preferences.
Cost of institutional incentives for promoting cooperation in $2\times2$ games and collective risk games Mathematical foundations of moral preferences
Reference 1
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T11:20:51.886446Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-22T06:32:14.747728+00:00.
Observation cabc81b4-ee72-4904-9594-5fc55d7e9c11 · outbound
This paper cites Preferences for efficiency, rather than preferences for morality, drive cooperation in the one-shot stag-hunt game.
Cost of institutional incentives for promoting cooperation in $2\times2$ games and collective risk games Preferences for efficiency, rather than preferences for morality, drive cooperation in the one-shot stag-hunt game
Reference 2
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T11:20:51.872654Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-22T06:32:14.747728+00:00.
Observation 2ef2cafd-de30-4a9c-a2b9-b14dc6263981 · outbound
This paper cites Cost-efficient interventions for pro- moting fairness in the ultimatum game.
Cost of institutional incentives for promoting cooperation in $2\times2$ games and collective risk games Cost-efficient interventions for pro- moting fairness in the ultimatum game
Reference 3
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T11:20:51.860093Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-22T06:32:14.747728+00:00.
Observation 4ba19073-a6dc-4de6-988f-cf14ba312114 · outbound
This paper cites Hawks, doves, and international cooperation.
Cost of institutional incentives for promoting cooperation in $2\times2$ games and collective risk games Hawks, doves, and international cooperation
Reference 4
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T11:20:51.847142Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-22T06:32:14.747728+00:00.
Observation f5c41487-5d4b-4b37-b14d-d8af5250c2b4 · outbound
This paper cites an unresolved cited work.
Cost of institutional incentives for promoting cooperation in $2\times2$ games and collective risk games Unresolved cited work
Reference 5
- Resolution
- unresolved
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T11:20:51.835122Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-22T06:32:14.747728+00:00.
Observation c99ce787-4b21-4234-8cc8-ff0bc9073a1a · outbound
This paper cites an unresolved cited work.
Cost of institutional incentives for promoting cooperation in $2\times2$ games and collective risk games Unresolved cited work
Reference 6
- Resolution
- unresolved
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T11:20:51.820837Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-22T06:32:14.747728+00:00.
Observation 671eaaac-de47-4ee3-ad38-ab41650a3879 · outbound
This paper cites Cost efficiency of institutional incentives for promoting cooperation in finite populations.
Cost of institutional incentives for promoting cooperation in $2\times2$ games and collective risk games Cost efficiency of institutional incentives for promoting cooperation in finite populations
Reference 7
- Resolution
- unresolved
- no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T11:20:50.127824Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation f7e3d003-e909-4ba6-9303-6fc67111ef43 · outbound
This paper cites Learning to resolve social dilemmas: a survey.
Cost of institutional incentives for promoting cooperation in $2\times2$ games and collective risk games Learning to resolve social dilemmas: a survey
Reference 8
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T11:20:51.798384Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-22T06:32:14.747728+00:00.
Observation 383284e3-6b69-45bb-b482-1d7e80145d2c · outbound
This paper cites Evolution of commitment in the spatial public goods game through institutional incentives.
Cost of institutional incentives for promoting cooperation in $2\times2$ games and collective risk games Evolution of commitment in the spatial public goods game through institutional incentives
Reference 9
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T11:20:51.686639Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-22T06:32:14.747728+00:00.
Observation af762876-5578-4198-b8c9-079b98069e7b · outbound
This paper cites G´ ois, Fernando P.
Cost of institutional incentives for promoting cooperation in $2\times2$ games and collective risk games G´ ois, Fernando P
Reference 10
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T11:20:51.674835Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-22T06:32:14.747728+00:00.
Observation 484a2d08-3a31-42e7-aef9-f5ab2c07c943 · outbound
This paper cites The competitive advantage of sanctioning institutions.
Cost of institutional incentives for promoting cooperation in $2\times2$ games and collective risk games The competitive advantage of sanctioning institutions
Reference 11
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T11:20:51.663086Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-22T06:32:14.747728+00:00.
Observation a4788761-c586-414a-b2dc-66f125900472 · outbound
This paper cites Evolutionary mechanisms that pro- mote cooperation may not promote social welfare.
Cost of institutional incentives for promoting cooperation in $2\times2$ games and collective risk games Evolutionary mechanisms that pro- mote cooperation may not promote social welfare
Reference 12
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T11:20:51.650043Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-22T06:32:14.747728+00:00.
Observation 112dc31b-8d13-44af-869d-8219bd3e867a · outbound
This paper cites Evolution of commitment and level of participation in public goods games.
Cost of institutional incentives for promoting cooperation in $2\times2$ games and collective risk games Evolution of commitment and level of participation in public goods games
Reference 13
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T11:20:51.637373Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-22T06:32:14.747728+00:00.
Observation 0be2a407-5865-4cee-8536-567d0be9fb12 · outbound
This paper cites Cost-effective external interference for promoting the evolution of cooperation.
Cost of institutional incentives for promoting cooperation in $2\times2$ games and collective risk games Cost-effective external interference for promoting the evolution of cooperation
Reference 14
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T11:20:51.623940Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-22T06:32:14.747728+00:00.
Observation 08d609cc-f4b0-4fb3-bc53-32bf3f727ab2 · outbound
This paper cites Rewarding endowments lead to a win-win in the evolution of public cooperation and the accumulation of common resources.
Cost of institutional incentives for promoting cooperation in $2\times2$ games and collective risk games Rewarding endowments lead to a win-win in the evolution of public cooperation and the accumulation of common resources
Reference 15
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T11:20:51.611345Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-22T06:32:14.747728+00:00.
Observation c58a5a9a-8bd3-41c3-aafa-ce3e886e171b · outbound
This paper cites Coevolutionary dynamics of population and institutional rewards in public goods games.
Cost of institutional incentives for promoting cooperation in $2\times2$ games and collective risk games Coevolutionary dynamics of population and institutional rewards in public goods games
Reference 16
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T11:20:51.599043Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-22T06:32:14.747728+00:00.
Observation f30ed31b-770d-4fad-82a0-f95d9429678f · outbound
This paper cites Analytical inversion of general tridiagonal matrices.
Cost of institutional incentives for promoting cooperation in $2\times2$ games and collective risk games Analytical inversion of general tridiagonal matrices
Reference 17
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T11:20:51.585463Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-22T06:32:14.747728+00:00.
Observation b0faf4b2-8189-48d7-aed8-9ae01d70f111 · outbound
This paper cites Perspectives on the micro-macro distinction.
Cost of institutional incentives for promoting cooperation in $2\times2$ games and collective risk games Perspectives on the micro-macro distinction
Reference 18
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T11:20:51.571678Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-22T06:32:14.747728+00:00.
Observation db5112bf-7d68-42a2-bbe0-c96e30c2c53e · outbound
This paper cites Effects of interconnections among corruption, institutional punishment, and economic factors on the evolution of cooperation.
Cost of institutional incentives for promoting cooperation in $2\times2$ games and collective risk games Effects of interconnections among corruption, institutional punishment, and economic factors on the evolution of cooperation
Reference 19
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T11:20:51.559747Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-22T06:32:14.747728+00:00.
Observation 9d0ac368-8d33-4065-8938-9223c4c36f12 · outbound
This paper cites Evolution of trust in the n-player trust game with transformation incentive mechanism.
Cost of institutional incentives for promoting cooperation in $2\times2$ games and collective risk games Evolution of trust in the n-player trust game with transformation incentive mechanism
Reference 20
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T11:20:51.546638Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-22T06:32:14.747728+00:00.
Observation 5620fdd7-339b-4267-94dd-db319eca1742 · outbound
This paper cites Hawks, doves, and peace: an experimental approach.
Cost of institutional incentives for promoting cooperation in $2\times2$ games and collective risk games Hawks, doves, and peace: an experimental approach
Reference 21
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T11:20:51.533730Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-22T06:32:14.747728+00:00.
Observation c1d30d15-f9cb-414d-83e9-9a60ffb83aef · outbound
This paper cites an unresolved cited work.
Cost of institutional incentives for promoting cooperation in $2\times2$ games and collective risk games Unresolved cited work
Reference 22
- Resolution
- unresolved
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T11:20:51.520593Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-22T06:32:14.747728+00:00.
Observation 49bebc0c-34a1-4480-aa9c-73fc239da03f · outbound
This paper cites an unresolved cited work.
Cost of institutional incentives for promoting cooperation in $2\times2$ games and collective risk games Unresolved cited work
Reference 23
- Resolution
- unresolved
- no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T11:20:51.195441Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation 8e11efbc-2b1e-465c-81ca-d4360f2939e9 · outbound
This paper cites Jordan, David G.
Cost of institutional incentives for promoting cooperation in $2\times2$ games and collective risk games Jordan, David G
Reference 24
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T11:20:51.498431Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-22T06:32:14.747728+00:00.
Observation fdea9022-1838-4352-b2dc-c2761d81bad6 · outbound
This paper cites More can be better: An analysis of single-mutant fixation probability functions under 2 × 2 games.
Cost of institutional incentives for promoting cooperation in $2\times2$ games and collective risk games More can be better: An analysis of single-mutant fixation probability functions under 2 × 2 games
Reference 25
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T11:20:51.486243Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-22T06:32:14.747728+00:00.
Observation 86e6ccdd-3dd8-41e8-8f10-464af75507fd · outbound
This paper cites Rand and Martin A.
Cost of institutional incentives for promoting cooperation in $2\times2$ games and collective risk games Rand and Martin A
Reference 26
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T11:20:51.474398Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-22T06:32:14.747728+00:00.
Observation 2a2ec50c-3331-4352-ae38-91865b10288a · outbound
This paper cites The optimal control for promoting the cooperation in evolution game generated by prisoner’s dilemma.
Cost of institutional incentives for promoting cooperation in $2\times2$ games and collective risk games The optimal control for promoting the cooperation in evolution game generated by prisoner’s dilemma
Reference 27
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T11:20:51.460504Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-22T06:32:14.747728+00:00.
Observation de64d339-fc63-4d3b-b8fb-db73d9bead89 · outbound
This paper cites The take-it-or-leave- it option allows small penalties to overcome social dilemmas.
Cost of institutional incentives for promoting cooperation in $2\times2$ games and collective risk games The take-it-or-leave- it option allows small penalties to overcome social dilemmas
Reference 28
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T11:20:51.448164Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-22T06:32:14.747728+00:00.
Observation 8be6a170-f43c-4deb-a86f-f18b8fb6dcfa · outbound
This paper cites The calculus of selfishness.
Cost of institutional incentives for promoting cooperation in $2\times2$ games and collective risk games The calculus of selfishness
Reference 29
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T11:20:51.435903Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-22T06:32:14.747728+00:00.
Observation 0c3b5596-741e-4cf7-946f-640d8772c291 · outbound
This paper cites Social learning promotes institutions for governing the commons.
Cost of institutional incentives for promoting cooperation in $2\times2$ games and collective risk games Social learning promotes institutions for governing the commons
Reference 30
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T11:20:51.423388Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-22T06:32:14.747728+00:00.
Observation 2cef909f-3436-41a6-84b5-1e3dc0d8b132 · outbound
This paper cites Combination of institutional incentives for cooperative governance of risky commons.
Cost of institutional incentives for promoting cooperation in $2\times2$ games and collective risk games Combination of institutional incentives for cooperative governance of risky commons
Reference 31
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T11:20:51.410409Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-22T06:32:14.747728+00:00.
Observation 23d5c67d-7c1e-4d8a-a03f-a09fcf2a710d · outbound
This paper cites Mutual trust and cooperation in the evolutionary hawks–doves game.
Cost of institutional incentives for promoting cooperation in $2\times2$ games and collective risk games Mutual trust and cooperation in the evolutionary hawks–doves game
Reference 32
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T11:20:51.396900Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-22T06:32:14.747728+00:00.
Observation f0a2f790-e36f-458d-8e7a-0a6ec1774993 · outbound
This paper cites an unresolved cited work.
Cost of institutional incentives for promoting cooperation in $2\times2$ games and collective risk games Unresolved cited work
Reference 33
- Resolution
- unresolved
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T11:20:51.383683Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-22T06:32:14.747728+00:00.
Observation a893eedf-0f4a-4f1f-b6ab-c1b6a38bbbbb · outbound
This paper cites Van Lange, Bettina Rockenbach, and Toshio Yamagishi.
Cost of institutional incentives for promoting cooperation in $2\times2$ games and collective risk games Van Lange, Bettina Rockenbach, and Toshio Yamagishi
Reference 34
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T11:20:51.371152Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-22T06:32:14.747728+00:00.
Observation c424524a-562d-4ff9-9ac7-c708b837a50c · outbound
This paper cites Partial intervention promotes cooperation and social welfare in regional public goods game.
Cost of institutional incentives for promoting cooperation in $2\times2$ games and collective risk games Partial intervention promotes cooperation and social welfare in regional public goods game
Reference 35
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T11:20:51.357676Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-22T06:32:14.747728+00:00.
Observation ee46648a-0e1a-429a-b60d-6fc48d304fd1 · outbound
This paper cites Exploring optimal institutional incen- tives for public cooperation.
Cost of institutional incentives for promoting cooperation in $2\times2$ games and collective risk games Exploring optimal institutional incen- tives for public cooperation
Reference 36
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T11:20:51.343183Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-22T06:32:14.747728+00:00.
Observation 215dac3b-2763-4761-bef5-5e2a4d7b180d · outbound
This paper cites Decentralized incentives for general well-being in networked public goods game.
Cost of institutional incentives for promoting cooperation in $2\times2$ games and collective risk games Decentralized incentives for general well-being in networked public goods game
Reference 37
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T11:20:51.330889Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-22T06:32:14.747728+00:00.
Observation 70d0f66b-5ce8-4e61-8a21-d28ce13bf755 · outbound
This paper cites Optimization of institutional incentives for cooperation in structured populations.
Cost of institutional incentives for promoting cooperation in $2\times2$ games and collective risk games Optimization of institutional incentives for cooperation in structured populations
Reference 38
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T11:20:51.317923Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-22T06:32:14.747728+00:00.
Observation 37e4c7dd-47ce-4419-b2e1-28bf1cc49a1f · outbound
This paper cites Inverses of cartan matrices of lie algebras and lie superal- gebras.
Cost of institutional incentives for promoting cooperation in $2\times2$ games and collective risk games Inverses of cartan matrices of lie algebras and lie superal- gebras
Reference 39
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T11:20:51.304385Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-22T06:32:14.747728+00:00.
Observation b4da7b88-d41e-4dec-bf8d-912ca2148c78 · outbound
This paper cites Reputation and reciprocity.Physics of Life Reviews , 2023.
Cost of institutional incentives for promoting cooperation in $2\times2$ games and collective risk games Reputation and reciprocity.Physics of Life Reviews , 2023
Reference 40
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T11:20:51.291660Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-22T06:32:14.747728+00:00.
Pith citing papers
No inbound Pith citation observations are available.