Paper Citation Record · LEDGER

Neural Double Auction Mechanism

As of 22 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 24 of 24 outbound references and 1 inbound Pith citation observation for arXiv:2412.11465.

A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.

pith.paper-citation-record.v1
2412.11465 v1

Coverage vector

measured 24 of 24 reference resolution

Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-11T14:58:52.127453Z

measured 25 of 25 standing notices

One-hop event checks from named stored sources.

Source: scholarly_work_events, retraction_status_cache, observed 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00

measured 1 of 1 inbound itemization

Pith citing papers itemized under the disclosed page cap.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-03T19:33:07.765926Z

measured 0 of 1 external citation measurements

A source-named dated measurement, never combined with another source.

Source: cited_works

Reference resolution

24 of 24 outbound references displayed

verified exact0
verified fuzzy19
unresolved5
parse uncertain0
malformed identifier0
metadata mismatch0

External citation measurements

No source-named external measurement is stored.

Outbound references

Observation face7b18-5b05-495e-8f36-95b4b7809a2a · outbound

This paper cites Concurrent auctions across the supply chain.

Neural Double Auction Mechanism Concurrent auctions across the supply chain

Reference 1

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T14:58:52.419467Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation 390fe8ef-94c8-4826-9fdd-658329d37657 · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Neural Double Auction Mechanism Unresolved cited work

Reference 2

Resolution: unresolved; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T14:58:52.409367Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation c2797ba4-248c-4240-b8b8-c87e62b073d4 · outbound

This paper cites Complexity of mechanism design.

Neural Double Auction Mechanism Complexity of mechanism design

Reference 3

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T14:58:52.398748Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation c44985be-8d85-41c0-a4dd-d30f7cfc8684 · outbound

This paper cites Self-interested automated mechanism design and implications for optimal combinatorial auctions.

Neural Double Auction Mechanism Self-interested automated mechanism design and implications for optimal combinatorial auctions

Reference 4

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T14:58:52.388754Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation 6fb43476-25d6-491a-a6cb-f68503f243dd · outbound

This paper cites A scalable neural network for dsic affine maximizer auction design.

Neural Double Auction Mechanism A scalable neural network for dsic affine maximizer auction design

Reference 5

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T14:58:52.378395Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation 172d0682-5b44-4768-b5a9-a4199fb66ca5 · outbound

This paper cites Optimal auctions through deep learning.

Neural Double Auction Mechanism Optimal auctions through deep learning

Reference 6

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T14:58:52.368283Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation fbeec3e7-5dde-4e95-b1a9-7f127084ba81 · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Neural Double Auction Mechanism Unresolved cited work

Reference 7

Resolution: unresolved; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T14:58:52.357193Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation 0c11a588-487b-4740-9489-3f8443f28393 · outbound

This paper cites The Double Auction Market: Institutions, Theories, and Evidence.

Neural Double Auction Mechanism The Double Auction Market: Institutions, Theories, and Evidence

Reference 8

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T14:58:52.346061Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation 7e2544ff-094e-474d-9244-7ca66749ebed · outbound

This paper cites Incentives in teams.

Neural Double Auction Mechanism Incentives in teams

Reference 9

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T14:58:52.334033Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation e3fa67b3-3f57-47ca-a59e-44afbe69f156 · outbound

This paper cites Computationally feasible automated mechanism design: General approach and case studies.

Neural Double Auction Mechanism Computationally feasible automated mechanism design: General approach and case studies

Reference 10

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T14:58:52.321796Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation 044e45f1-51bc-48cb-a054-19406904a180 · outbound

This paper cites Optimal-er auctions through attention.

Neural Double Auction Mechanism Optimal-er auctions through attention

Reference 11

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T14:58:52.309558Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation c2063244-a9bc-4f0f-a8a1-1cec9811e091 · outbound

This paper cites Neural auction: End-to-end learning of auction mechanisms for e-commerce advertising.

Neural Double Auction Mechanism Neural auction: End-to-end learning of auction mechanisms for e-commerce advertising

Reference 12

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T14:58:52.297549Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation ce749b75-8af4-4711-a00e-ea0ba44b63dc · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Neural Double Auction Mechanism Unresolved cited work

Reference 13

Resolution: unresolved; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T14:58:52.285512Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation a3256bbb-9352-4b3a-a9b4-b22b9a116833 · outbound

This paper cites A dominant strategy double auction.

Neural Double Auction Mechanism A dominant strategy double auction

Reference 14

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T14:58:52.273920Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation f06764fa-5083-433f-8caa-4dccfec6e145 · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Neural Double Auction Mechanism Unresolved cited work

Reference 15

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-11T14:58:52.093959Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 1cd1c5cd-d407-4577-9b71-91f55d0df843 · outbound

This paper cites Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading.

Neural Double Auction Mechanism Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading

Reference 16

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T14:58:52.253393Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation ba2af72a-e26e-423a-bb9f-e5e4e34fa196 · outbound

This paper cites Matthew Weinberg.

Neural Double Auction Mechanism Matthew Weinberg

Reference 17

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T14:58:52.241639Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation ebc7f4de-ac5e-4d7b-a469-c0a3ef77f2f7 · outbound

This paper cites Matthew Weinberg.

Neural Double Auction Mechanism Matthew Weinberg

Reference 18

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T14:58:52.230772Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation 90526b19-472d-4f6b-9d03-12278ccc427b · outbound

This paper cites Deep Learning for Two-Sided Matching.

Neural Double Auction Mechanism Deep Learning for Two-Sided Matching

Reference 19

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-11T14:58:52.108439Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 12d81c49-2d71-4da0-891a-3b70a1bb65f8 · outbound

This paper cites Deep false-name-proof auction mechanisms.

Neural Double Auction Mechanism Deep false-name-proof auction mechanisms

Reference 20

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T14:58:52.218844Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation fc6036e7-9055-4b6e-8707-14b375fe5e3e · outbound

This paper cites Automated mechanism design: A new application area for search algorithms.

Neural Double Auction Mechanism Automated mechanism design: A new application area for search algorithms

Reference 21

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T14:58:52.206585Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation 4045e630-faa6-467a-879d-114198198f65 · outbound

This paper cites Automated design of revenue-maximizing combinatorial auctions.

Neural Double Auction Mechanism Automated design of revenue-maximizing combinatorial auctions

Reference 22

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T14:58:52.195397Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation b0761a18-da29-4447-a957-139668071a54 · outbound

This paper cites Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders.

Neural Double Auction Mechanism Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders

Reference 23

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T14:58:52.183990Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation 82d38a14-dd62-4642-9a5b-58a83a61d8fe · outbound

This paper cites Robust double auction protocol against false-name bids.

Neural Double Auction Mechanism Robust double auction protocol against false-name bids

Reference 24

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T14:58:52.172155Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Pith citing papers

Observation 1695faf8-2291-4052-a6ca-0d59a82bee02 · inbound

Truthful and Trustworthy IoT AI Agents via Immediate-Penalty Enforcement under Approximate VCG Mechanisms cites this paper.

Truthful and Trustworthy IoT AI Agents via Immediate-Penalty Enforcement under Approximate VCG Mechanisms Neural Double Auction Mechanism

Reference 32

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-03T19:33:07.765926Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.