pith. sign in

arxiv: 1907.01334 · v1 · pith:HBP7CZSInew · submitted 2019-07-02 · 📡 eess.SP

Bit Error Probability Instead of Secrecy Rate Criterion to Enhance Performance for Secure Wireless Communication Systems

Javad Taghipour , Paeiz Azmi , Nader Mokari , Moslem Forouzesh , Hossein Pishro-Nik This is my paper

Pith reviewed 2026-05-25 10:58 UTC · model grok-4.3

classification 📡 eess.SP
keywords physical layer securitybit error probabilitypower allocationsecrecy rateoutage probabilitysecure wireless communicationadversary users
0
0 comments X

The pith

Bit error probability replaces secrecy rate as the criterion for power allocation in physical layer security, allowing lower transmit power while meeting error targets for both users.

A machine-rendered reading of the paper's core claim, the machinery that carries it, and where it could break.

The paper shows that secrecy rate values alone do not ensure acceptable error rates at the legitimate receiver or high error rates at the adversary. Calculating bit error probability for both parties and allocating power to meet BEP targets produces a workable security scheme that uses less transmit power than rate-based methods. The authors derive an optimum power level from the BEP expressions, introduce a BEP-based outage probability, and verify the approach for unknown-mode and cooperative adversaries. Simulations across scenarios indicate power reductions exceeding 5 dB.

Core claim

BEP can be better criterion for performance evaluation of the physical layer security systems. Based on BEP, the optimum transmit power is obtained and a new definition for outage probability is proposed and obtained theoretically. The proposed method needs more than 5dB lower power for different scenarios.

What carries the argument

Bit error probability (BEP) computed separately for the legitimate user and the adversary, used to set transmit power and to define a new outage probability.

If this is right

  • Optimum transmit power follows directly from chosen BEP thresholds for each user.
  • Outage probability is redefined in terms of BEP rather than secrecy rate.
  • The BEP method extends without change to unknown-mode and cooperative-adversary settings.
  • Power savings greater than 5 dB hold across the tested scenarios.

Where Pith is reading between the lines

These are editorial extensions of the paper, not claims the author makes directly.

  • The same BEP targets could be imposed on top of existing secrecy-rate constraints to create a hybrid allocation rule.
  • The reported power reduction would directly improve battery lifetime or coverage range in energy-limited secure links.
  • Closed-form BEP expressions derived here could be inserted into larger network optimization problems that include multiple users.

Load-bearing premise

Secrecy rate by itself fails to guarantee the actual error performance seen by the legitimate and adversary users.

What would settle it

A direct comparison, in the same channel realizations, of the minimum power needed to reach target BEPs via secrecy-rate optimization versus via BEP optimization; if the secrecy-rate method consistently requires equal or lower power, the claimed advantage disappears.

Figures

Figures reproduced from arXiv: 1907.01334 by Hossein Pishro-Nik, Javad Taghipour, Moslem Forouzesh, Nader Mokari, Paeiz Azmi.

Figure 2
Figure 2. Figure 2: BEP vs. Transmit power. the BEPs for the legitimate receiver and the adversary user have small values and they can be acceptable for some networks or services. Therefore, increasing transmit power to the large values is not recommended in these systems, and it is needed to have some constraints on BEP of the users. 10-6 10-5 10-4 T 1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 Optimum Transmit Power (Watt) E=1 E=2… view at source ↗
Figure 3
Figure 3. Figure 3: The optimum power value for different number of the [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p008_3.png] view at source ↗
Figure 1
Figure 1. Figure 1: The secrecy rate vs. Transmit power. In [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p008_1.png] view at source ↗
Figure 6
Figure 6. Figure 6: The outage probability for cooperative adversary us [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p009_6.png] view at source ↗
Figure 7
Figure 7. Figure 7: Outage probability with channel coding. probability for the cooperative adversary users case is less than that of the adversary users with unknown modes. In the adversary users with the unknown modes, we assume that they send jamming signal to increase the BEP of the legitimate users, and in this case we assume the worst case for the network. Therefore, the outage probability in this case has a larger valu… view at source ↗
Figure 5
Figure 5. Figure 5: The optimum power value for cooperative adversary us [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p009_5.png] view at source ↗
Figure 8
Figure 8. Figure 8: Outage probability with using beamforming and sendi [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p010_8.png] view at source ↗
Figure 9
Figure 9. Figure 9: BEP of the legitimate and adversary users. [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p010_9.png] view at source ↗
read the original abstract

In this paper, we propose a new practical power allocation technique based on bit error probability (BEP) for physical layer security systems. It is shown that the secrecy rate that is the most commonly used in physical layer security systems, cannot be a suitable criterion lonely. Large positive values are suitable for the secrecy rate in physical layer security, but it does not consider the performance of the legitimate and adversary users. In this paper, we consider and analyze BEP for physical layer security systems because based on it, the performance of the legitimate and adversary users are guaranteed and it is needed to use lower power. BEP is calculated for the legitimate and adversary users and it is shown that BEP can be better criterion for performance evaluation of the physical layer security systems. Based on BEP, the optimum transmit power is obtained and a new definition for outage probability is proposed and obtained theoretically. Also, the proposed approach is applied for adversary users with unknown mode and the cooperative adversary users. Simulation results show that the proposed method needs more than 5dB lower power for different scenarios.

Editorial analysis

A structured set of objections, weighed in public.

Desk editor's note, referee report, simulated authors' rebuttal, and a circularity audit. Tearing a paper down is the easy half of reading it; the pith above is the substance, this is the friction.

Referee Report

3 major / 0 minor

Summary. The manuscript proposes using bit error probability (BEP) as a performance criterion and power-allocation metric for physical-layer security systems, arguing that the conventional secrecy rate does not guarantee acceptable error performance for the legitimate receiver or the eavesdropper. It derives the optimal transmit power that satisfies BEP targets for both users, introduces a new BEP-based definition of outage probability, extends the framework to adversaries with unknown operating modes and to cooperative adversaries, and reports simulation results claiming that the BEP-based scheme requires more than 5 dB lower transmit power than secrecy-rate-based allocation across the examined scenarios.

Significance. If the BEP targets can be shown to enforce an information-theoretically comparable security level to a positive secrecy-rate threshold, the work would supply a practical, link-level alternative to secrecy-rate optimization that directly controls error performance while reducing required power. The theoretical derivation of optimal power and the new outage definition, together with the extensions to unknown-mode and cooperative-adversary cases, would constitute a concrete contribution provided they are accompanied by an explicit security-equivalence argument.

major comments (3)
  1. [Abstract] Abstract: the central claim that the BEP-based method achieves equivalent security at >5 dB lower power rests on an unstated mapping between chosen BEP targets for Bob and Eve and the conventional secrecy-rate threshold; without this mapping the reported power saving may reflect a weaker security requirement rather than an improvement.
  2. [Abstract] Abstract: the new BEP-based outage probability is introduced without an explicit relation to the standard secrecy-outage probability P(R_s < R_th); it is therefore unclear whether the new metric enforces a comparable security guarantee.
  3. [Abstract] Abstract: the assertion that secrecy rate 'cannot be a suitable criterion lonely' because it ignores user performance is stated without a concrete counter-example in which a positive secrecy rate coexists with unacceptable BEP for the legitimate or eavesdropper link.

Simulated Author's Rebuttal

3 responses · 0 unresolved

We thank the referee for the constructive comments highlighting the need for clearer connections between the proposed BEP criterion and conventional secrecy-rate metrics. We agree that the abstract would benefit from explicit mappings and examples, and will revise the manuscript accordingly. Below we respond point by point to the major comments.

read point-by-point responses

  1. Referee: [Abstract] Abstract: the central claim that the BEP-based method achieves equivalent security at >5 dB lower power rests on an unstated mapping between chosen BEP targets for Bob and Eve and the conventional secrecy-rate threshold; without this mapping the reported power saving may reflect a weaker security requirement rather than an improvement.

    Authors: We acknowledge that the abstract does not provide an explicit mapping. The BEP targets (low for Bob, near 0.5 for Eve) are chosen to enforce reliable decoding at the legitimate receiver and unreliable decoding at the eavesdropper, which is the practical goal of physical-layer security. In the revision we will add a discussion (likely in Section II or a new subsection) showing the relation: for AWGN channels, BEP_Bob ≤ 10^{-3} and BEP_Eve ≥ 0.4 typically requires a positive secrecy rate under the same SNR conditions. This will clarify that the security level is intended to be comparable while directly controlling link-level performance, and the reported power savings are under these equivalent targets. revision: yes

  2. Referee: [Abstract] Abstract: the new BEP-based outage probability is introduced without an explicit relation to the standard secrecy-outage probability P(R_s < R_th); it is therefore unclear whether the new metric enforces a comparable security guarantee.

    Authors: The new outage is defined as the probability that BEP_Bob exceeds its target or BEP_Eve falls below its target. We agree an explicit relation to P(R_s < R_th) is missing from the abstract and will add it in the revision. Specifically, we will derive the conditions under which the BEP-outage coincides with or bounds the secrecy-outage probability, noting that the BEP formulation directly incorporates the error-performance constraints that secrecy rate alone does not guarantee. revision: yes

  3. Referee: [Abstract] Abstract: the assertion that secrecy rate 'cannot be a suitable criterion lonely' because it ignores user performance is stated without a concrete counter-example in which a positive secrecy rate coexists with unacceptable BEP for the legitimate or eavesdropper link.

    Authors: We agree a concrete counter-example would strengthen the motivation. In the revised manuscript we will insert an example (e.g., in the introduction) showing a high-SNR regime where secrecy rate is positive yet BEP_Bob remains above 10^{-2} due to insufficient link margin, rendering reliable communication impossible despite the positive secrecy rate. This illustrates the practical limitation of relying solely on secrecy rate. revision: yes

Circularity Check

0 steps flagged

No circularity: BEP-based power allocation and outage derived independently from explicit calculations

full rationale

The paper treats BEP as a direct, calculable performance metric for legitimate and eavesdropper users, using it to obtain optimum transmit power and define a new outage probability. These steps rely on standard BEP formulas applied to the system model rather than redefining secrecy rate quantities or fitting parameters that are then renamed as predictions. No self-citations are invoked as load-bearing uniqueness theorems, and the critique of secrecy rate is presented as a modeling preference without any definitional loop. The derivation chain remains self-contained against external benchmarks such as explicit BEP expressions and simulation validation.

Axiom & Free-Parameter Ledger

0 free parameters · 1 axioms · 0 invented entities

Review performed on abstract only; full derivations, channel models, and any fitted parameters are not visible. The ledger therefore records only the high-level modeling assumptions stated in the abstract.

axioms (1)
  • domain assumption BEP calculations for legitimate and adversary users accurately reflect system performance and can be used to guarantee both users' error rates
    Invoked when the authors state that BEP guarantees performance of legitimate and adversary users and leads to lower power.

pith-pipeline@v0.9.0 · 5742 in / 1403 out tokens · 25519 ms · 2026-05-25T10:58:21.185760+00:00 · methodology

discussion (0)

Sign in with ORCID, Apple, or X to comment. Anyone can read and Pith papers without signing in.

Reference graph

Works this paper leans on

33 extracted references · 33 canonical work pages

  1. [1]

    The wire-tap channel,

    A. D. Wyner, “The wire-tap channel,” Bell Syst. Tech. J., vol. 54, no. 8, pp. 1355-1387, Oct. 1975

    work page 1975

  2. [2]

    Secrecy capacity of wir eless channels,

    J. Barros and M. R. D. Rodrigues, “Secrecy capacity of wir eless channels,” in Proc IEEE Int. Symp. Info. Theory Seattle, USA Dec. 2006, pp. 356-360

    work page 2006

  3. [3]

    Security-E nhanced SC- FDMA Transmissions Using Temporal Artificial-Noise and Sec ret Key Aided Schemes,

    M.F. Marzban, A. Shafie, N. Dhahir, R. Hamila “Security-E nhanced SC- FDMA Transmissions Using Temporal Artificial-Noise and Sec ret Key Aided Schemes,” . IEEE Access, pp. 14807 - 14824 Jan. 2019

    work page 2019

  4. [4]

    Secure Trans- mission for Differential Quadrature Spatial Modulation Wi th Artificial Noise,

    Y . Wang, T.Zhan, W.Y ang, G. Guo, Y . Liu, X. Shang, “Secure Trans- mission for Differential Quadrature Spatial Modulation Wi th Artificial Noise,” IEEE Access, V ol. 7, pp. 7641 7650, Dec. 2019

    work page 2019

  5. [5]

    Secure Transmission D esign of Millimeter-Wave Wiretap Channel with Guard Zone and Arti ficial Noise,

    Y . Song, W. Y ang, Z. Xiang, Y . Cai, “Secure Transmission D esign of Millimeter-Wave Wiretap Channel with Guard Zone and Arti ficial Noise,” in proc IEEE International Conference on Wireless Communi- cations, Hangzhou, China, Oct. 2018, pp. 1-6

    work page 2018

  6. [6]

    Relay selection for i mproved security in cognitive relay networks with jamming,

    S. Jia, J. Zhang, H. Zhao, R. Zhang, “Relay selection for i mproved security in cognitive relay networks with jamming,” IEEE Wireless Communications Letters , vol. 6, no. 5, pp. 662-665, Oct. 2017

    work page 2017

  7. [7]

    Secrecy Energy Ef ficiency for MIMO Single-and Multi-Cell Downlink Transmission with Con fidential Messages,

    A. Zappone, P . H. Lin, E. A.Jorswieck. “Secrecy Energy Ef ficiency for MIMO Single-and Multi-Cell Downlink Transmission with Con fidential Messages,” IEEE Transactions on Information F orensics and Security , Jan. 2019

    work page 2019

  8. [8]

    Detection of Jamming A ttack in Non-coherent Massive SIMO Systems,

    S. Xu, W. Xu, C. Pan, M. Elkashlan. “Detection of Jamming A ttack in Non-coherent Massive SIMO Systems,” IEEE Transactions on Informa- tion F orensics and Security, Feb. 2019

    work page 2019

  9. [9]

    Phy sical Layer Secu- rity in Cell-Free Massive MIMO,

    S. Timilsina, D. Kudathanthirige, G.Amarasuriya, “Phy sical Layer Secu- rity in Cell-Free Massive MIMO,” In proc IEEE Global Communications Conference, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, Dec.2018, pp. 1-7

    work page 2018

  10. [10]

    Frien dly jamming for wireless secrecy

    J.P . Vilela, M. Bloch, J. Barros, S. W. Laughlin, “Frien dly jamming for wireless secrecy” in proc IEEE International Conference on Communi- cations, Cape Town, South Africa, May. 2010, pp. 1-6

    work page 2010

  11. [11]

    Physical laye r security in cooperative energy harvesting networks with a friendly jam mer,

    T.M. Hoang, T. Q. Duong, V . Son, C. Kundu, “Physical laye r security in cooperative energy harvesting networks with a friendly jam mer,” IEEE Wireless Communications Letters, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 174-177, Apr. 2017

    work page 2017

  12. [12]

    Secrecy Outage Probability Analysis of Friendly Jammer Selection aided Mu ltiuser Scheduling for Wireless Networks,

    B. Li, Y . Zou, J. Zhou, F. Wang, W. Cao, Y . D. Y ao, “Secrecy Outage Probability Analysis of Friendly Jammer Selection aided Mu ltiuser Scheduling for Wireless Networks,” IEEE Transactions on Commu- nications, Jan. 2019

    work page 2019

  13. [13]

    Y uan, S

    Z. Y uan, S. Wang, K. Xiong, J. Xing, ”Game theoretic jamm ing control for the gaussian interference wiretap channel” in ptoc International Conference on Signal Processing , Hangzhou, China, Oct. 2014, pp. 1749-1754. 11

    work page 2014

  14. [14]

    Solutions for the M IMO Gaussian wiretap channel with a cooperative jammer,

    S. A. Fakooria, A. L. Swindlehurst, “Solutions for the M IMO Gaussian wiretap channel with a cooperative jammer,” IEEE Transactions on signal Processing. vol. 59, no. 10, pp. 5013-5022, Oct. 2011

    work page 2011

  15. [15]

    Artificial noise ass isted secure transmission under training and feedback,

    H.-M. Wang, C. Wang, and D. W. K. Ng, “Artificial noise ass isted secure transmission under training and feedback,” IEEE Transaction Signal Processing, vol. 63, no. 23, pp. 62856298, Dec. 2015

    work page 2015

  16. [16]

    C ooperative jamming protocols in two hop amplify-and-forward wiretap c hannels,

    D. Fang, N. Y ang, M. Elkashlan, P . L. Y eoh, and J. Y uan, “C ooperative jamming protocols in two hop amplify-and-forward wiretap c hannels,” in Proc. IEEE International Conference communication, Budapest, Hun- gary, Nov. 2013, pp. 21882192

    work page 2013

  17. [17]

    Relay s election for secure cooperative networks with jamming,

    I. Krikidis, J. S. Thompson, and S. Mclaughlin, “Relay s election for secure cooperative networks with jamming,” IEEE Transaction Wireless Communication, vol. 8, no. 10, pp. 50035011, Oct. 2009

    work page 2009

  18. [18]

    Joint rela y and jammer selection improves the physical layer security in th e face of CSI feedback delays,

    L. Wang, Y . Cai, Y . Zou, W. Y ang, and L. Hanzo, “Joint rela y and jammer selection improves the physical layer security in th e face of CSI feedback delays,” IEEE Transaction V ehicular Technology, vol. 65, no. 8, pp. 62596274, Aug. 2016

    work page 2016

  19. [19]

    Physic al layer security game: Interaction between source, eavesdropper a nd friendly jammer,

    Z. Han, N. Marina, M. Debbah, and A. Hjorungnes, “Physic al layer security game: Interaction between source, eavesdropper a nd friendly jammer,” Wireless Communication Network, vol. 2009, pp. 452907 1452907-10, Mar. 2009

    work page 2009

  20. [20]

    Destination assiste d cooperative jam- ming for wireless physical layer security,

    Y . Liu, J. Li, and A. P . Petropulu, “Destination assiste d cooperative jam- ming for wireless physical layer security,” IEEE Transaction Information F orensics Security, vol. 8, no. 4, pp. 682694, Apr. 2013

    work page 2013

  21. [21]

    On the secure degrees of freedom of relaying with half-duplex feedback,

    T. T. Kim and H. V . Poor, “On the secure degrees of freedom of relaying with half-duplex feedback,” IEEE Transaction Information Theory, vol. 57, no. 1, pp. 291302, Jan. 2011

    work page 2011

  22. [22]

    Secure transmission for multiuser relay networks,

    S. I. Kim, I. M. Kim, and J. Heo, “Secure transmission for multiuser relay networks,” IEEE Transaction Wireless Communication, vol. 14, no. 7, pp. 37243737, Jul. 2015

    work page 2015

  23. [23]

    Spatially selective artificial-noise ai ded transmit optimization for MISO multi-eves secrecy rate maximizatio n,

    Q. Li, W. K. Ma “Spatially selective artificial-noise ai ded transmit optimization for MISO multi-eves secrecy rate maximizatio n,” IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing , vol. 61, no. 10, pp. 27042717, May. 2013

    work page 2013

  24. [24]

    A novel co operative jamming scheme for wireless social networks without known C SI,

    L. Huang, X. Fan, Y . Huo, C. Hu, Y . Tian, J. Qian “A novel co operative jamming scheme for wireless social networks without known C SI, ” IEEE Access , vol. 5, pp. 26476 - 26486, Nov. 2017

    work page 2017

  25. [25]

    A novel physical laye r security approach in OFDMAMISO networks in the presence of noncooper ative and cooperative adversary users with unknown mode,

    J. Taghipour, P . Azmi, N. Mokari, “A novel physical laye r security approach in OFDMAMISO networks in the presence of noncooper ative and cooperative adversary users with unknown mode,” Transactions on Emerging Telecommunications Technologies, vol. 29, no. 6, Jun. 2018

    work page 2018

  26. [26]

    Artificial-noise-aided transmission in multi-antenna relay wiretap channels with spatially ran dom adversary users,

    C. Liu, N. Y ang, R. Malaney, J. Y uan “Artificial-noise-aided transmission in multi-antenna relay wiretap channels with spatially ran dom adversary users,” IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications vol. 15, no. 11, pp. 7444-7456, Nov. 2016

    work page 2016

  27. [27]

    LDPC codes for the Gaussian wiretap channel,

    D. Klinc, J. Ha, S. W. McLaughlin, J. Barros, B. J. Kwak, “ LDPC codes for the Gaussian wiretap channel, ” IEEE Transactions on Information F orensics and Security vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 532-540 , Sep. 2011

    work page 2011

  28. [28]

    Physical layer security u sing BCH and LDPC codes with adaptive granular HARQ,

    M. H. Taieb, J. Y . Chouinard, “Physical layer security u sing BCH and LDPC codes with adaptive granular HARQ, ” In proc IEEE Communications and Network Security Conference (CNS), Las V egas, NV , USA, Oct. 2019, pp. 564-569

    work page 2019

  29. [29]

    Efficient Secure Channel Coding based on QPP-Block-LDPC Codes,

    W. Guan, and L. Liang. , “Efficient Secure Channel Coding based on QPP-Block-LDPC Codes, ” Wireless Personal Communications, vol. 98, no. 1, pp. 1001-1014, 2018

    work page 2018

  30. [30]

    Zhang LTE Optimization Engineering Handbook, John Wiley & Sons, Jan

    X. Zhang LTE Optimization Engineering Handbook, John Wiley & Sons, Jan. 2018

    work page 2018

  31. [31]

    G. J. Proakis, M. Salehi, Digital communications, McGraw-Hill; 2008

    work page 2008

  32. [32]

    Papoulis, S

    A. Papoulis, S. U. Pillai, Probability, random variables, and stochastic processes, Tata McGraw-Hill Education; 2002

    work page 2002

  33. [33]

    Boyd, and L

    S. Boyd, and L. V andenberghe, Convex Optimization, Cambridge Uni- versity Press, 2004

    work page 2004